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ABSTRACT 
The aim of the thesis is to rebut the dominant autonomy-based defence of hate 
speech within a liberal framework. The thesis argues that liberal egalitarianism is 
compatible with certain restrictions on free speech. I defend the view that liberal 
ideals such as equality and autonomy are, contrary to the arguments of many liberals, 
better achieved by imposing certain restrictions on what citizens are allowed to 
express. 
I examine the problem of freedom of expression in the context of the 
public/private distinction. In particular, I explore the Rawlsian conception of this 
distinction, which is based on the idea that principles of justice apply only to the 
`basic structure of society'. Citizens are required by justice to treat all others as free 
and equal citizens, but this seems to hold only when citizens deliberate about 
`constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice'. In their private lives and other 
social contexts citizens are free to treat other people without equal respect and 
concern, provided that basic rights are not violated. This position is criticised by 
calling attention to recent developments in Social and Cognitive Psychology. 
Evidence suggests that much of our behaviour is triggered by features of the 
environment that bypass individuals' rational control: this includes social 
stereotypes, non-instrumental behaviour, and goal-oriented activity among others. 
I develop these ideas into a discussion of free speech and autonomy. I argue 
that autonomy defences of free speech need to assess how the environment directly 
affects rational processes. Moreover, I argue, given the structure of human cognition, 
there is no guarantee that attitudes and actions cultivated in the private sphere will 
not `spillover' into the public sphere. For this reason, I suggest, political morality 
must also extend to the justice of our private practices. To the extent that autonomy 
and justice matter, I argue that we have reasons to limit the expression of certain 
views, in particular those which trigger processes that bypass rational control. 
Finally, despite the importance I attribute to the concept of autonomy, I reject 
the claim that my position endorses a form of liberal perfectionism. I do so by 
defending a conception of full publicity and demonstrating that the view I articulate 
is compatible with rejecting perfectionism. 
Keywords Automatic Behaviour, Autonomy, Ecological Rationality, Free 




There is a deep divide within liberalism on the subject of freedom of speech. There 
are important controversies about how the best interpretation of liberal values, such 
as equality and justice, relate to issues of free expression. In particular, instances of 
racist and sexist speech are troublesome. Some liberals that endorse equality, such as 
Thomas Scanlon, Thomas Nagel and Ronald Dworkin, are committed to the 
protection of speech even when it challenges the most basic assumption of liberal 
egalitarianism: the idea of moral equality. In this thesis I refute this claim and defend 
a view which conflicts with it. 
Free speech has a peculiar structure. According to a popular liberal view, a 
minimal principle of liberty holds that it is wrong to interfere with the actions of an 
individual so long as they do not harm others. However, a principle of free speech 
extends beyond this, protecting expression even when it is harmful. There are 
various reasons offered to support this. Popular examples include the claims that free 
speech is necessary for advancing the truth, that it is a necessary component of a 
democratic regime, that its restriction risks a slippery slope which threatens the 
minimal principle of liberty, or that it is necessary for the pro4notion and protection 
of personal autonomy. It is the last of these that is the focus of this thesis. 
Autonomy figures prominently in the justification of political morality which 
forms the background of this work. I argue that individuals have a fundamental 
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interest in developing an effective sense of justice and in living in an autonomous 
manner. The basic framework within which the argument of this thesis is developed 
is detailed in Chapter 1.1 explain the peculiar structure of freedom of speech and 
explore the reasons upon which its autonomy-based defence is prima facie attractive. 
I review the defence of free speech in conjunction of considerations of the popular 
public/private distinction, and suggest that criticisms of this distinction might also be 
applied to controversies of speech. I identify two problems. First, there is an issue 
regarding the `site' of justice. Should political principles only apply to coercive 
institutions, or should they also inform the discrete actions of private citizens? 
Second, there is an increasing amount of academic evidence which suggest that 
many forms of behaviour are caused directly by features of the environment. That is, 
some of our actions are not the result of acts of will, but, rather, caused by external 
stimuli. I suggest that the behaviour's automaticity challenges the public/private 
distinction by highlighting that (at least) some of an individual's actions are not 
completely under her control, and, therefore that she might not be able to respond 
differently in different realms as justice requires. 
The second chapter explores the notion of autonomy which underlies 
defences of free speech. In particular I seek to answer the question: how can we 
reconcile the idea of personal autonomy with the fact that much of our behaviour 
occurs automatically? I argue that, in order to accommodate the challenges derived 
from unconscious processing, we need to make certain revisions to some of the 
conditions for autonomy. 
Discussions of free speech sometimes distinguish between the various 
interests actors have in expression. In Chapter 31 ask whether it is always beneficial 
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for an audience for speech to be protected. To address this question I discuss a 
famous argument provided by Thomas Scanlon. I conclude that, although it seems 
free speech is, in general, beneficial to audiences, it can also have bad consequences. 
Should it not be in an audience's interests to neutralise forms of speech that affect us 
in non-autonomous ways? I suggest that it is, and defend the view through a 
contractualist argument. 
Nevertheless, it is arbitrary to favour only the interests of an audience; theirs 
are not the only ones at stake. In Chapter 41 turn my attention to the other significant 
interests in free speech: those of speakers. Perhaps, even if audiences are better 
protected by speech restrictions, speakers' expressive interests trump the former, 
rendering restrictions illegitimate. There seem to be two approaches by which this 
conflict can be addressed. On the one hand, it might be suggested that we must 
balance the two interests and adjudicate between them according to which side's 
interests are more significant. On the other hand, one might argue that the interests 
of speakers are conditional upon their being just. I favour the second response, and 
employ Dworkin's account of ethical integrity to defend this view. 
The arguments developed to this point could reasonably suggest to some a 
form of liberal perfectionism. In Chapter 51 attempt to dispel such an impression. I 
defend a qualified version of political liberalism based on a Rawlsian condition of 
full publicity. This version is anti-perfectionist, but remains concerned with 
protecting autonomy. 
In the last chapter I explore a different liberal institution, whose defence 
resembles, in several important aspects, that of speech: free association. I itemise 
some `associational goods' and explore whether associations which have racist 
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admissions policies or a `racist agenda' could be defended by appealing to such 
goods. Nancy Rosenblum argues they could, asserting that an association is to be 
assessed exclusively on the impact it has on its members. I criticise this view posing 
the question: Can attitudes cultivated in private be detrimental to the development of 
citizens' two moral powers? If so, then perhaps we should re-think the relationship 
between moral development and free association. I suggest that associational goods 
can be produced in a manner consistent with justice if the practices of associations 
are constrained by a condition of reasonableness, and its admissions policies are 
justifiable by public reasons. 
Rawls writes that some unreasonable doctrines must be contained `like war 
or disease' I. The task of this thesis is to defend an argument according to which 
restrictions on racist speech are compatible with autonomy and justice. In this 
respect, restrictions of speech are legitimate means to contain racist doctrines. The 
position I defend is not complete. Clearly, autonomy and justice are not the only 
relevant moral concerns in adjudicating on speech regulation, and perhaps they are 
not decisive. A complete defence must wait for another time. 
The thesis is also incomplete in another respect. This is only a first attempt to 
articulate an ecological account of liberalism. Disciplines other than political theory 
are developing a deeper understanding of the nature of rationality and the 
relationship between human cognition and the environment. These advances suggest 
that the need to revise some of the associations liberals assume between liberal 
institutions (such as freedom of speech and association) and liberal values (such as 
John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 64, n. 19. 
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justice, autonomy, equality). How deep these revisions must be remains an open 
question. What seems clear, though, is that, as Susan Hurley writes `if liberal values 
are to survive and flourish in the face of these discoveries, we need to begin to link 
questions about how we make up our minds with questions about how our minds are 
made up' 2. 
2 Susan Hurley, 'Bypassing Conscious Control: Unconscious Imitation, Media Violence, and Freedom 
of Speech', in Pockett, S., W. Banks and S. Gallagher (eds. ) Does Consciousness Cause Behavior 
(Cambridge. MA: MIT Press, 2006), 327. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE PRINCIPLE OF FREE SPEECH AND THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE 
DISTINCTION 
In this chapter, I explore some of the basic ideas of political morality upon which 
the thesis will operate. The discussion is necessarily sketchy and short; most 
arguments are stated and discussed in more detail in later chapters. In the first 
section I review a popular liberal idea: the harm principle. I examine what 
constitutes harm with reference to Joel Feinberg's analysis. In the second section, I 
explore the relationship between the harm principle and free speech. I rehearse two 
popular strategies for defending the right to unrestricted expression and conclude 
that a free speech principle needs to be different and independent of other political 
principles. Among the different defences of speech I highlight one based on 
autonomy and I explain the reasons for this focus. 
In the third section I connect the notion of autonomy with the public/private 
distinction in two different ways. First, I argue that liberalism assumes a primacy of 
private responsibility (which I call a principle of discontinuous responsibility), 
according to which autonomy is a constraint on governmental action. Second, I 
consider Rawls's political liberalism emphasising the contrast between public and 
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non-public reasons. I argue that both aspects of the public/private distinction appear 
to support a principle of free speech. 
The fourth section presents a number of objections raised against this 
distinction. The first regards Rawls's views about the `site' of justice and is based 
on the work of G. A. Cohen. The second emerges from important developments of 
Cognitive and Social Psychology. I highlight that, in virtue of bypassing 
autonomous control, a significant part of our behaviour threatens the possibility of 
public reason. Also, contrary to what the principle of discontinuous responsibility 
suggests, rational agency has a public, rather than private, origin. In section five, I 
consider the importance of racist speech that motivates this thesis. 
I 
The Harm Principle 
Many liberals think that the government is barred from interfering with people's 
activities unless such actions harm third parties. This idea was formulated by John 
Stuart Mill, who famously wrote that `the only purpose for which power might 
rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will 
is to prevent harm to others' 1. This is what has become known as the `harm 
principle'. In a contemporary treatment, Joel Feinberg argues that in order to 
constitute a harm (in the relevant sense) an action must be a setback of certain 
interests2. 
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 14. 
2 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Others (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1984). 33-6. 
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Things people are said to have interests in are those components of their 
well-being in which they have a stake. Accordingly, the person `flourishes or 
languishes as [their interests] flourish or languish'3. A person has interests in many 
different things, and the importance of an interest varies in relation to the way it 
promotes or thwarts her well-being. One can distinguish between two kinds of 
interests. On the one hand, a person has an interest in doing things she wishes to do. 
Call this category `volitional interests'. On this late spring evening I want an ice- 
cream, and my volitional well-being will increase if I have one, and it will increase 
it only for that reason. I recognise that my interest in eating ice-cream is wholly 
dependant on my craving for it. But other interests are of a different kind. These 
interests are independent from wants in the sense that a person has them even if she 
ignores or rejects them. Call these interests `critical interests'4. A person's life goes 
better and her critical well-being is increased if such interests are satisfied, and the 
reason an individual (in general) desires these things is because she acknowledges 
they will do so. 
John Rawls's conceptualisation of the person assumes that, as free and equal 
moral agents, she has two fundamental moral powers: one is the capacity for an 
effective sense of justice; the other is the capacity to develop a conception of the 
good. Accordingly, a person has two critical, `highest-order' 5, interests in 
exercising those powers. First, the capacity for a sense of justice `is the capacity to 
understand, to apply, and to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the 
Ibid. 34. 
4 Ronald Dworkin highlights this distinction. See Ronald Dworkin, 'Foundations of Liberal Equality', 
in Darwall, S. (ed) Equal Freedom: Selected Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1995). 229-34. I will return to this distinction in Chapter 4. 
5 John Rawls, `Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', in his Collected Papers (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), 3l2. 
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principles of political justice that specify the fair terms of social cooperation'. 
Second, the capacity for a conception of the good is `the capacity to have, to revise, 
and to rationally pursue a conception of the good. Such a conception is an ordered 
family of final ends and aims which specifies a person's conception of what is of 
value in human life '6 
This second interest is intimately related to the idea of autonomy. One of the 
conditions of autonomy is that a person should be able to identify and critically 
revise her ends and goals7. The harm principle, then, attributes special significance 
to these interests and stipulates that actions which threaten or interfere with their 
satisfaction (or with the satisfaction of other interests instrumental to them) are 
harmful in the relevant sense. On this definition, a person also has interests in 
things the setback of which is not relevant for a conception of harms. In the 
following chapters, I will argue that the interests racists have in speech are not of 
the kind protected by this principle, and, as such, that restricting the expression of 
racist views does not constitute harm. 
Feinberg's characterisation of the harm principle includes a second 
condition, according to which an action is harmful if interests are setback in a 
wrongful manner. This condition seems to be required in order to exclude situations 
6 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2001), 18-9. 
Rawls argues that these interests belong to a political conception of the person, rather than a moral or 
a psychological conception. See further development in Chapters 2 and 3. See also Rawls, J. Political 
Liberalism, 18-9,29-35. 
' Liberal writers such as Galston and Kukathas do not share this concern for autonomy. In the future 
I refer to as `liberals' those who regard it as important. Presumably, authors who do not value 
autonomy would defend speech by other reasons, such as democracy or truth. Cf. William Galston, 
Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002): Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A 
Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
8A complete theory of harm needs to give criteria by which we can distinguish which interests are 
covered by the harm principle. This task, though, extends beyond the limits of this thesis. 
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in which someone's well-being is worsened as a result of another's action, but in 
which the result is not morally objectionable, as Robert Nozick's unlucky suitor 
exemplifies9. According to Feinberg, both conditions are necessary for an action to 
count as harm, and to make permissible governmental intervention. 
This condition, however, raises an important problem. By making wrongful 
action necessary for harm, it moralises the principle in a manner that restricts its 
use. For instance, imagine Colin, a perfectionist who forces Maggie to go to the 
opera rather than the movies. Most liberals will agree that Colin harms Maggie by 
not letting her live according to her own values. Nevertheless, Colin might argue 
that he does not violate the harm principle. Although he does setback Maggie's 
interests in cinema, he does not do so wrongfully. After all, going to the opera only 
makes Maggie's life better. In this respect Feinberg's second condition is 
undetermined; we still need an elaboration of the criteria for wrongfulness. This 
difficulty is not crucial to the argument I develop in this thesis because 
understanding harm as a setback of interests in justice and autonomy suffices for 
the argument to be sustained. Moreover, the argument does not claim that 
restrictions on hate speech are acceptable because the views expressed are wrong, 
but only in virtue of the consequences on citizens' two highest-order moral 
interests. 
The harm principle establishes a minimal presumption for liberty: 
governmental intervention is justified only when an action set back certain interests 
(namely, those necessary for developing a sense of justice and living an 
autonomous life). In other words, an individual should be free to do whatever she 
9 Robert Nozick, . Anarchy. State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 237. 
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wants except those actions which harm (or put at considerable risk of harm) third 
parties. As Kent Greenawalt states, `government should not prohibit people from 
acting as they wish unless it has a positive reason to do so. The ordinary reason for 
prohibiting action is that the action is deemed harmful or potentially harmful in 
some respect' 10 
II 
Speech and Harm: Minimalism and Maximalisml 
The relation between the harm principle and free speech 12 is not a straightforward 
one. The idea that speech must be free from intervention could be either an 
instantiation of the more general harm principle (a minimalist strategy), or an 
independent principle (a maximalist approach). 
Minimalism 
In general minimalists argue that expressive activities are covered by the harm 
principle 13: their main claim is that speech does not harm third parties and, being 
thus consistent with the harm principle, it must be protected. There are two main 
variants within this strategy. The most radical, `no-cost minimalism' 14, claims that 
10 Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989). 9. 
1 This taxonomy comes from Joshua Cohen, 'Freedom of Expression', Philosophy and Public Affairs 
22 (1993), 217-22. 
12 In this thesis I use `free speech', `freedom of speech' and `freedom of expression' interchangeably. 
13 I say `in general' because there might be ways of defending an independent principle of free 
speech within a minimalist strategy, although minimalism does not require that step. For it, speech 
must be protected as part of the harm principle. Cf. Cohen, `Freedom of Expression', 218. 
14 This term comes from Susan Brison, 'Speech, Harm, and the Mind-Body Problem in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence', Legal Theory 4 (1998), 42-3. 
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`there can be no legitimate reason to curtail [freedom of expression] since its 
possession and its exercise do no one any harm' 15 . Famously, Justice Antonin 
Scalia, stated that `[s]ticks and stones will break my bones [... ] but words can never 
hurt me' 16. According to this view, speech, unlike other forms of action, cannot 
cause harm because it is always mentally mediated17. By mental mediation, it is 
usually meant that communication is always rationally evaluated, and that the ways 
in which speech affects agents' preferences and beliefs are always assessed by 
critical reflection. In this view, mental mediation neutralises the would-be harmful 
effects of speech. 
Another version of minimalism ('low-cost minimalism') holds that, 
although speech has some costs, these are always redressable by `more, and better 
speech' 18. The thought here is that whatever harm speech does cause, it can always 
be outweighed by `positive' speech. 
Imagine a person is racially insulted, and, as a result, she is shocked. How 
would these two versions of minimalism respond to this situation? No-cost 
minimalism denies that the person is harmed in the relevant sense: advocates would 
probably accept that she is offended, but will argue that offence does not suffice for 
governmental intervention 19. They will also argue that she is responsible for her 
15 Joseph Raz, `Freedom of Expression and Personal Identification', in his Ethics in the Public 
Domain (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 147. Notice, though, that Raz does not endorse this view. 
16 Quoted by Brison, 'Speech, Harm, and the Mind-Body Problem in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence', 39. Brison also quotes Judge Wood who writes `[i]t may also be well to remember 
that often "words die away - leaving no taste, no color, no smell, not a trace'. Ibid. 43. 
17 The problem of mental mediation will be discussed later, first in relation to responsibility (Chapter 
3), and later I will discuss empirical evidence showing that the claim is false; indeed a good amount 
of speech bypasses mental control. 
18 Brison, `Speech, Harm, and the Mind-Body Problem in First Amendment Jurisprudence', 43. For a 
list of different -unsuccessful- arguments used in defending minimalism see Ibid. 42-47. 
19 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Offense to Others (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985). 
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own reaction: just as she can exercise some control over her preferences and 
beliefs, she could have controlled her response. Low-cost minimalism, on the other 
hand, does not deny that she may be harmed, but it argues that harm can be rectified 
through `more, better speech'20, by discrediting the racist, or by helping her in other 
ways. She can be counselled and, through mental effort, the damages will 
disappear. In this sense, speech is not sufficiently harmful as to warrant 
interference. 
The important point in this discussion of minimalism is that it does not give 
positive reasons for protecting speech. It merely shows that speech warrants 
protection under the harm principle. As Susan Brison writes: `both "no-cost/low- 
cost" accounts of speech fail to perform the job they are supposed to do, namely to 
provide a plausible basis for the First Amendment, since they do not say what is 
special about speech such that it merits heightened constitutional protection' 21. It 
seems that if no cost/low cost accounts were tenable, then free speech would be no 
different to the minimal principle of liberty. 
Maximalism 
Some people are not convinced by minimalism. They want to protect speech 
beyond the harm principle. That is, to furnish it with an independent justification. 
This seems to be the natural way to read, for instance, the First Amendment to the 
US Constitution 22. This position holds that it is not enough to show that speech 
20 I will discuss this strategy in Chapter 5. 
2! Brison, 'Speech, Harm, and the Mind-Body Problem in First Amendment Jurisprudence', 47. 
2' The First Amendment the US Constitution is a paradigmatic example of a strong principle of free 
speech. 
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causes harm because there are good reasons to protect it beyond the harm principle. 
As Schauer argues 
The Free Speech principle is an exception or qualification, of no necessary 
size or strength, to the general rule in force under a particular political theory 
[say, the harm principle]. When a Free Speech Principle is accepted, there is a 
principle according to which speech is less subject to regulation [... ] than 
other forms of conduct having the same or equivalent effects23. 
Maximalism holds that `expression merits stringent protection because its great 
value guarantees that the benefits of protection trump the costs' 24. According to this 
view, then, there are reasons to protect speech even when speech violates the harm 
principle. What are these reasons? 
A popular argument is that free speech is a necessary condition if we are to 
discover truths25; truth searching requires no opinion or idea to be excluded from 
discussion. This argument has been combined with different levels of fallibilism26, 
mainly claiming that, because it is possible for at least some of our beliefs to be 
false, we should not exclude speech from the `marketplace' of ideas. 
Another argument holds that speech is to be protected in order to preserve 
democracy. Self-government requires that citizens are able to discuss and deliberate 
about their beliefs and preferences, and censoring speech can thwart the processes 
by which democratic decisions are made (for instance, by removing ideas from the 
23 Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982), 7. However, this view has been criticised by Larry Alexander, Is There a Right of 
Freedom of Expression? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). He examines different 
rationales for a principle of free speech and concludes that none are convincing. His claim is not 
minimalist, but essentially originates from the belief that liberal governments cannot be neutral in 
the sense required for such a principle. 
24 Cohen, 'Freedom of Expression', 220. 
25 Cf. Mill, On Liberty, Chapter'-?. 
26 Cf. Alan Haworth, 'On Mill, Infallibility, and Freedom of Expression', Res Publica 13 (2007). 77- 
100. 
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agenda, and so on)27. In support of this view, Owen Fiss argues that `[t]he purpose 
of free speech is [ ... ]the preservation of 
democracy, and the right of a people, as a 
people, to decide what kind of life it wishes to live [ ... ]. We allow people speak so 
others can vote' 28. 
Although these arguments are popular, many liberals29 instead defend free 
speech on grounds of autonomy30. They think that if individuals are to be respected 
as moral, autonomous agents, then a strong right of free expression must be 
guaranteed. Normally this defence of free speech has a natural connection with a 
maximalist strategy, for these authors think that respecting autonomy trumps the 
harms speech can cause. As Raz explains, some people think that freedom of 
expression `lies at the heart of people's humanity, [it] is a requirement of 
personhood or rationality' 31. In this respect, George Kateb argues 
Freedom of expression is not, then, properly conceptualised as a means or 
instrument for persons who exercise it [... ]. Whatever the goals we attain by 
expression are [... ] conceptually secondary. The primary notion is that a lot of 
the time, one is one's expression, one lives to express, one lives by expressing. 
One does not merely use speech; one is one's speech; one's life is mostly 
speech. [... ] To be free, one must express oneself freely and freely receive the 
27 Cf. Cass Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: Free Press, 1993); 
Owen Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
28 Owen Fiss, Liberalism Divided (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 13. 
29 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Ronald 
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2000); Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006); Thomas Nagel, 'Personal Rights and Public Sphere', in Concealment and 
Exposure (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 31-52; Thomas Scanlon, 'A Theory of 
Freedom of Expression', in The Difficulty of Tolerance (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press, 
2003). 6-25; Thomas Scanlon, 'Freedom Of Expression and Categories of Expression' in The 
Difficulty of Tolerance, 84-112; Rawls, Political Liberalism, Lecture VIII. 
30 Susan Brison, The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech', Ethics 108 (1998), 312-39. 
31 Raz, 'Freedom of Expression and Personal Identification', 147. 
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free expression of one's fellows. Freedom of expression is not the whole of 
freedom, but its soul' 32 
Or, from a listener's perspective, the thought is that, if individuals are to develop a 
sense of justice and a conception of the good, governments must not prevent them 
from hearing different opinions or communicating their own. 
In this thesis I will primarily address the autonomy-based defence of speech. 
I do so for a number of reasons. First, the relation between autonomy and speech is 
intrinsically linked to liberal political morality. As noted above, the liberal 
conception of the person involves an idea of autonomy33. Second, we generally 
think autonomy has significant value. It might not be the only value and it might 
not always outweigh others, but it is of great importance nevertheless. If there are 
reasons of autonomy to protect free speech, then those reasons are weighty, and not 
easily trumped. If, on the other hand, autonomy does not establish a right to free 
speech, then the case for the latter is weakened. We would then need to explore 
other arguments, such as truth or democracy, for its protection. Third, other 
justifications for free speech are (in part or wholly) dependent on the autonomy 
defence. This seems especially so in the argument from democracy34. One of the 
reasons we believe democracy to be valuable is that it (more or less) reconciles the 
ideal of people being free and, at the same time, subject to political authority35 
32 George Kateb, `The Value of Association', in A. Gutmann (ed) Freedom of Association 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 53. 
33 This claim is controversial: I am not arguing that liberals believe autonomy to be the most 
important (or only) value, but rather that some notion of autonomy is necessary. The intuition that 
agents are able to reflect and decide (within the constraints of their social circumstances) about what 
is valuable in their lives is one shared by many liberals. Clearly, the notion of autonomy can be 
thicker or thinner, political or comprehensive, but, ultimately, they are all conceptions of autonomy. 
34 Cf. Fiss. Liberalism Divided, 13. He says that the reasons for speech are democratic and not 
autonomy dependent. 
35 The classical indictment of this idea comes from Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who writes that the 
fundamental problem is `to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole 
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Democracy's appeal is, in essence, a function of the manner in which it promotes 
and/or respects (some sense of) autonomy. Fourth, some other defences of free 
expression seem not to apply to hate speech. There is no relation, for instance, 
between truth and racist speech. If the former were the only reason to defend free 
speech, it is not inconceivable that liberals would support restrictions to the latter. 
For them, hate speech is to be protected on grounds of autonomy, not knowledge. 
Moreover, some forms of racist speech are not themselves presented as truths: a 
Neo-Nazi parade is a manifestation of attitudes, rather than epistemic propositions. 
That is why liberals justify protection on the basis of autonomy rather than truth. 36 
One important clarification is required before we continue. Sometimes 
people make a distinction between speech and other forms of conduct37. This 
distinction is, however, unhelpful in understanding how `speech' is used in the 
literature. There are many examples of speech not covered by the free speech 
principle such as falsely shouting `fire' in a theatre, speaking loudly in libraries, or 
yelling in avalanche-risk zones, and so on. These do not count as `speech' in the 
common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with 
all, might still obey himself alone and remain as free as before'. Jean-Jacques Rousseau `The Social 
Contract' in The Social Contract and other Discourses, (London: Everyman, 1993), 191. 
36 Racist science is indubitably false; there is sufficient scientific evidence showing that the racial 
differences defended by racists simply do not exist. The same holds for Holocaust Deniers. Their 
arguments have been thoroughly discredited in academia. Cf. Deborah Lipstadt, Denying the 
Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory (London: Penguin, 1994); Michael Shermer, 
and Alex Grobman Denying History: Who Says the Holocaust Never Happened and Why They Say 
It? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Richard Evans, Lying About Hitler: History, the 
Holocaust and the David Irving Trial (New York: Basic Books, 2001); Catriona McKinnon, 'Should 
We Tolerate Holocaust Denial'. Res Publica 13 (2007), 9-28. 
37 Both minimalists and maximalists can accept this distinction, although they will take opposite 
sides in how it is assessed: the latter will say that speech is too important to be regulated (speech's 
transcendental value outweighs other forms of `physical' behaviour), the former will say that speech 
is innocuous and cannot hurt (as in the 'sticks and stones' view). 
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relevant sense: in terms of the `free speech doctrine' they are only noise38. On the 
other hand, other forms of conduct usually not regarded as `speech' receive 
protection under a free speech principle: pictures, films, burning flags, silent 
protestations, graffiti, etc. In this sense `speech' is a term of art used to describe 
items that fall under the reasons for protecting speech39. The distinction can also be 
challenged at a more general level by noting that speech is in fact a form of action 
and that we can `do things' with it40. Through speech we perform actions and bring 
about new states of affairs. By saying `I do', one can get married and create new 
rights and obligations. Under certain conditions uttering some words might scare, 
intimidate or subordinate others. Conversely, other forms of conduct can have a 
communicative dimension, and might mean things to us. Preparing a sandwich 
`communicates' that I am hungry, rushing out of the library `means' that I am late, 
and so on. Trying to understand `free speech' while employing this distinction is 
not likely to succeed41 
III 
Free Speech and the Public/Private Distinction 
There is a relation between the public/private distinction and the idea of autonomy 
important for understanding the liberal defence of free speech. Liberals hold that 
autonomy places a constraint on the coercive use of government's action. There is a 
38 Cf. R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U. S. (1992) 377. 
39 Hurley. 'Bypassing Conscious Control', 317. 
40 Two classic works on the subject are John Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1962); and John Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969). 
41 Scanlon, `A Theory of Freedom of Expression', 9. 
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distinction between two realms: the private sphere, in which government has no 
right to interfere, and the public sphere in which governmental intervention is not 
illegitimate. Although there are different ways of differentiating these two spheres, 
for the sake of the argument defended two are especially important. 
One sense of the distinction gives private responsibility a special priority 
over governmental intervention 42. According to this principle we can distinguish 
between the direct and indirect effects of an agent's actions. The priority of private 
responsibility states that a person is to be held responsible only for the direct effects 
of her actions. It is to be understood, that is, as `discontinuous'43. For instance, John 
sells a gun to Eva; the following week Eva shoots Jim dead. According to the 
principle of discontinuous responsibility it is only Eva (not John) who can be held 
responsible44. The reasoning for this is that, although John's action indirectly 
harmed Jim, it was Eva who directly killed Jim45. An example of the priority of 
private responsibility argument is Ronald Dworkin's `ethical individualism'. One of 
its dimensions holds that `each person has a special responsibility for realizing the 
success of his own life, a responsibility that includes exercising his judgement 
42 The relation between responsibility and autonomy is that the former is necessary but not sufficient 
for the latter. Only responsible agents can be autonomous, but not every responsible agent is 
autonomous. 
4; Susan Hurley calls this principle `the principle of proximal agency' `Public Ecology of 
Responsibility', (2006), Unpublished paper. 
44 This view is different from what Nozick calls the `bucket theory of responsibility'. This model 
holds that there is a fixed amount of responsibility for each act. If we hold Eva fully responsible for 
shooting Jim, there would be no responsibility left to attribute to John. According to this model if we 
wanted to hold John (partly responsible) for Jim's death, then we would need to subtract that amount 
of responsibility from Eva's, such as if the amount of responsibility for the act is `Tr', then John's 
responsibility `Jr' plus Eva's responsibility `Er' must equal `Tr' (Tr= Jr+Er, or Jr=Tr-Er). The 
model is clearly mistaken `because responsibility is not a bucket in which less remains when some is 
apportioned out'. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 130. 
45 This principle leads naturally to a defence of free speech: A expresses a view. After being 
convinced by it, B acts in a way that harms C. According to this principle, only B is responsible. not 
A. Cf. my assessment of T. Scanlon's `Millian Principle' in Chapter 3. 
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about what kind of life would be successful for him'46. Responsibility and 
autonomy place limits on governmental action: an individual's responsibility for 
her actions renders paternalistic policies illegitimate47 
Another (related) popular sense in which the public/private distinction is 
employed within liberalism is connected to Rawls's idea of `public reason'. He 
argues that special constraints apply to the reasons citizens can legitimately offer 
each other when making certain political decisions. Public reasons are those 
acceptable to reasonable citizens in an `overlapping consensus'. An overlapping 
consensus, according to Rawls, means that a `political' conception of justice `is 
supported by the reasonable though opposing religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines that gain a significant body of adherents and endure over time from one 
generation to the next'48. Because Rawls thinks that in a well-ordered society the 
free use of practical reason will lead to a `reasonable pluralism' of comprehensive 
and controversial doctrines, the only way in which a government's use of coercive 
power might be acceptable to citizens (who disagree about their conceptions of the 
good) is if it is being justified independently of any of those comprehensive 
doctrines49. A political conception of justice is worked out as to be acceptable to 
reasonable citizens. To qualify as a `political' conception, a conception of justice 
46 Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?, 10. I will have more to say about Dworkin's defence of 
free speech in Chapter 3. 
" Or at least make them problematic: in order to be acceptable, paternalism needs special 
justification. I will discuss further issues related to paternalism in Chapters 3 and 4. 
48 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 32. 
49 This very much simplifies Rawls's position, though I will return to these ideas in greater in due 
course. See his Political Liberalism, Introduction, Lectures II and IV; John Rawls, `The Idea of 
Public Reason Revisited' in The Laic of Peoples and the "Idea of Public Reason Revisited" 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 131-80; and John Rawls, `The Domain of the 
Political and Overlapping Consensus' in his Collected Papers, 473-96. 
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must have three features. First, its specific subject is the `basic structure of a 
constitutional democratic regime' 50 . 
Thus, Rawls argues that 
the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, 
the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights 
and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation. 
By major institutions I understand the political constitution and the principal 
economic and social arrangements. Thus the legal protection of freedom of 
thought and liberty of conscience, competitive markets, private property in the 
means of production, and the monogamous family are examples of major 
social institutions51 
The specific subject of a conception of justice is distinguished from general moral 
theories, which `appl[y] to a wide range of subjects, and in the limit to all subjects 
universally' 52. While a political conception is public (in the sense that its scope is 
restricted to political actions), a general conception applies to both the public and 
the private. The latter provides guidelines about how to behave in relation to one's 
friends, family, private associations, career, etc. 53 
The second feature of a political conception of justice is that its acceptance 
`does not presuppose accepting any particular comprehensive doctrine' 54. Due to 
the `fact of reasonable pluralism'55, a conception of justice must not be derived 
from any comprehensive doctrine; otherwise it would not be acceptable to all 
reasonable citizens. Although it is `freestanding' 56, this does not mean that it cannot 
50 Rawls, `The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus', 480. 
51 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 6. 
52 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 13. 
53 I will briefly discuss the problems related with the `site' of justice in section IV. 
54 Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus', 480. 
55 Rawls. Political Liberalism. 36. 
56 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 13. 
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be derived from, or supported by, comprehensive doctrines. It does demand, 
though, that its acceptance does not commit persons to accept any particular 
doctrine. A political conception can form the basis for an overlapping consensus 
only if this condition is satisfied. 
The third feature of a political conception of justice is that it `is formulated 
as far as possible solely in terms of certain fundamental intuitive ideas viewed as 
implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society'57. Rawls sees his 
own conception, justice as fairness, as embodying the values of freedom and 
equality as have been developed in recent centuries58. What kind of justifications 
can citizens offer each other when fundamental political issues arise? Rawls's 
answer is that 
[c]itizens must be able [... ] to present one another publicly acceptable reasons 
for their political views in cases raising fundamental political questions. This 
means that our reasons must fall under the political values expressed by a 
political conception of justice. If free and equal persons are to cooperate 
politically on a basis of mutual respect, we must justify our use of corporate 
and coercive power, where those essentials matters are at sake, in the light of 
public reason 
59 
Among the different aspects of public reason, two are relevant here: the first 
concerns the relevant sort of questions and subject; the other specifies the persons 
to whom it applies. First, Rawls argues that the subject of public reason is `the 
public good concerning questions of fundamental political justice [which are two 
57 Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus', 480. 
58 In his recent book, Dworkin argues that `in spite of the popular opinion, [Americans] actually can 
find shared principles of sufficient substance to make a national political debate possible and 
profitable' Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?, 6. Notice, however, that Dworkin's theory is not 
a political conception in the Rawlsian sense 
59 Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 91. 
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kinds], constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice'60. Second, public 
reason applies only to the `public political forum', which comprises `the discourse 
of judges in their decisions', `the discourse of government officials' and `the 
discourse of candidates for public office'61. It does not apply to the `background 
culture' comprised of civic society, private associations, churches, universities, or 
the media62. It is worth noting here that legislators are not bound to honour the ideal 
of public reason in all decisions. If public reason is restricted to questions relating 
to the basic structure (constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice), then it 
seems that legislators can use non-public reasons when deciding whether to fund a 
public park, build a sport centre, a parking lot or an opera venue. In representative 
democracies, the ideal of public reason applies to citizens when voting for their 
representatives and, if there are any, referenda and other democratic procedures. 
Ideally, citizens must think of themselves as legislators `and ask themselves what 
statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they 
would think it most reasonable to enact' 63 
How does the public/private distinction relate to the protection of hate 
speech? On the one hand, an overlapping consensus demands racist views be 
excluded from political discussions. Given that citizens reasonably reject the 
content of those opinions, they cannot be used as justification for policies. In this 
sense, hate speech will not be tolerated in the public sphere. On the other hand, 
however, and perhaps more importantly, it seems that within the background 
culture there could be no restrictions on speech. If there are sound reasons to defend 
60 Rawls, `The Idea of Public Reason Revisited', 133. 
61 Ibid. 133. 
62 Ibid. 134. 
63 Ibid. 135. 
23 
CHAPTER 1 The Principle of Free Speech and the Public/Private Distinction 
a free speech principle then it can accommodate hate speech in the non-public 
realm. Persons, qua individuals who endorse a racist conception of the good, are not 
to be restricted in expressing their views, it would seem, provided that these are not 
enacted by legislatures in constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. 
IV 
Some Worries about the Public/Private Distinction 
In this section I will address two concerns surrounding the public/private 
distinction. The first worry rehearses familiar critiques made by some feminists and 
a powerful variant professed by G. A. Cohen64. The second is rather different; it is 
motivated by recent developments in Social and Cognitive Psychology. 
The `Personal is Political' 
Feminists have argued that the private sphere, and especially the domestic realm, is 
politicised65. To claim that domestic relations are unrelated to justice amounts to 
condoning the inequalities present in gender relations. For instance, they have 
argued that the unequal division of domestic labour between men and women 
affects the principle of fair equality of opportunity by placing the latter in a 
disadvantaged position. For some, the institution of marriage, in virtue of being a 
64 G. A. Cohen, 'Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice'. Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 26 (1997), 3-30. See also his 'Incentives, Inequality, and Community', in Darwall, S. (ed. ) 
Equal Freedom (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1995), 331-97; `The Pareto Argument for 
Inequality', Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (1995), 160-85, If You're an Egalitarian How Come 
You're so Rich? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). 
65 Susan Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Susan Okin, 
'Gender, the Public and the Private', in Held, D. (ed. ) Political Theory Today. (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1991); Iris Young, `Taking the Basic Structure Seriously', Perspective in Politics 4 (2006), 
91-97. 
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voluntary association between competent adults, is an area in which unequal 
practices are not a concern for justice (insofar as rights are not violated -obviously 
marital rape and other forms of violence are condemned). Feminist writers argue, 
however, that due to gender inequalities, private practices are translated into 
inequalities in the public sphere. Think, for instance, of how some parents choose to 
invest more resources in a son's education, leaving daughters with fewer 
opportunities for career development. Or of how many women work part time (in 
worse paid jobs), because they carry the burdens of childrearing. 
Another criticism, launched by Okin, claims that a gendered family is unjust 
to children because they are born into it 'involuntarily. Basic socialisation, the 
argument holds, takes place (usually) within families, and children (both boys and 
girls) educated in a sexist environment will fail to develop a sense of justice 
required to be autonomous citizens66. Families nurture future citizens and that 
provides a strong reason to have just families67. 
G. A. Cohen employs the form of the feminist critique against the 
public/private distinction in his critique of Rawls's difference principle68. His main 
claim is that `choices not regulated by the law fall within the purview of justice' 69 
Cohen believes that there is an inconsistency in Rawls's work. The difference 
principle holds that `inequalities are just if and only if they are necessary to make 
66 The upshot of the argument is not limited to justice between the sexes; it covers other instances 
such as religion. Cf. Matthew Clayton, Legitimacy and Justice in Upbringing (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
67 Cf. Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family, 17,131. I will examine the relationship between moral 
development, justice and free association in Chapter 5. 
68 Cohen's work has motivated a number of responses, among which see Andrew Williams, 
'Incentives, Inequality and Publicity', Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (1998), 225-47; Joshua 
Cohen, 'Taking People as They Are', Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (2001), 363-86; Samuel 
Scheffler, 'Is the Basic Structure Basic? ' in Sypnowich, Ch. (ed. ) The Egalitarian Conscience 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 102-29. 
69 Cohen, 'Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice', 4. 
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the worst off people in society better off than they would otherwise be'70. Cohen 
argues that there are two ways of reading the idea of `necessary inequalities' 71: a 
`lax' interpretation and a `strict' one. The latter implies that talented people need 
the extra money in order to produce more (and to benefit the worst-off). Without 
the extra they simply could not be more productive. The lax interpretation, on the 
other hand, suggests that talented people are not willing to work harder unless they 
are paid better. They could produce the extra benefits for the worst-off, but they do 
not want to. Under this interpretation, it seems that a society in which incentives for 
inequalities are necessary is not a just society. For how can the same person affirm 
and uphold correct principles of justice and simultaneously deem inequalities 
necessary to elicit his most productive performance72? 
Cohen believes that the natural answer open to Rawls is the `basic structure 
objection': the latter might say that because principles of justice apply only to the 
basic structure, they leave individual choices outside the purview of justice. The 
idea is that qua citizen, a person must honour the principles of justice but in his 
daily life he is free to act in a different fashion. 
Cohen criticises this response by noting that there is an important ambiguity 
within the definition of the basic structure. Rawls seems to suggest sometimes that 
`coercive (in the legal sense) institutions exhaust it, or, better, that institutions 
70 Ibid. 5. 
71 See also his see also his If You're an Egalitarian How Come You're so Rich?, 127. 
72 For it is her denial to produce more without the incentives which generates the `just' inequalities. 
Cohen writes: for [the talented] could not claim that, in self justification, at the bar of the difference 
principle, that their high rewards are necessary to enhance the position of the worst-off, since [... ] it 
is they themselves who make those rewards necessary, through their unwillingness to work for 
ordinary rewards as productively as they do for exceptionally high ones, an unwillingness which 
ensures that the untalented get less then otherwise would'. If You're an Egalitarian How Come 
You're so Rich?. 127 
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belong to it only in so far as they are (legally) coercive'73. This interpretation has 
some force, for it is clear that coercion requires special justification 
74. However, it 
is not convincing. Despite coercion being an important moral concern, taking it as 
the defining element seems arbitrary. For there are non-coercive institutions whose 
effects in people's lives are equally as important as the coercive ones. We are thus 
led to the second interpretation of the basic structure. Rawls says `[t]he basic 
structure is the primary subject of justice because its effects are so profound and 
present from the start '75. Partly, this profound impact affects `[society's] members 
and determines in large part the kind of persons they are'. It fosters and limits 
certain ambitions, desires and talents while discouraging others. `More generally, 
the basic structure shapes the way the social system produces and reproduces over 
time a certain form of culture shared by persons with certain conceptions of their 
good'76. Even though they are not coercive, many of these private institutions apply 
to us involuntarily, and this fact seems to make the need for special justification 
compelling. Legal coerciveness cannot be a necessary condition (although it might 
be sufficient) for inclusion as part of the basic structure. So, Cohen concludes, 
Rawls must `admit application of the principles of justice to (legally optional) 
73 Cohen, `Where the Action Is', 18. For instance Rawls writes: `The basic structure of society is the 
way in which the main political and social institutions of society fit together into one system of social 
cooperation, and the way they assign basic rights and duties and regulate the division of advantages 
that arises from social cooperation over time [... ]. The political constitution with an independent 
judiciary, the legally recognized forms of property, and the structure of the economy (for example, as 
a system of competitive markets with private property in the means of production), as well as the 
family in some form, all belong to the basic structure. The basic structure is the background social 
framework within which the activities of associations and individuals take place. A just basic 
structure secures what we may call background justice' Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 
10. 
74 For a sympathetic reading of this interpretation, see Scheffler, `Is the Basic Structure Basic? '. 
75 Rawls, A Theory, of Justice, 7. 
76 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 269. 
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social practices, and indeed, to patterns of personal choice that are not legally 
prescribed'77. 
Political Persons and Public Rules 
There is, however a problem with Cohen's argument. Rawls argues that `the 
underlying unity [of the basic structure] is provided by the idea that free and equal 
moral persons are to construct reasonable and helpful guidelines for moral 
reflection in view of their need for such organizing principles and the role in social 
life that these principles and their corresponding subjects are presumed to have'78. 
Principles of justice, then, must be public in the sense that they can guide people 
with confidence79, and their fellow citizens can see others being guided by these 
principles. It is imperative that the principles of justice provide public rules to 
citizens acting in good faith80. The requirement of publicity helps to understand one 
aspect of the relationship between citizens and the basic structure: citizens might be 
better able to comply with the reasons of justice which apply to them than 
following their own judgement81. So the basic structure objection is not an avenue 
for citizens to opt for lesser obligations of justice; rather it is more effective means 
of ensuring compliance. 
There are, then, choices and patterns of behaviour that cannot be included as 
part of the basic structure because they cannot be public in the sense of providing 
reasonable and helpful guidance to citizens. Nevertheless, they produce unjust 
" Cohen `Where the Action Is', 22. 
78 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 262, emphasis added. 
79 I defend the `full publicity condition' in Chapter 4. 
80 Williams, A. (1998) `Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity'. 
81 Here I draw from Joseph Raz's normal justification of authority. See The Morality of Freedom 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), Chapters 2-4. 
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states of affairs: fair equality of opportunity might be frustrated, some citizens 
might not reach the `social basis for self-respect' 82 required by justice, and so on. 
These results might be the outcome of social prejudices that are implicit in the 
background culture; not `from public policies of explicit distinction and exclusion, 
but rather from widespread but relatively unnoticed assumptions embedded in 
institutional rules, the material infrastructure of social action, and everyday habits 
of comportment and interaction' 83. Even though (some of) these patterns might not 
part of the basic structure, justice cannot ignore them. Justice requires that we find 
public ways to neutralise these effects. In part, the argument of this thesis provides 
an answer to such concerns. 
Automatic Behaviour and Situated Rationality. 
There are two further problems that afflict the public/private distinction. In contrast 
with the comments above, which were normative, both of these are naturalistic. 
They emanate from recent developments in Social and Cognitive Psychology. 
Automatic Behaviour and the Public/Private Overlap. There is a dominant 
understanding of human rational agency is one in which perceptions are linked to 
actions indirectly84. A person perceives something and through rational processes 
he arrives at beliefs about the world. Later those beliefs, through rational processes, 
direct actions. It is assumed that the relation between perceptions and actions is 
82 Rawls argues that `perhaps the most important primary good is self-respect' Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice, 386. 
83 Young, 'Taking the Basic Structure Seriously', 96. Cf. Cohen, If You're an Egalitarian How Come 
You're so Rich?: `While the law may play a large role in securing [the social basis of self-respect] to 
people vulnerable to racism, legally unregulable racist attitudes also have an enormous negative 
impact on how much of that good primary good they get', 211, n. 19. 
84 Susan Hurley calls this feature `decoupling'. See `The Public Ecology of Responsibility'. 
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always mediated by reasoning. Perceptions form beliefs, which are evaluated 
according to the agent's goals. 
There is some evidence however, suggesting that this picture is not accurate. Recent 
research indicates that a significant part of our behaviour is not `decoupled', but 
automatically caused by features of the environment. In other words, in many cases 
perception causes behaviour directly, without rational mediation85. For instance, 
merely thinking about performing an action increases the likelihood of you actually 
performing that action86. Engaging in some activity automatically triggers goals 
associated with that pursuit. And the mere perception of a piece of behaviour 
increases the likelihood of an agent acting likewise without the intention of doing 
so87. This phenomenon, the `chameleon effect', shows that `the perception of 
another's behaviour (be it facial expression, body posture, mannerism, etc) 
increases the tendency for the perceiver to behave in a similar manner, and that this 
is an entirely passive and nonconscious phenomenon' 88. 
The idea behind this `ideomotor principle' -that `every representation of 
movement awakes in some degree the movement it represents' 89- is that 
`perception is for doing'. It is likely that perceptive systems evolved in order to 
make responses to the environment efficient, rather than to understand the world. 
85 Cf. John Bargh and Erin Williams, 'The Automaticity of Social Life', Current Directions in 
Psychological Science 15 (2006), 1-4; John Bargh and Tanya Chartrand, 'The Unbearable 
Automaticity of Being', American Psychologist, 54 (1999), 462-79. 
86 Ap Dijksterhuis and John Bargh, 'The Perception-Behavior Expressway: Automatic Effects of 
Social Perception on Social Behavior', Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 33 (2001), 1- 
40; Tanya Chartrand and John Bargh, 'The Chameleon Effect: The Perception-Behavior Link and 
Social Interaction' Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, (1999), 893-9 10; John Bargh 
Mark Chen and Lara Burrows, 'Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects on Trait Construct 
and Stereotype Activation on Action', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71 (1996), 230- 
44; Hurley, 'Bypassing Conscious Control'. 
87 See Hurley `Bypassing Conscious Control', 310-2. 
88 Chartrand and Bargh, 'The Chameleon Effect', 897. 
89 Hurley `Bypassing Conscious Control', 310. 
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Having an `expressway' between perception and action produces more effective 
responses than requiring rational intermediation. In evolution, animals developed 
perception systems that lead directly to reactions. For instance, frogs have a 
perceptual system that allows them to perceive and hunt small objects. Every time a 
frog perceives a small object moving irregularly on the pond's surface, the frog 
reacts and attacks it90. Human beings, in contrast, do not usually react in such 
fashion, because we have evolved ways of inhibiting some of those simple 
reactions91. However, this does not mean that `old modules do not suddenly cease 
to exist; rather than that some new function is added'92. It is not only behaviour 
which can be caused automatically; there is also evidence showing processes of 
belief formation can be caused directly by things we perceive. Experiments show 
that, under certain circumstances, people tend to believe information without 
subjecting it to rational scrutiny93 
These examples of automatic behaviour challenge the public/private 
dichotomy in a fundamental way by casting doubts on some factual premises 
implicit in this distinction. In essence, the idea is that people's actions are not 
completely under their control and, seemingly, they are not as able to react in 
accordance with what is required in different realms as the distinction assumes. 
Imagine that Tom is a highly sexist person at home and at the local private club, but 
90 Dijksterhuis and Bargh, 'The Perception-Behavior Expressway', 3-4. 
91 An explanation of why this phenomenon happens is that `perception and action share neurological 
systems. This means that the translation of perception into corresponding action is a consequence of 
the way we are wired'. Dijksterhuis and Bargh, 'The Perception-Behavior Expressway', 6,7-8; and 
Hurley. 'Bypassing Conscious Control', 312-3 for more neurophysiologic evidence 
92 Dijksterhuis and Bargh, 'The Perception-Behavior Expressway', 5. 
93 Daniel Gilbert, 'How Mental Systems Believe' American Psychologist, 46 (1991), 107-19; Daniel 
Gilbert, 'The Assessment of Man: Representation and the Control of Belief, in Wegner, D., and J. 
Pennebaker, (eds. ) Handbook of Mental Control (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 1993). Cf. 
Chapter 5. 
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when he is at his local council discussing employment policies he tries to respond 
in a non-sexist way. Given what we have just reviewed regarding about automatic 
behaviour, it is likely that some sexist responses will be triggered without his 
awareness. In this sense, the distinction between a person's public and private 
identities becomes dubious. 
Rethinking Rationality. There is also another naturalistic issue worth exploring. 
Recent developments in theories of rationality suggest that rationality has a public, 
rather than a private origin as it has been traditionally thought. 
A view sometimes associated with liberalism holds that rationality has 
fundamentally a private dimension94. This is a common assumption in theories of 
rational choice and expected utility95. Criticisms have been made of some of these 
assumptions. It has been shown that people often fail to reason according to the 
rules of probability and Bayesian rules96. For instance, people `make estimates by 
starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the answer' 97, even if the 
initial value is arbitrary. In this sense people's judgements get `anchored' to 
information that might not be (and often is not) relevant. Another common failure is 
the potentially variant responses elicited by different formulations of the same 
problem. People tend to value a medical treatment less, for instance, when it is 
94 Cf. Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge University Press, 1985); 
Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998). 
95 Cf. Hurley, `The Public Ecology of Responsibility'. 
96 Gerd Gigerenzer, Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 61. 
97 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, `Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases', in 
Kahneman, D., P. Slovic, and A. Tversky (eds. ) Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 14. 
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described in terms of mortality than when it is described in terms of the number of 
people saved, even though the two options are logically similar98. 
As a response to these problems, the `simple heuristics' research program 
proposes that we should revise our conception of rationality (rather than dismissing 
failures to apply the rules of probability consistently as examples of irrationality) 99. 
The aim of this program is to find `fast and frugal' computational procedures that 
are reliable in a given environment, rather than having complicated and demanding, 
general-domain, rules. Gigerenzer coins the term `ecological rationality' to describe 
how fast and frugal reasoning can match the structure of environments and yield 
reasonable and reliable outcomes. The key to their success is that they are domain- 
specific'°°; they work in some environments but not in others. In contrast, 
probability rules cannot make this trade-off; they must work in every domain'0' 
Ecological rationality explains how systems with limited mental resources and 
limited time can make good decisions and inferences in particular environments. 
Some authors argue that the mind is constituted by different autonomous 
cognitive modules 102: 
[a]ccording to the massive modularity hypothesis [... ] the mind is to a large 
extent made up of a variety of domain- or task-specific cognitive mechanisms 
or `modules. [... ] A cognitive module is an autonomous mind-brain device 
98 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, `Choices, Values and Frames' in Kahneman, D., and A. 
Tversky (eds. ) Choices, Values and Frames (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
99 See especially the collection of essays in Gerd Gigerenzer and Peter Todd, Peter Simple Heuristics 
that Make Us Smart (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). For criticisms to this program see 
Kim Sterelny, Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2003). 
ioo Gigerenzer, Adaptive Thinking, Ch. 10. 
101 Gerd Gigerenzer and Peter Todd, 'Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive Toolbox', in Simple 
Heuristics that Make Us Smart, 18-9. 
102 Cf. John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, 'The Psychological Foundations of Culture', in J. Bakow, L. 
Cosmides. and J. Tooby, (eds. ) The . adapted Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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characterized by specific inputs from which it derives specific outputs through 
its own procedures. A module is autonomous not only in the way it functions 
but also in its phylogenetic and ontogenetic development, which are distinct 
from that of other models, and also in its failures, which can be quite 
diagnostic 103 
The rationale behind this hypothesis is that it seems likely the human mind evolved 
in order to solve specific problems. In this picture, the mind resembles an adaptive 
tool-box; it has different modules for solving different problems. These adaptations 
are domain-specific rather than domain general. For instance, Leda Cosmides and 
John Tooby argue that people have a domain-specific adaptation to detect cheating 
in social exchanges. People often fail to apply deductive rules such the `modus 
ponens' (during experiments using the Wason task 104) However, if the task is 
framed as involving social contracts and cheating they tend to do significantly 
better' 05 Although the simple heuristics and the massive modularity hypothesis are 
different, they seem to be compatible; cognitive modules might be ecological in the 
same sense that fast and frugal heuristics are; they evolved in order to solve specific 
problems related to particular environments 106 
103 Dan Sperber and Lawrence Hirschfeld, `Culture and Modularity' in Carruthers, P., S. Laurence, 
and S. Stich, (eds. ) The Innate Mind II: Culture and Cognition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 157. Phylogenesis refers to the sequence of events involved in the evolutionary development 
of a species or a taxonomic group. Ontogenesis refers to the process of an individual organism 
developing from a simpler to a more complex level. 
104 I will return to the `Wason task' in Chapter 2, section 6F. 
105 Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, (1992) 'Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchanges', in The 
Adapted Mind, 163-228. But their claims are controversial see Nick Chater and Mike Oaksford, 
`Human Rationality and the Psychology of Reasoning: Where Do We Go From Here? ' British 
Journal of Psychology 92 (2001). 193-216. 
106 Cf. Peter Carruthers, 'Simple Heuristics Meet Massive Modularity', in Carruthers, P. Stephen 
Laurence, and Stephen Stich, (eds. ) The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 2006). 181-98. 
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Despite the appeal of these hypotheses, there are difficulties regarding their 
flexibility in social environments. Solving the sorts of problems that nature presents 
to individuals can be relatively easy; environments are stable and can be exploited 
by specific heuristics. But social environments are much more dynamic and 
unreliable; they change according to the actions of other agents and present 
problems of deception, free-riding, and so on. In contrast with natural 
environments, simple heuristics can perform badly if they cannot cope with the 
changeability of social environments 107. Some have argued that having general 
domain rules function better in solving social problems 108. This suggests that formal 
rules might emerge due to demands of social ecology; a race in which one competes 
with others might explain, for instance, the emergence of processes such as 
imitation and mind-reading 109 These processes, combined with general domain 
rules, are sufficiently flexible to cope with the difficulties of social life. If this view 
is plausible, then, rationality has a public, rather than a private origin. The 
traditional picture of rationality is reversed; publicity comes first, privacy later. 
V 
Racial Thinking, Cognition and the Costs of Speech 
107 Sterelny, Thought in a Hostile World. 
108 Dan Sperber, 'Modularity and Relevance: How Can a Massively Modular Mind be Flexible and 
Context-Sensitive? ' in Carruthers, Peter, Laurence, Stephen and Stich, Stephen (eds. ) The Innate 
Mind I: Structure and Contents, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 53-68. 
109 Susan Hurley suggests the idea of `social heuristics'. See her 'Social Heuristics that Make Us 
Smarter', Philosophical Psychology, 18 (2005), 585-612. 
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In this last section, I will comment briefly on the issue of racist speech and the 
reasons this thesis focuses on it. Racist speech and racial categories seem especially 
troublesome in contemporary politics because they build upon pervasive features of 
our society. First, despite many efforts, racial minorities still suffer massive 
disadvantages in society. Incidents of racial abuse and racial crime have increased 
in recent years, and the possibility of substantive integration between races looks 
grim110 Moreover, it seems that racial thinking is not only a product of history, but 
that it is linked in a more fundamental way to our cognitive architecture. 
Categorising Race 
Lawrence Hirschfeld argues that human beings have a domain-specific module for 
categorising `human kinds', which is independent from the categorisation of both 
non-living things and non-human animals 11I. He argues that 
Humans [... ] form knowledge of human types on the basis of outward 
appearance. Two sorts of appearance, gender and race, have been found to be 
particularly salient [... ]. Like other natural categories, gender and racial 
categories seem to capture nonobvious similarities that can be recruited to 
extend knowledge. However, in contrast to the benign way their natural 
categories promote inference, these cognitive simplifications -usually called 
º ºo See the collection of essays Fred Pincus and Ehrlich Howard (eds. ) Race and Ethnic Conflict 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); see also Andrew Hacker, Two Nations: Black and White, 
Separate, Hostile, Unequal (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995) 
An example of how racial integration is being threatened by right-wing judges in the U. S, see 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 et. al. 551 U. S. 2007. 
ººº Lawrence Hirschfeld, Race in the Making: Cognition, Culture, and the Child's Construction of 
Human Kinds (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). The idea of nonobvious similarities means that 
there are alleged correlations between different observable and non-observable features. For 
instance, racist thinking attributes moral and psychological dispositions to people according to their 
skin colour. 
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stereotypes- create patterns of belief that have undesirable social and political 
effects12. 
In contrast with `historical' explanations of racial thinking, Hirschfeld argues that 
racial categories are present in many different societies across diverse locations and 
times. These observations suggest that the existence of racial categories is not 
entirely caused by socio-historical factors emerging from the last few centuries 
(although since the 1700s there have been many attempts to systematise racial 
thinking into a scientific body of knowledge' 13); rather they may have deeper roots. 
It is significant that both adults and young children construct racial 
categories with significant ease, and they seem to do so naturally. Hirschfeld 
conducted a number of experiments to test whether young children construct racial 
categories on their own 114 He showed drawings to young children (aged between 3 
and 7) of adults: some black individuals, some white; some male, some female. A 
third distinctive feature was that a number were dressed as doctors and the others as 
police officers. Lastly, the drawings also varied in body build, some individuals 
being stouter than others. (Notice that all the features are visual perceptions, and 
they all have stereotype associations). The children were presented with drawings 
including one baby and a couple (a male and a female) of adults. The babies shared 
one feature with each adult. For instance, if there was a black male baby dressed as 
a doctor one adult was a white doctor, and the other was a black police officer. In 
this case, the children were asked to say which adult the baby would become.. In the 
second task, the children were presented with pairs of adults who shared one feature 
112 Ibid. 9. 
113 For a brief history of racist thought see Ali Rattansi, Racism: A very short introduction (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006)). 
114 The experiments are reported and discussed in Hirschfeld, Race in the Making, Ch. 4. 
37 
CHAPTER 1 The Principle of Free Speech and the Public/Private Distinction 
with the baby. For instance, a stout white baby was showed a couple of stout black 
adults and a couple of thin white adults. Children were asked to say which couple 
were the baby's parents. The results showed that children were more likely to make 
associations based on race than any other characteristics115 It is likely that they 
think that race is an inherent feature that remains over time (from being a baby to 
becoming an adult), and also that it is inherited (black couples have black children 
and white couples have white children). In contrast, inheritance and identity do not 
appear to be prize significant associations in correlation with hair colour or texture. 
More interestingly still is the fact that when the drawings in experiments displayed 
non-human animals and objects (such as cars), colour was not consistently the 
dominant association. 
Another experiment was designed to investigate whether children 
essentialise race. Young children were told a story about a baby (in some stories the 
baby was black, in others it was white) who was switched at birth to another home 
(the black baby to a white home and vice versa). Children were then shown 
drawings of a black and a white adult, and they were asked to say which one the 
baby had become. They almost always made the claim that it was the adult of the 
same colour. In most cases, children `naturalise' race; they believe it cannot be 
changed through nurture. These experiments show that children have a tendency to 
identify race as a feature that defines a person's identity' 16; it is natural and 
inherited. In a sense, race is used as describe the kinds of people there are in the 
world 
117 
115 Race was chosen over profession, which was preferred over body built. See ibid. 97. 
116 'Identity' not in a moral sense, but as the feature that makes an entity to be the same over time. 
117 Hirschfeld, Race in the Making, 106. 
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The ease with which people construct racial categories is somewhat 
puzzling. Children in the experiments do not `discover' race, they construct it. 
Racial categories cannot be explained by the phenomenon of `race' because we 
know that `[h]umans are not discriminable into discrete, self-evident biological 
kinds' 118. Simply, `race' has no biological basis at all. This does not mean that 
`there are not biologically grounded differences in human external anatomy [but] 
that races as socially defined do not (even loosely) capture interesting clusters of 
these differences' 119 As Naomi Zack explains: 
The genes for bone structure, skin shade, and hair texture, which are 
associated with social and racial membership do not all get inherited together. 
There is greater variation within any race of these `racial' traits than between 
or among any of the recognized races, as groups. Within the human species, as 
a whole, the genetic variations that occur randomly -that is, between any two 
people- constitute 0.2% of all human genetic material. Of that 0.2%, or 
1/1500,85% occurs locally, or between any two individuals who happen to be 
neighbors, 7% occurs within races, and 8% occurs between races. Thus, the 
amount of human genetic difference due to difference in race is 8% of 0.2% or 
less than 1/6000 [... ] Of course, that 1/6000, although small could be 
important. But there is no evidence that it is. No racial essence has ever been 
identified. There are no general genes for race, such that, once identified, their 
presence could be used to predict more specific, or secondary, racial 
characteristics. None of the physical characteristics associated with racial 
difference in human talent, function or skill12o 
118 Ibid. 3. 
119 Ibid. 4. 
120 Naomi Zack, 'Race and Racial Discrimination'. in LaFollette, H. (ed. ) The Oxford Handbook of 
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Racial thinking, the widely shared belief that human beings can be 
portioned into natural groups, is, according to Hirschfeld, parasitic on a domain- 
specific competency for perceiving human kinds. However, he is not suggesting 
that we have a `race' module. This `race' module could not exist because during 
human evolution populations (at least those which were in contact) were not as 
physically diverse as we are now. His suggestion is, rather, that race categories 
exploit the tendency we have to construct human kinds and to associate those kinds 
with intrinsic and essential properties. As he argues, `[r]ace is [... ] a unique sort of 
belief, in significant measure unlike any other commonsense notion. This 
uniqueness is due in part to the interaction of historical and cultural particulars [... ]. 
Nevertheless, [ ... 
] race is an extraordinarily widely encountered notion whose 
recurrence across varied cultural and historical landscapes derives from deep-rooted 
psychological processes' 121 
Racial Thinking and Hate Speech 
It is important to note that racial thinking enables the possibility for a person 
engaging in racism. Although they are not the same, they are related: for racism 
exploits racial thinking by ascribing moral and political significance to racial 
categories. If this view is plausible, then the problems of racialism (the tendency to 
think along racial lines), and racism in particular, are more troublesome than we 
might at first think. In particular, it suggests that they will be difficult to eradicate. 
We have a vulnerability to racial thinking, which will not fade away easily or 
naturally. Although racial categories are not innate and racism is not inescapable, 
Practical Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 259. 
12 1 Hirschfeld, Race in the Making, 12. 
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we are prone to them. In a sense, we have a blind-spot to our racialised perceptions 
of human beings. Just as children have susceptibility to certain diseases and need to 
be treated with vaccines, it seems that we might have a similar susceptibility to 
certain ideas, and we too might need some treatment to deliver protection. 
This thesis elaborates an argument which claims that restrictions on racist 
and gender-based speech are compatible with the liberal account of political 
morality explored in the third section of this chapter. The argument provides an 
account of personal autonomy which highlights the need to control exposure to 
racist speech as a means of protection against our susceptibility to racial and racist 
thinking. 
Although there is plausibility in Hirschfeld's theory, it is not decisive for 
my thesis. It does accommodate the intuition that race and racism have a central 
place in our society, and it offers a reasonable explanation for this. Moreover, it is 
coherent with the massive-modularity hypothesis and compatible with 
developments in socio-biology. However, the argument of this thesis is independent 
of the validity of Hirschfeld's cognitive theory of race. It is sufficient for my 
purposes that racial stereotypes and discrete forms of racism are widespread on our 
societies, even if they are caused by socio-historical factors alone. On the other 
hand, if Hirschfeld is right, then we have an even stronger reason to be deeply 
concerned with the effects and endurance of racial and racist thinking. 
However, some might object that the phenomena of automatic behaviour, 
racial stereotypes, and cognitive biases (what I will call `mental contamination' 122) 
upon which the argument is built proves too much. According to this objection, if 
122 See Chapter 2. 
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the argument if generalised to spheres other than hate speech it would imply an 
unreasonable amount of restrictions on speech. 
The argument I defend, however, is aimed at racist speech and might not be 
extended to other spheres. Although I acknowledge that the psychological and 
cognitive biases that sustain the argument have a more general scope, the argument 
here holds that race and gender are special cases. First, if Hirschfeld's theory is 
right, then there is a direct link between human cognition and racial thinking, a link 
that makes protection against it more urgent than in other domains. Second, race 
and gender inequalities are significantly larger in our societies than most (if not all) 
others. An important portion of these are (partly) produced by automatic processing 
as well as by actions in the `private' realm. Reducing these inequalities in a manner 
compatible with justice is therefore imperative. Third, citizens have an important 
interest in living autonomously and justly. The argument I develop here claims that 
although mental contamination affects us in many different areas, we need to 
categorise the importance of those areas. It seems more important to reduce the 
extent of racist and sexist attitudes (both those cultivated autonomously and non- 
autonomously) than, for instance, attitudes regarding our tastes in cinema or food. I 
suggest that we begin by considering cases we regard as more important. Perhaps 
later, we should extend the argument to cover other areas, perhaps not. The 
decision, it seems, must be based on an assessment of each case. Such evaluation, 
however, must wait for another time and should not be inferred from this writing: 
here we are solely concerned with racist and sexist speech. 
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CHAPTER 2 
AUTONOMY, MENTAL CONTAMINATION AND FREE SPEECH' 
A distinctive feature of liberalism is its claim that governments must respect, in 
some sense, their citizens' autonomy. One way in which in this idea is construed, for 
instance, holds that special justification is required for interfering with people's 
actions. In this sense, autonomy places a constraint on government conduct. As we 
have seen in the last chapter, the harm principle provides one such justification: 
government can legitimately interfere with my actions in order to prevent harm to 
third parties. Nevertheless, respecting autonomy prohibits certain justifications for 
governmental interference. For instance, the anti-paternalism argument holds that 
governments cannot coerce a person into behaving in certain ways for her own good: 
attempts to ban food with high contents of fat or sugar in order to encourage a 
healthier life style will be met with suspicion by most liberals. The argument against 
such restrictions is that autonomous agency requires that agents make these decisions 
for themselves2. 
Some of the material of this chapter appears in Andres Moles, `Autonomy, Free Speech, and 
Automatic Behaviour', Res Publica 13 (2007), 53-75. 
2 The anti-paternalistic principle is not absolute. There is some room for paternalistic policies but they 
require strong justification, in particular, they must be compatible with autonomy. I will discuss some 
aspects of paternalism in Chapter 3. 
43 
CHAR 2 Autonomy, Mental Contamination and Free Speech 
Some liberals extend this argument, claiming that governments have a duty 
not only to protect autonomy but also to promote it. Institutions must be set up in a 
manner that fosters citizens' autonomy. On this view, governments have a positive 
duty to facilitate spaces in which autonomy-enhancing practices are executed. 
Liberal perfectionists, for instance claim that the government can endorse autonomy- 
based programs justifying its decisions on the value of autonomy3. Anti-perfectionist 
liberals, despite being more ambiguous, might claim that promoting citizens' 
autonomy might be a legitimate goal under certain conditions and within certain 
limits4. 
Both interpretations of the relation between autonomy and government have 
been employed to defend freedom of expression and association. As we have seen, 
the autonomy defence of speech cites positive reasons to defend it beyond the harm 
principle. One of the problems with such defences though is that the conception of 
autonomy invoked is seldom defined, and, moreover, it is sometimes employed as if 
it were an uncontested notions. In order to assess the success of such defences it is 
necessary to get a clear understanding of the relation between autonomy and free 
speech. In this chapter I shall present a series of challenges that a conception of 
autonomy must answer in order to provide a sufficient basis for free speech. 
The chapter is divided into three main sections. First, I will present a 
`standard', procedural model of autonomy that is commonly used in political theory. 
In brief, the model holds that in order to be autonomous our mental states must be 
3 This does not mean, of course, that they are committed to the view that autonomy always trumps 
other values. 
'' In Chapter 4I defend a version of anti-perfectionism which is, nevertheless, autonomy-based. 
5 Cf. Brison, `The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech'. In this article she examines six notions of 
autonomy used by different defences of free speech. According to her, all six of them fail. 
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obtained through the right processes and have the right structure. Autonomy, here, is 
an ideal of personhood which can be achieved primarily through independence and 
rational reflection. In the second section I develop several challenges that might 
thwart the ideal. Some of the challenges are normative and are familiar in 
discussions in moral and political philosophy. Other challenges emanate from 
research in experimental social and cognitive psychology. As we discussed in the 
last chapter, psychologists have found that a large amount of human behaviour 
occurs automatically or non-consciously. Unfortunately, these findings seem to have 
been neglected by current studies in moral and political philosophy6. In the light of 
this automatic behaviour, autonomy seems to be impossible, or at least considerably 
rarer than we may suppose. How can we reconcile. the idea that a large amount of our 
action occurs automatically with the claim that we must govern ourselves? In the 
third section, I will relate the challenges presented in the second with the conditions 
described in the first. This chapter will leave us better equipped to assess the 
autonomy defence of free speech; a task which will be undertaken in the next 
chapters. 
I will defend a model of autonomy that is ecological in nature. This means 
that it abandons the requirements of classical rationality. This account is sensitive to 
the structure and history of our mental states, and pays particular attention to the 
processes of critical reflection, to the development of deliberative capacities, and to 
the way in which environments influence those processes and capacities. Moreover, 
it acknowledges that meaningful available options are necessary and requires mental 
6 An important exception is Hurley, 'Bypassing Conscious Control: Unconscious Imitation, Media 
Violence, and Freedom of Speech'. 
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contamination to be neutralised in sensitive areas. Although it does not embrace 
substantive constraints, it need not to be content-neutral. 
I 
Conditions for autonomy 
In this section I reconstruct a model of autonomy which is roughly assumed in 
discussions regarding freedoms of speech and association, and more generally in 
political philosophy. Rather than offering an exegetical work on certain theories of 
autonomy I draw ideas from different authors. The goal is not to support any 
particular account, but, to a certain extent, to provide an overview of a familiar set of 
assumptions about the content of autonomy. The strategy here is not very dissimilar 
to Gilbert Ryle's picture of the `official doctrine' of the mind or to John Tooby and 
Leda Cosmides' portrait of the `standard social science model' 7 
The preoccupation with autonomy derives, as Isaiah Berlin famously states, 
from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life 
and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I 
wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's acts of will. I wish to 
be subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, 
which are my own, not by causes that affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish 
Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Penguin, 1963): Tooby and Cosmides, 'The 
Psychological Foundations of Culture'. Although the strategy I follow here is similar to theirs, unlike 
Ryle I do not claim that there is an `official version of autonomy'. 
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to be somebody, not nobody; a doer [... ] [capable] of playing a human role, that 
is of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realising theme. 
There are some background mental capacities and abilities that individuals 
require in order to reach the capacity for autonomy9. Broadly conceived, these 
include the ability to make rational choices, the `ability to comprehend the means 
required to realise [... ] goals, the mental faculties necessary to plan actions, etc' 10 
Notice also that autonomy is not an all-or-nothing concept; people might have a 
greater or lesser degree of it and they can exercise their capacities to a greater or 
lesser extent. There is some debate, into which I will not digress, regarding the scope 
of autonomy. What are the units to which autonomy applies? Does it encompass 
whole lives, or periods of lives? Is a person who leads a non-autonomous life in his 
youth, but who later, in his adulthood, makes autonomous choices autonomous tout 
court? Do we need to make these sorts of judgements, or can we apply autonomy to 
parts of lives? Can a person be autonomous with respect to one aspect of his life (for 
instance, his professional career) but fail tragically with respect to autonomy in 
another (say, his intimate relationships)? Do we need to balance these spheres in 
order to reach a conclusion, or are we to say that he is autonomous only in some 
aspects and not in others? I will not try to address these questions here. Instead I will 
explore some of the conditions necessary for autonomy. 
8 Isaiah Berlin, `Two Concepts of Liberty' in his Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
178. In this paragraph. Berlin is developing the idea of `positive freedom' and not autonomy. 
Although these notions are not the same they are related, and Berlin's words express also the idea of 
autonomy. 
9 Cf. Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Self (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986), 28-31. 
10 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 373. 
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1) Identification 
The condition of identification requires that an individual's actions, desires, and 
higher-order mental states have the `right' relation. Minimally they must satisfy 
some conditions of consistency: they must be neither contradictory nor intransitive. 
Similarly, the relationship between convictions and actions must be of the right kind; 
the convictions must explain actions qua reasons for actions, and they must not lead 
to overt irrationality, such as persistent weakness of the will or similar phenomena' 1 
These minimal conditions constitute what Jon Elster calls the `thin theory of 
rationality' 12. Another aspect of the thin theory claims that plans must also be 
consistent; they must be logically coherent and they must have the correct 
means/goals structure13 in the sense that `there should be a possible world in which it 
[the plan] is realised' 14. Moreover, consistent plans must harbour the property of 
being deliberately realisable, and not only by chance or essentially as a by-product15 
It is also supposed that first-order and second-order desires must be 
consistent 16. In order to qualify as an autonomous agent it is not sufficient that I have 
certain desires; I must wish that I have those desiresl7. Think about Tom, a hard 
11 For a classical statement of the relations between reasons and actions see Donald Davidson, Essays 
on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) See especially Essay 1. 
12 Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983). Chapter 1. 
13 Consistency in this sense does not require optimality or maximization. For a criticism of the idea 
that rationality requires optimality see ibid. 12-4; and Gigerenzer and Todd, Simple Heuristics that 
Make Us Smart. 
14 Elster, Sour Grapes. 11. 
15 Ibid. 11. 
16 Cf. John Christman, `Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy', in Zalta E. (ed. ), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (2003), 
http: //www. plato. stanford. edu/archives/fal12003/entries/autonomy-moral/ [accessed 1S` December 
2004]; Sarah Buss, 'Personal Autonomy', in Zalta, E. (ed. ) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
(2002), http: //www. plato. stanford. edu/archives/win2002/entries/personal-autonomy [accessed 5`h 
January 2004]. 
17 A classic exposition of this idea is elaborated in Harry Frankfurt, `Freedom of the Will and the 
Concept of a Person', The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971), 5-20. Notice, though, that in this article 
Frankfurt discusses the idea of free will, not the concept of autonomy. 
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working student who spends must of his Sundays reading rather than watching 
football at the local pub. Every Sunday morning Tom knows that he can either stay 
at home reading or go to the pub with his friends. Although he would like to watch 
the matches, usually Tom decides to stay at home because he wants to get ready for 
next week's seminars. Moreover, Tom also thinks that he would like to be a hard 
working student who reads on Sundays instead of watching TV. Although 
identification is too weak to be sufficient for autonomy, it, nevertheless, seems to be 
a necessary condition (insofar as one is moved to act by a desire that she also wishes 
to hold). 
It is also important to note that this condition is completely internalist: 
autonomy consists solely in relations between mental states. One of the corollaries of 
this condition is that it does not render the origin and causal history of our mental 
states relevant for autonomy. For it says nothing about how such mental sates came 
about. Consider again Tom. This model of autonomy claims that he is autonomous 
regardless of the causal processes which caused his mental states. Imagine that Tom 
is hard working as a result of his mother telling him that the only way in which he 
can earn the respect of others is by studying in every single moment of his spare 
time. After many years of living with his mother, Tom is convinced that the source 
of his worth as a human being depends on being well prepared for his seminars. So, 
he studies on Sundays and he is satisfied with the kind of person he is. Under the 
model of autonomy I have been describing Tom's obsessiveness is irrelevant to the 
question of whether or not he qualifies as an autonomous being. It is this sense in 
which this model is completely internalist: autonomy is only comprised of relations 
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between mental states. The next condition of autonomy is aimed at addressing this 
shortcoming. 
A second problem of this condition is concerned with the meaning of 
`identification'. In particular it is not clear what it requires. Two interpretations are 
possible. On the one hand, a weak version claims that in order to identify with my 
higher order mental states I merely need to acknowledge that fact that I have them' g. 
However, this requirement does not seem too promising. What does my 
acknowledgment of having a mental state add to my having it? Tom could 
acknowledge that he is an obsessive student, he could even accept that he has got a 
problem, and, according to this interpretation, he would still satisfy this condition. 
On the other hand, under a more stringent interpretation, the identification clause 
would require approval of my mental states. But approval seems to be too strong a 
condition for autonomy, `in that I will not identify with many of my own 
imperfections [ ... ] in the sense I 
do not approve of them all told' 19. The fact that I 
am not perfect according to my own standards cannot be enough to make me non- 
autonomous. Perhaps I regret that I like cheesy pop-music, and would rather that my 
musical tastes were more refined. Nevertheless, it does not seem true that I do not 
identify with myself, and therefore am not autonomous. This strong version needs to 
be qualified. It seems more reasonable to suggest that so long as I do not deeply 
regret having some trait, or I do not feel dismay at certain aspects, the identification 
condition is satisfied20. 
18 Christman, `Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy'. 
19 John Christman, 'Procedural Autonomy and Liberal Legitimacy', in Taylor, J. (ed. ) Personal 
Autonomy: Neu' Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Roles in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2005), 279-80. 
20 Christman replaces the condition of 'identification' with a `non-alienation' condition. Cf. Ibid. 279. 
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2) Historical Amendments 
Autonomy, Mental Contamination and Free Speech 
Some authors have tried to solve the problems of the first condition by proposing an 
amendment: in order to be autonomous an agent's mental states must (also) have 
been derived in the `right' way21. Accordingly, John Christman writes: `the key 
element of autonomy is [ ... ] the agent's acceptance or rejection of the processes of 
desire formation or the factors that give rise to that formation922 . 
Despite the difficulties of defining which are the right ways that mental states 
need to be formed, there are some intuitive ideas that help us to make sense of this 
condition. The most important aspect here is the concern only with the causal history 
of those mental states, not their content. Consider Elster's distinction between 
autonomy23 and ethical goodness (in regard to desires), and between judgment and 
truth (regarding beliefs)24. He argues that in order to construct a substantive view of 
rationality and autonomy we must be concerned with the causal processes by which 
our mental states are brought about. Rightly formed beliefs are to be contrasted with 
the available salient evidence rather than with the truth. In this sense autonomously 
held beliefs are independent of the truth; they are dependent only on how they were 
formed. What this shows is that one can autonomously and rationally hold false 
21 Although in a strict sense the only feature described thus far that is completely internal is the first 
one, the other features are similarly internal insofar as they are concerned only with internal mental 
states: their structure, the causal processes by which they are shaped, and the way in which they must 
be revised, adopted or rejected. So it seems that there are two different ways of understanding 
internalism here: the first (stronger) one implies that only references to internal states, structures and 
processes matter (as in the condition of identification); the second (weaker) sense is internalist in that 
it does not make references to actual present conditions of the world, but only to those that have 
affected internal mental processes. Condition 5 in particular focuses on the external conditions for 
autonomy. 
22 John Christman, 'Autonomy and Personal History', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991). 2. 
Emphasis added. 
23 Because his understanding of autonomy comprises only desires shaped in the right way, his theory 
covers much less than the version pictured here. Cf. Elster, Sour Grapes, 2,20. 
24 Ibid. '0. 
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beliefs provided that the evidence supports them in the right way. For example I can 
falsely, but autonomously, believe that the train to Edinburgh departs at noon 
because the current schedule says so, when in fact the departure time has been 
suddenly changed to 12: 30. The fact that my belief is false does not affect the way 
we assess the processes by which it came about. Similarly, Elster argues that 
autonomously held preferences and desires are independent of their ethical content25. 
A person can have non-moral preferences and desires that have been shaped by the 
correct causal processes, and presumably even immoral preferences26. The task 
seems to be, then, to search for `drives' which distort the autonomous processes of 
preference and desire formation. Following Elster's definition, `drives must be 
conceived as non-conscious psychic forces that are geared to the search for short- 
term pleasure, as opposed to the conscious desires that may forego short-term 
pleasure to achieve some longer-term gain' 27. Due to the difficulties of determining 
which processes are causally correct, it seems that autonomy is what remains once 
we remove drives that misshape preferences, such as adaptation and 
counteradaptation. These phenomena will be discussed at length in the second 
section of the chapter. 
3) Critical Reflection 
This condition links the two already reviewed. It gives normative force to the 
processes by which desire and belief are formed, and also assesses how identification 
must take place. For it says that the critical rational reflection must play a causal 
25 Ibid. 23. 
2" This distinction is further articulated by the condition of content neutrality that I will discuss below. 
27 Elster, Sour Grapes, 25 
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role in the manner our mental states are formed and structured. According to this 
condition, in order to be autonomous one needs to be able to conceive of a plan for 
her life and to formulate a conception of the good. Moreover, it is not sufficient that 
autonomous agents hold such a conception; they must also have the capacity to 
critically revise their convictions in the light of pertinent information28. 
There seem to be three different ways of understanding this condition. First, 
one could argue that critical endorsement of a life-plan needs to be done just once. 
After careful deliberation, being 20 years old, Ernesto decided that a particular 
conception of the good (say, living as a hippie community in Mid-Wales) is best for 
him. He endorses the values, beliefs and goals that such a conception of the good 
demands. Forty years later, Ernesto still behaves, endorses and approves of his way 
of life. However, he has not subjected his beliefs to critical scrutiny since he was 20 
years old. Imagine that in those 40 years things have changed enough that if he 
thought about, say, the meaning of his being a hippie nowadays, he would not 
endorse those beliefs and values anymore. But because he has not thought about 
them, he still believes that his hippie commune in Mid Wales is the best available 
way of life. Although he satisfies many of the conditions so far stated it seems that 
his critical endorsement is somewhat defective. Autonomy cannot be guaranteed by 
one comprehensive act of critical reflection, it needs to be revised and updated as 
circumstances change. 
Accordingly, under a second interpretation, critical deliberation is understood 
as a continuous exercise. Strictly speaking this requirement is impossible. It implies 
that an agent needs to critically deliberate about her conception of the good at every 
28 What counts as `pertinent' information is an open question. 
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moment in her life. Every single decision, even the most trivial action needs to be 
contrasted and critically assessed in order to be autonomous. Autonomy so 
understood leads to paralysis. 
Richard Arneson29 suggests that there is a third, more plausible way of 
understanding the condition of critical deliberation. According to him, it should be 
understood 'dispositionally'. 
To live an autonomous life an agent must decide a plan of life through critical 
reflection and in the process of carrying it out, remain disposed to subject the 
plan of critical review if disturbing or unanticipated evidence indicates the 
needs for such review3o 
Arneson's view, however, also has problems. To the point, the agent himself needs 
to set the level at which revision is needed, and that level needs to be set 
autonomously. Autonomy, then, can only be achieved by an agent who 
autonomously knows when and what will trigger the need for a critical review. 
Although the person might have the disposition to change his beliefs if `disturbing or 
unanticipated evidence' suggest he should do so, he still needs to know what would 
qualify as `disturbing' and 'unanticipated'. The problem, in essence, seems to be that 
even the dispositional understanding `require[s] perfect rationality and unlimited 
capacities' 31 
29 Arneson, Richard 'Autonomy and Preference Formation', in Coleman, J., and A. Buchanan, (eds. ) In 
Harm's Way: Essays in Honour of Joel Feinberg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
30 Ibid. 94. 
31 Ibid 48. For a criticism of these assumptions see Gerd Gigerenzer and Peter Todd `Fast and Frugal 
Heuristics', in Gigerenzer and Todd, Simple Heuristics that Make Us Smart. See also section II 
below. 
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In order to make autonomy possible, critical reflection must be `effective' in 
an important sense. It must make a difference to what agents do: agents must be in a 
situation in which they can respond to the reasons derived from their critical 
reflection and scrutiny. Otherwise, reflection is wasted. 
4) Content Neutrality 
An important feature of autonomy requires that it be content neutral. The reason is 
that autonomy `should not contain conditions that allow the imposition of a 
particular value conception [ ... 
] into the lives of otherwise competent, authentic 
adults' 32. According to authors who support neutral accounts of autonomy, appealing 
to neutrality makes autonomy, in some sense, valuable33. Imagine a man who accepts 
his desires and goals, has not been subject to any wrong processes of belief or desire 
formation, and is free from `illegitimate external influences' 34. His life plan, 
however seems to be a waste of time: his only goal is to watch reality shows on TV. 
He might be a `coach potato', but an autonomous one nevertheless. Defenders of 
neutrality argue that even if we disagree with his `freely' chosen life style we cannot 
conclude that he lacks autonomy. Moreover, the only means to protect a plurality of 
ways of life and respect for agents is by adhering to neutrality3s 
32 Christman, `Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy'. 
33 This is by no means true of all writers. For instance, Raz's account of autonomy is compatible with 
perfectionism. He argues that the value of autonomy depends `many morally acceptable options be 
available to the person'. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 378 ff. 
3' Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, 'Introduction: Autonomy Reconfigured', in Mackenzie, C., 
and N. Stoljar (eds. ) Relational Autonomy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 16. Unlike 
John Christman, they are skeptical about this assumption. For arguments rejecting the idea that 
autonomy must be content-neutral see Natalie Stoljar, 'Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition', in 
Mackenzie and Stoljar (eds. ) Relational Autonomy, 94-111. 
35 The problem of political neutrality will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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This condition is controversial, and reaching a conclusion regarding its 
appeal is beyond the remit of this chapter. It is important to note, however, how it is 
embodied in many defences of free speech. Normally only content-neutral 
restrictions on speech are deemed acceptable, such as regulations related to the time 
and manner of speech. However there is a very strong presumption against 
regulations aimed at subject matter and/or viewpoint. The neutrality condition of 
autonomy is the basis for this presumption: if autonomy were not content-neutral, 
then autonomy-based justifications could not be either. For if autonomy were 
consistent with the `imposition' of some substantive values, then a coherent defence 
of free speech would need to be consistent with those impositions 36 
5) Adequacy of Choice 
A fifth point to be discussed relates to the external conditions of autonomy. 
According to Joseph Raz, autonomy requires a varied, adequate range of significant 
options. In order to be autonomous an agent `must not only be given a choice but he 
must be given an adequate range of choices' 37. Consider Raz's example of the man 
in the pit: A man who falls into a pit and remains there for the rest of his life. In the 
pit there is food enough to feed him and shelter to protect him on cold nights. Can he 
be a master of himself? According to Raz he cannot. The range of available options 
is trivial and his choices are somewhat meaningless: `His options are all short-term 
and negligible in their significance and effects' 
38 
6 The presumption against content regulations and its relation with autonomy is the subject of 
Chapter 4. 
37 Raz, The Morality of Freedoin, 373. 
1, Ibid. 374 
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However, we should not think that trivial choices per se are irrelevant to 
autonomy. Consider the `hounded woman' case who shares an island with a fierce 
carnivorous animal that perpetually hunts her39. Someone whose options are all life- 
or-death choices cannot achieve autonomy either. Living an autonomous life requires 
the ability to form a life-plan, which, in turn, requires both significant and trivial 
options. The extremes illustrated by the hounded woman and the man in the pit show 
two ways in which the absence or `tragedy' of choice can thwart autonomy. 
How does this condition qualify the value and meaning of options? It seems 
that they are specified in an objective agent-independent sense. These examples 
suggest that living in a pit or being hounded are circumstances incompatible with 
autonomy independently of whether the person in the situation believes this to be the 
case. If this is so, then a conflict arises with the condition of neutrality: while the 
latter claims that conditions for autonomy must not make any substantive claims, the 
former argues that there are situations so dreary as to make autonomy impossible. A 
possible means of reconciling these views would be to specify a substantive 
threshold below which autonomy is unachievable while withdrawing further 
substantive judgment above that line. How acceptable this position is for a defender 
of content neutrality is an issue to be seen. 
6) Classical Rationality 
Some versions of autonomy seem to make certain assumptions about the nature and 
character of human rationality, often resembling those of rational choice and 
39 Ibid. 374. 
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expected utility theories40. According to these approaches, human rationality can be 
best conceptualised as a decision making device connecting goals and means, where 
the former are taken as given. This view of rationality, so described, is consistent 
with the condition of content-neutrality. Rationality demands that an agent finds the 
best means to achieve whatever ends he desires: he must ponder all the available 
options and compare how they 'score'. The rational action is the most efficient way 
to achieve a given end. Explaining a rational action `[w]ould', according to Elster, 
`show that the action is the (unique) best way of satisfying the full set of agent's 
desires, given the (uniquely) best beliefs the agent could form, relatively to the 
(uniquely determined) optimal amount of evidence'41. Or, in the case of decisions 
under uncertainty, a rational decision between options A and B an agent must 
compute his personal expected utility for [A], he [has] to determine all the 
possible consequences that [A] [can] bring, attach quantitative probabilities to 
each of these consequences, estimate the subjective utility of each consequence, 
multiply each utility by its associated probability and finally add all these 
numbers up. The same procedure [has] to [be] repeated for the alternative [B]. 
Finally, he [has] to choose the alternative with the higher total expected 
utility42 
For instance, recall Richard Arneson's remarks on critical reflection. He suggests 
that an autonomous agent must be predisposed to revise his plans and commitments 
when `disturbing or unanticipated evidence'43 advise the need to do so. Similarly, the 
ao Hurley, `The Public Ecology of Responsibility'. 
41 Jon Elster, 'The Nature and Scope of Rational Choice Explanation', in LePore, E., and B. 
McLaughlin (eds. ) Actions end Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1985), 71. 
42 Gigerenzer and Todd, 'Fast and Frugal Heuristics', 9. 
43 Arneson, `Autonomy and Preference Formation', 49. 
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processes that lead to one's formation of plans and goals must involve `full 
information and perfect rationality'`W. 
This conception of rationality might be segregated into two different variants. 
One, purely behavioural, argues that agents are expected to behave as if they were 
maximising expected utility. This view does not make any claims about the 
processes by which actions are caused. On the other hand, a different approach 
suggests that rationality encompasses the processes by which actions are brought 
about. Here, the processes of decision-making must themselves be rational in some 
sense. In general, these processes must satisfy some criteria of reasoning, such as 
being consistent with the rules of logical deduction. This criterion implies that 
rationality is thought to be general in its application and scope. 
Lastly, this view of rationality seems to suggest that mental states such as 
perceptions, beliefs, desires and intentions are connected through rational processes. 
These mental states are mediated by processes of reasoning in a familiar way: my 
perception of red, my forming a belief about the object being red, my desire to reach 
that red object and my intention to move my arm towards it are all mediated by `acts 
of will', which must be, in some sense, rational. 
Conditions for Autonomy: A Summary 
Before I present some challenges that might thwart the possibility of autonomy, I 
will sum up its associated conditions. The first condition states that autonomy 
requires mental states to be coherent in a usual way: they must be transitive and 
consistent. Moreover, there must be some identification between higher- and lower- 
44 Ibid. 48. 
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order states, such that if a person has a desire X, she must also accept or wish she 
had that desire. Second, mental states must have also the proper history; they must 
be the outcome of the `right' processes of desire and belief formation. In contrast 
with the first condition, which focused on the content of mental states, this condition 
focuses on the processes by which mental states come to be what they are. The third 
condition links the previous two: it holds that rational processes must have a causal 
role in the formation of mental states and that their content must be subjected to 
critical scrutiny whenever circumstances require this. This condition is here 
understood as a disposition towards critical reflection. The fourth condition holds 
that autonomy is to be gauged in a content-neutral fashion; this is motivated by the 
idea that autonomy should be independent of ethical considerations regarding the 
worthiness of controversial views of the good life. The fifth clause holds that 
autonomy requires an available range of meaningful options. Although this condition 
is perhaps in some tension with content-neutrality, it seems plausible that a life with 
very limited choice or a life in which every choice is life threatening cannot be an 
autonomous one. Finally, I specified some assumptions about rationality that 
seemingly underlie many conceptions of autonomy. These assumptions are 
embodied by classical theories of rational choice and exported utility theory. 
Paradigmatically, they assume that rationality is a general-domain, maximising, 
decision-making device linking given goals with the most effective means to achieve 
them. Another assumption is that mental states are mediated by reasoning and acts of 
will. With these conditions explored we must also consider various issues which 
threaten the possibility of autonomy prevailing. It is to this issue I shall now turn 
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II 
Challenges to Autonomy 
A) Adaptive Preference Formation 
One of the important challenges to autonomy is the tendency for an individual to 
adapt her preferences and desires to the set of feasible options and opportunities in 
order to avoid cognitive dissonance45. This process `runs behind their back' insofar 
as they are not aware that their preferences are being adapted. Imagine Beto, a 
relatively good young football player from a town in a remote village in a Latin 
American country. One day, scouts from Arsenal FC offer him the chance to 
participate in a pre-selection process at The Emirates Stadium. If successful, Beto 
could sign a contract for Arsenal's youth team for 5 years (let's assume that playing 
for Arsenal is much better than playing for his local team `Atletico Huixquilucan'). 
However, Beto cannot afford the flight to London. When his friends ask him why he 
didn't attend the pre-selection match, Beto sincerely tells them that, after all, he 
didn't want to play for Arsenal, the weather in London is very bad, Arsenal are an 
awful team, and, besides, he would really miss his mother's cooking46. According to 
the structural model Beto's choice would be autonomous, for he has both the desire 
to keep playing for his local team, and the desire to have that desire. However we 
might object that something is wrong here47. The processes by which Beto has 
45 Elster, Sour Grapes. 
46 We must assume that he is telling the truth; he has become convinced about these reasons. 
47 In order to establish that a process of adaptive preference has taken place we need to assume other 
things: we need to presuppose that if Beto had had enough money to go to London, he would have 
gone and would not have formed the desire not to travel to London. Another possibility, even more 
complicated, is that even having the money he just could not picture himself playing abroad. In this 
case, we must presuppose that his preferences are adapted towards the meagre expectations he has 
got. 
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achieved coherence between his different mental states are awkward in the sense that 
his refusal to play for Arsenal was caused by his limited (in this case economic) 
means for satisfying a desire. So it is not the case that his higher order desires or 
goals determined his actions (and lower order desires) but, rather, his circumstances 
have determined his character with no awareness on Beto's part. There are many 
different situations in which individuals adapt their preferences and desires in this 
fashion. In Amartya Sen's words it is possible that `[t]he hopeless beggar, the 
precarious landless labourer, the dominated housewife, the hardened unemployed or 
the overexhausted coolie' could qualify as autonomous under the structural view. 
Surely, however, they would not pass the historic test48. 
The opposite phenomenon to `sour grapes' is what Elster calls 
`counteradaptive preferences'. Here, preferences are also shaped by the feasible set 
but in the opposite direction. This phenomenon is captured by the maxim, `the grass 
is greener on the other side'. Imagine Dave, a football player who, last year, was 
playing for an English team and dreamed about playing in the Spanish League. This 
year he is hired by a Spanish team, but now he dreams of returning to play in 
England. Similar to the scenario in `sour grapes' his preferences are shaped `behind 
his back' and not through learning49. Counterfactually if he were to play in England 
again he would return to his hope of playing in Spain. These phenomena are 
important for autonomy because individuals' desires and preferences are being 
shaped by drives (with no awareness) rather than by intentional desires. 
However, not every adaptation threatens the ideal of autonomy. Sometimes 
individuals can autonomously reduce the gap between what they can achieve and 
48 Amartya Sen, On Ethics and Economics (Oxford: Blackwell. 1987), 45. 
49 Elster, Sour Grapes. 111. 
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what they wish to achieve. For instance, contrast `wrong' adaptation processes with 
`character planning'. As Elster writes, 
In both cases [sour grapes and character planning] the process [of adaptation] 
begins with a state of tension between what you can and what you might like to 
do. If the escape from this tension takes place by some causal mechanism of 
dissonance reduction, we are dealing with sour grapes; if it is engineered by 
conscious `strategies of liberation', with character planning 50 
The crucial difference is that in the former the process of adaptation is purely causal 
(drive shaped), while in the latter it is also intentional (produced through meta- 
preferences) 51 
B) Abnormal Belief Formation 
Beliefs can also be misshaped by a process of `wishful thinking'. In this case, beliefs 
are changed in order to conform with desires and feasible options. In similarity to 
adaptive preferences, the `function' of wishful thinking is to reduce cognitive 
dissonance. In its pure form, wishful thinking operates under the maxim `believe 
what you would like to be the case'. I believe that the town in which I live is the best 
town to reside in, or the University for which I work is the best in the world. Those 
can be cases of wishful thinking, provided that the belief in question has been caused 
50 Ibid. 117. 
51 Sometimes character planning might also conflict with autonomy; one person might become non 
autonomous by over-planning the way he wants to be. A strong desire to be a certain kind of person 
might conflict with critical reflection. Think for example in Tolstoy's picture of Prince Steven 
Arkadievich Oblonsky: `Oblonsky's tendency and opinions were not his by deliberate choice: they 
came of themselves, just as he did not choose the fashion of his hats or coats but wore those of the 
current style. Living in a certain social set, and having a desire, such as generally develops with 
maturity, for some kind of mental activity, he was obliged to hold views, just as he was obliged to 
have a hat. If he had a reason for preferring Liberalism to Conservatism of many in his set, it was not 
that he considered Liberalism more reasonable, but because it suited his manner better'. Leo Tolstoy, 
Anna Karenina (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 6. 
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(merely) by the desire that the world is thus rather than by salient evidence or good 
reasons. Wishful thinking reduces autonomy insofar as beliefs are formed 
subconsciously or by the wrong processes. 
It seems also possible to find a process of abnormal belief formation similar 
to the sour grapes mechanism52. According to this phenomenon, the processes by 
which an individual conceives her life-plans or conception of the good might be 
threatened by her deprived circumstances. In this case the mechanism operates at the 
level of convictions rather than at that of desires. Someone can fail to appreciate 
salient evidence because the circumstances in which he lives make it difficult to 
form certain rational beliefs. Imagine someone who due to living in an extremely 
violent society53, believes that violence is `natural' (in the sense that that there is 
nothing wrong with it). His failure to recognise the wrongness of violence might be 
explained by the fact that the `normal' processes of belief formation have been 
distorted by the violent environment in which he lives54 
C) Oppressive Socialisation 
The problem of `oppressive socialisation' arises because a theory of autonomy needs 
to avoid individuals repeating and reproducing certain conditions into which they 
have been socialised. Social environments and a community's shared values (be it 
the family, nation, clan, social class) can be causally effective in conditioning an 
individuals' conception of the good. Somehow, the upbringing generates the 
standpoint from which critical reflection and the assessment of one's opportunities 
52 Indeed Elster notes that some versions of the Sour Grapes fable involve misshapen beliefs. Elster, 
Sour Grapes, 123 n. 45. 
5; Something like the society pictured in the movie City of God. 
54 Cf. Gilbert 'How Mental Systems Believe', especially 111-2. 
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and choices are carried out. Values and practices inculcated during childhood have a 
great impact in the development of autonomy: some of them facilitate its 
developments, whereas others hinder it. Through oppressive socialisation people 
might find themselves merely reproducing the conditions under which they were 
socialised, and, furthermore, they might also identify themselves with such practices. 
There are dramatic examples of oppressive socialisation in which manipulation and 
brainwashing are common; women educated to be dominated by males, people 
educated into making huge sacrifices for a political party or religious leader, and so 
on55 
Besides those well known examples there are less dramatic cases in which 
people are introduced to practices and comprehensive views non-autonomously56 
Think about Alice, a competent woman who enters into an unequal marriage. Due to 
her traditional and conservative Catholic upbringing, she does not feel 
uncomfortable living a life which consists mainly in looking after children, attending 
social meetings with her husband, and gossiping with friends. Although her 
upbringing was relatively traditional, we cannot say that she was brainwashed or 
manipulated and she certainly was not coerced by anybody to enter into this 
marriage. Moreover, at the time she married she also had the options of attending a 
university or pursuing a career in ballet dancing. In other words, she did have a 
variety of meaningful options. Finally, she now thinks that her life is fine: she 
identifies with the kind of life she is living and so on. There seems to be something 
awkward in the way Alice shaped her life; she is merely replicating the values of this 
55 Think about educational policies such those described in George Orwell's novel 1984. 
56 See. for instance, Clayton, Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing. 
65 
CHAPTER 2 Autonomy, Mental Contamination and Free Speech 
form of Catholicism57. Now compare Alice with Ana, another Catholic woman 
whose life is substantively similar to Alice's. She also is confined to looking after 
the children, attending social meetings in Church, and gossiping. However Ana was 
not raised in a Catholic family. Her upbringing was `free' in the sense that she was 
not introduced to any particular conception of the good. But when she reached 22 
years old, she converted into Catholicism. Does is it make any difference? There 
seem to be two different ways of assessing these examples. On the one hand we 
could say that Alice is not autonomous due to the distorted processes through which 
she came to affirm the values she does. This view is consistent with the condition of 
content-neutrality insofar as it does not oppose the alleged oppressiveness of 
Catholicism; only the processes that led Alice to endorse those values. Alice's 
autonomy is threatened because her `oppressive' upbringing is the standpoint from 
which she evaluates and judges her life. From this perspective, the problem is the 
way in which she has come to endorse those values; namely through an oppressive, 
or at least a non-autonomy-fostering socialisation. On the other hand, a second 
strategy can attempt to disqualify both of Alice and Ana from being autonomous on 
the grounds that they voluntarily entered in an unequal marriage. In order to defend 
this strategy one needs to argue that oppressive relations are incompatible with 
autonomy even if `autonomously' chosen. On this view, autonomy is incompatible 
with certain oppressive values regardless of the way in which the person came to 
affirm them. Autonomy here is not content-neutral, but substantive58. The problem 
57 There are two different ways to read Alice's case: one holds, consistently with content-neutrality, 
that there is nothing autonomously-diminishing in affirming Catholic oppressive values. On the 
second view autonomy is incompatible with certain oppressive values regardless of the way in which 
the person came to affirm them. 
58 See Mackenzie and Stoljar `Introduction: Autonomy Reconfigured' for a defence of this view. A 
critical assessment comes in John Christman, 'Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the 
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with this second view is that it somewhat confuses the question of autonomy with 
ethical assessment of our lives. In order to rule out cases of oppressive socialisation, 
we must find a procedure to ensure that critical reflection does not `simply replicate 
the oppressive social conditions that autonomous living is meant to stand against' 59 
One could conclude that because Alice is less autonomous than Ana, the 
latter should bear the costs arising form her choices. However, this claim is 
mistaken. Andrew Mason rightly claims that women living in a sexist society should 
not bear the full costs of their actions (even if, like Ana's, their decisions are 
autonomous)60. Mason argues that insofar as some choices are made against a 
background in which sexist norms are `widely accepted and transmitted in a variety 
of different ways through a complex system of gender socialisation' 61, it would be 
unfair to make women bear the full costs of her choices, `even if their decision is 
fully autonomous' 62. The reason is not merely that preferences and desires are 
shaped by socialisation, but that some of the norms into which a person is socialised 
are unjust. The implication of this point, however, extends beyond the aims of this 
chapter. Here the concern is the concept of autonomy, rather than in which 
circumstances autonomy is relevant for the distribution of burdens and benefits in 
society. 
D) Automatic and Unconscious Processes 
Social Constitution of Selves', Philosophical Studies, 117 (2004), 143-64; Christman, `Procedural 
Autonomy and Liberal Legitimacy'. 
59 Christman, 'Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution of Selves', 
154. 
60 Andrew Mason. Levelling the Playing Field: The Idea of Equal Opportunity and its Place in 
Egalitarian Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 182-8. 
61 Ibid. 185. 
62 Ibid. 185. 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, it has been shown by several experiments in 
Social and Cognitive Psychology that much behaviour is automatic and non- 
conscious. Distinct disciplines have converged on the conclusion that the 
automaticity of behaviour constitutes a salient ingredient of the way human beings 
function63. As Selten writes: `Much of human behaviour is automatised in the sense 
that it is not connected to any conscious deliberation' 64 
Automatic processes have been defined as mental acts which have one or 
more of the following elements: they are unconscious, unintentional or effortless6s 
`An automatic mental phenomenon occurs reflexively whenever certain triggering 
conditions are in place; when those conditions are present, the process runs 
autonomously, independently of conscious guidance'66. Some of the conditions 
necessary for automatic processes 
require only the presence of the triggering environmental event; it does not 
matter were the current focus of conscious attention is, what the individual was 
recently thinking, or what the individual's current intentions or goals are. [... ] 
What it means for a psychological process to be automatic, therefore is that it 
happens when its set of preconditions are in place without needing any 
conscious choice to occur, or guidance from that point on67. 
63 See the collection of essays in Ran Hassin, James Uleman and John Bargh, The New Unconscious 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Bargh and Chartrand 'The Unbearable Automaticity of 
Being'; Bargh, Chen, and Burrows, 'Automaticity of Social Behavior'; Chartrand and Bargh, 'The 
Chameleon Effect'; Timothy Wilson, Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious 
(New York: Belknap, 2002). 
64 Reinhard Selten, 'What is Bounded Rationality', in Gigerenzer, G., and R. Selten (eds. ) Bounded 
Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 16. 
65 Wilson, Strangers to Ourselves, 222 n. 4. Cf. Bargh and Chartrand define a conscious process as 
those `mental acts of which we are aware, that we intend (i. e. that we start by an act of will), that 
require effort. and that we can control (i. e. we can stop them and go on to something else we choose'. 
Bargh and Chartrand `The Unbearable Automaticity of Being', 463. 
66 John Bargh, The Automaticity of Everyday Life', Advances in Social Cognition, 10 (1997), 3. 
67 Ibid. 3. 
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There seem to be at least two major forms of automatic mental processes: 
skill acquisition and unintentional automatic response. Skill acquisition is automatic 
in the sense that, once some degree of mastery has been achieved, the performance 
of some activity becomes mechanical. Think, for example, of the process of learning 
a foreign language or driving a car. This kind of behaviour begins with an act of will. 
Then, as the processes become more efficient over time, agents are able to perform 
the behaviour without conscious guidance: `[t]hese [are] intentional but effortless 
mental processes' 68. 
In contrast there is another kind of automatic processing that in addition does 
not require an act of will to be prompted. It is this kind of automaticity which 
occupies me in this thesis. Among the mechanisms that operate at an automatic level, 
one, which has received a great amount of attention in academic literature, is the so- 
called `ideomotor principle'69. The idea behind this is that the mere perception of 
some behaviour increases the likelihood of an agent performing that same behaviour 
unintentionally70. Of import here is that `the influence of perception on behavioural 
tendencies is automatic in that it is passive, unintentional and non-conscious' 7I. This 
principle is not restricted to perceptual experiences. The `representation of an 
action's goal can elicit movements that would be means to that end; it has effects 
68 Bargh and Chartrand `The Unbearable Automaticity of Being', 463. Skill acquisition is perfectly 
compatible with the standard notion of autonomy. In a sense, this kind of behaviour is kept in virtual 
control; individuals can make an effort to bring it back to consciousness. Philip Pettit, A Theory of 
Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (Cambridge: Polity, 2001) 
69 Bargh, 'Bypassing the Will'; John Bargh, 'The Automaticity of Everyday Life', Advances in Social 
Cognition, 10 (1997), 1-61; Dijksterhuis and Bargh, 'The Perception-Behavior Expressway'. 
70 Hurley, `Bypassing Conscious Control', 310. 
71 Bargh, Chen, and Burrows, 'Automaticity of Social Behavior', 233. 
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even when movements do not break through overtly. [ ... ] [M]erely imagining a 
skilled performance, in sport or music, improves your own performance' 72 
The ideomotor principle can be described as having two steps. First, there is a 
link between environmental stimuli and perception. Then there is a second step 
between perception and behaviour. In contrast with the standard view of the 
relationship between perception and action, which supposes mental mediation 
between different mental states, the ideomotor principle suggests that perceptual 
traits activate behavioural tendencies directly. Contrast the following pictures of the 
relation between perception and behaviour: 
Environment - Perception - Mental Representation -) Act of will - Action 
According to this view, behaviour always requires an element of 'volition'. The 
automatic behaviour perspective proposes a picture that dispenses the necessity of 
will. Its suggestion is this: 
Environment - Perception - Mental Representation 4 Action (Behaviour). 
In other words, `perceiving an action activates the mental representation of this 
action, which in turns leads to performance of the action973 . 
An important phenomenon related to the ideomotor principle is the so-called 
`Chameleon Effect'74, which holds that individuals tend to imitate whatever other 
people are doing. In a series of experiments, Tanya Chartrand and John Bargh 
72 Hurley, `Bypassing Conscious Control', 310. 
73 Dijksterhuis and Bargh. 'The Perception-Behavior Expressway'. 8. 
74 Chartrand and Bargh, 'The Chameleon Effect'; Hurley, 'Bypassing Conscious Control'. 
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suggest that imitative tendencies are easily triggered. In one of the experiments two 
individuals were sitting side-by-side both looking at a desk with pictures. They were 
asked to focus all their attention on the pictures (not on the other person). The results 
show that individuals tended to move their foot when sitting by someone who was 
also moving his foot, and tended to rub their face when the other person did 
likewise75. Similarly, when seated by someone who was smiling the experimenteers 
tended to smile, whereas when seated by a non-smiling individual they tended not to. 
Surprisingly, when the participants were asked if they felt that the other person was 
friendly or not, their answers were vague. In the majority of cases they said they did 
not pay attention to the other person. They also reported not attempting to be friendly 
or unfriendly themselves. It is important to note that, according to their own reports, 
in both experiments, participants were unaware of either, the other person's 
behaviour or their own76. 
A related group of phenomena do not depend on perceiving behaviour, but 
rely on activating concepts within an agent's mind. The idea here is that 
environmental features can activate concepts automatically, increasing the likelihood 
of behaving according to those concepts. It is important to see that concept activation 
is also a form of the ideomotor principle. Concepts trigger associated activities, and 
perceiving associated traits can activate those concepts77. Not surprisingly, automatic 
75 Chartrand and Bargh, 'The Chameleon Effect', 897-900. 
76 Ibid. 900-4. 
" It is not difficult to speculate as to why these tendencies evolved. The ideomotor principle does not 
require as many mental resources as a principle in which perception and action are completely 
independent. Imitation can be a very successful strategy for learning new unusual tricks. For instance, 
Hurley, `Bypassing Conscious Control' refers to the importance of imitation in Michael Tomasello, 
The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). On the other 
hand, stereotyping and generalising might prove more successful for structuring new information than 
using all new information as if it were the first time it was dealt with. See Gigerenzer and Selten, 
Bounded Rationality: Gigerenzer and Todd, Simple Heuristics that Make Us Smart. 
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and implicit elements78 also figure prominently in social perception and social 
cognition. For instance, in a series of experiments Bargh and his colleagues primed 
some students- with different concepts79. The students were not aware that they were 
being primed -they believed that they were performing a different task. In 
experiment 1, the students were primed with traits of rudeness or politeness by the 
use of a scrambled sentence test. After performing this task they were taken into a 
room in which a conversation was taking place. They were given the option of 
interrupting the conversation or waiting for it to end. The results show that 
individuals primed with words related to politeness tended to wait longer for the 
conversation to end (i. e. they behaved more politely) than people who were primed 
with the concept of `rudeness' 80. 
An important component of implicit social cognition are social stereotypes. 
A stereotype is a socially shared set of beliefs about traits that are characteristic 
of members of a social category. [... ] Stereotypes guide judgement and action 
to the extent that a person acts toward another as if the other possesses traits 
included in the stereotype. [... ] Implicit stereotypes are introspectively 
unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate 
attributions of qualities to members of a social category' 81. 
Because people are exposed to the content of social stereotypes from early childhood 
(according to Patricia Devine82 stereotypes are established in children as young as 5 
years old) it is predictable that stereotypes can be automatically triggered, as with 
78 Although different dichotomies such as `explicit-implicit', `aware-unaware', `conscious- 
unconscious', `automatic-controlled' are used to describe more or less the same processes, they tend 
to emphasise different aspects of overlapping phenomena. 
79 Bargh, Chen, and Burrows, 'Automaticity of Social Behavior'. 
80 Ibid. 233-6. 
x1 Greenwald and Banaji, 'Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes', 14-5. 
82 Patricia Devine, 'Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components', Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 56 (1989), 5-18. 
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other cognitive traits. This does not mean that people approve or endorse the content 
of the stereotype83. But, because stereotypes are learnt in early childhood, the 
cognitive structures of proposition rejection have not been fully developed. This 
makes it more difficult for individuals to put aside the automatic reactions to the 
stereotype in question. In a second experiment, John Bargh and others used the same 
scrambled sentence test employed in the `rude/polite' experiment. This time the 
stereotype of the elderly was activated. After completing the task, students who were 
primed with words related to the elderly stereotype walked slower (slowness being a 
trait associated with the elderly people stereotype) than those not primed84. 
A large number of similar experiments have been completed, and the 
evidence for these automatic phenomena is strong85. From them we can draw some 
significant conclusions. First, it is important to notice that these processes operate at 
many levels; they trigger goal-oriented behaviour as well as merely instrumental, 
bodily behaviour86. Second, the ideomotor principle and the chameleon effect 
operate continuously; they are the default state of human beings87. Third, it is the 
environment that directly causes the behaviour88. It does not matter whether 
individuals are aware that they are being primed; they usually do not accept that their 
behaviour is being caused by external stimuli rather than by their own wi1189. And 
fourth, the cost of controlling those automatic processes is high. It requires a great 
amount of attention and effort. Although people can control the processes by 
83 Ibid. 5. 
84 Bargh, Chen, and Burrows, 'Automaticity of Social Behavior', 236-8. 
85 Cf. Bargh, `Bypassing the Will' for a survey of convergent literature. 
86 Hurley, `Bypassing Conscious Control', 311. 
87 Ibid. 311. 
88 Bargh. 'Bypassing the Will'. 
89 Bargh and Chartrand `The Unbearable Automaticity of Being'; Bargh, `Bypassing the Will'; 
Hurley, `Bypassing Conscious Control'. 
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focusing on it not happening, this is only possible `when there is sufficient 
attentional capacity available for the act of control'90. When students were asked to 
walk fast after being primed with the stereotypes they were able to, thus overcoming 
the priming effect. It is very easy, however, due to our limited attentional capacity, 
to lose control. More important perhaps is the fact that people do not accept that such 
processes influence them. Automatic behaviour occurs, and it happens much more 
than we suppose. It increases the likelihood of meaningless movements (like rubbing 
my face, move my foot while sitting), but it also activates goal-oriented behaviour. 
Moreover, automatic behaviour influences social relations: people can act more or 
less politely, be more or less rude, or react to certain social groups with no awareness 
of their doing so. 
E) Mental Contamination 
Mental contamination is defined as the `process whereby a person ends up with an 
unwanted judgment, emotion or behavior because of mental processing that is 
unconscious or uncontrollable'. `Unwanted' here means `that the judgment maker 
would prefer not to be influenced by the mental process in question'91. Mental 
contamination is related to how stimuli trigger processes in a person's mind, usually 
with no awareness and necessarily without her approval. In this respect, mental 
contamination is linked to the condition of identification discussed above. An 
important feature of this definition is that it is subjectively defined; contamination 
occurs when a person responds in ways she would not like to. 
90 Bargh, Chen, and Burrows, 'Automaticity of Social Behavior'. 232. 
91 Timothy Wilson and Nancy Brekke, 'Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted 
Influences on Judgments and Evaluations', Psychological Bulletin, 116 (1994). 119. 
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One of the dynamics which facilitates mental contamination relates to our 
mind's opacity: due to our limited introspective capacities we are not very good at 
discovering the causes of our reactions and in many respects we are mistaken about 
ourselves. For instance, `when [people] form an evaluation of someone, what they 
experience is usually the final product [ ... 
], not the mental processes that produced 
this product'92. When mental contamination occurs, it may leave some clues. 
However, they are usually not definitive and, moreover, they can be misleading. 
There are two main causes of mental contamination: on the one hand, it can be the 
by-product of automatic responses; on the other, it can be due to source confusion. 
Recall that a significant part of our behaviour is automatic (it is effortless and 
unconscious). These processes might lead to contamination when they cause 
responses we would rather not have. Moreover, because they occur outside of one's 
awareness, these processes are extremely difficult to control. How can I control my 
mimicking someone when I am not aware than I am doing so? For this reason, 
automatic behaviour's contaminant potential is elevated. Similarly, it is not easy 
avoiding feelings or beliefs through sheer acts of wi1193. Even if behaviour is easier 
to control than mental states, as the literature on automatic behaviour suggests, it is 
likely that much will escape our control. We usually do not have spare mental 
resources to control everything we do. 
A second source of mental contamination concerns source confusion. 
`'' Wilson and Brekke, 'Mental Contamination and Mental Correction', 121. 
93 Cf. Daniel Wegner, 'You Can't Always Think What You Want: Problems in the Suppression of 
Unwanted Thoughts', Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 25 (1992), 193-225; Daniel 
Gilbert, Romin Tafarodi and Patrick Malone, 'You Can't Not Believe Everything You Read', Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 65 (1993), 221-33. See my discussion of this problem 
regarding free speech in Chapter 5. 
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In everyday life, people's responses are almost always multidetermined; their 
feelings for a loved one spring from many sources, and their evaluation of a job 
candidate is based on more than the candidate's many attributes. A considerable 
amount of research suggests, however, that people are not skilled at dissecting a 
judgment (recognizing the exact contribution of everything that caused it) [... ]. 
They recognize the thoughts and feelings that result but not the exact recipes 
that produced them. [... ] Because of this source confusion -the inability to 
recognize the exact contribution of all of the influences on one's judgments- it 
is difficult to take steps to avoid being affected by unwanted agents 94 
For instance, individuals tend to make mistakes in the attribution of the cause of their 
emotions and/or mental states; they can believe their arousal is caused by an 
attractive experimenter for instance, when in fact it was caused by fear of crossing a 
bridge9s 
An important and well-known source of confusion is the `halo effect', which 
is characterised as a situation in which a subject's learning that an unfamiliar person 
possesses a characteristic B tends to produce a `positive or negative attitude' 
(depending on whether B is judged positively or negatively) toward that person. That 
attitude then is likely to be generalised to some other specific attribute A of that 
person. `The attitude toward B is said to operate implicitly when the subject does not 
notice that B is influencing the judgment of A'96. For instance, essays written by a 
physically attractive student tend to get better marks than essays written by students 
who are less attractive97. Similarly, `attractive males and females are judged to be 
kinder, more interesting, more sociable, happier, stronger, of better character, and 
94 Wilson and Brekke, 'Mental Contamination and Mental Correction', 129. 
95 Ibid. 129. They list more examples of this kind. 
96 Greenwald and Banaji, 'Implicit Social Cognition', 9. 
97 Wilson and Brekke, 'Mental Contamination and Mental Correction', 129 
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more likely to hold prestigious jobs'98. In another example unrelated to physical 
attractiveness, a male person was presented to different groups of observers as a 
student, demonstrator, lecturer, senior lecturer and professor. Later, when the 
observers had to remember how the man looked, the description of his height was a 
function of his status, the student being the shorter and the professor the taller 99 
How can people avoid mental contamination, and how likely are they to be 
successful? Wilson and Brekke suggest that four steps are required. First, people 
must be aware that the biasing element will occur. Imagine that a teacher is marking 
the essays of two students. One of them is written by a physically attractive student, 
the other is written by a non attractive one. The marker gives the first student a 65%, 
while she gives to the second student 63% (suppose that in unbiased evaluation both 
essays get 64%). The teacher believes that the marks are fair and reflect only the 
quality of the written work. Following the `halo effect', it is likely that the teacher 
has been contaminated; an objective evaluation (of the quality of the essay) has been 
influenced by a subjective evaluation (how much she likes/dislikes the student). In 
order to avoid contamination, she must know that the `halo effect' has occurred, or is 
likely to occur. 
Second, people must be motivated to neutralise the bias. In the example 
above, the teacher must concede that she is actually susceptible to being biased. This 
step is not always taken since some people reject that they might be biased in these 
ways because it violates our common sense about ourselves. While the teacher reads 
about these phenomena, she would probably say "hold on, I believe that the `halo 
effect' happens to some people, but surely not to me. I'm being fair! ". In order to 
98 Greenwald and Banaji, 'Implicit Social Cognition', 9 
99 ibid. 9. 
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prove the extent to which people are motivated to correct their biases Wilson and 
others1°° designed the following experiment. They provided some data, published by 
the impartial magazine Consumer Report (CR), about two brands of condoms (A and 
B) to a group of female students. According to the Consumer Report brand A was of 
better quality than Brand B. They also produced two anonymous reports by students' 
of their university. The students' report (SR) recommended brand B over brand A. 
Participants could choose to read neither, one or both of the reports and later they 
had to choose which brand they would select in their private lives. Some of the 
students (13%) said they would want to be more influenced by the SR than by CR, 
but only 3% wanted a friend to be more influenced by the SR. For the rest of 
participants, the SR satisfied the definition of contaminant (they did not want to be 
influenced by it). Interestingly, when they were offered the information, most people 
choose to see both reports (77%), and very few avoided the SR (12%). `This 
suggests that although people recognized the invalidity of the [SR], they had faith in 
their ability to avoid being influenced by it in an undesirable way' °' As expected, 
when given both kinds of information, 31 % preferred brand B (the one 
recommended by SR), and, consistently their choice was the product of a 
contaminated decision. To sum up the results, 13% wanted to be influenced by SR, 
77% read both reports and 31 % ended up choosing the brand recommended by SR. 
Acknowledgment and motivation alone, however, are not sufficient to avoid 
contamination. Third, then, we also need to know the direction and magnitude of the 
bias. In the example of the teacher, suppose that she thinks she might be influenced 
by the `halo effect' and she wants to neutralise it. However, she does not know how 
100 Cf. discussion in Wilson and Brekke, `Mental Contamination and Mental Correction'. 124-5. 
101 Ibid. 125. 
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much biased she is. To be sure, she could take 5 points away from the attractive 
student, or give 5 extra points to the unattractive one. But then her marks would be 
biased again, not by the `halo effect' but due to an overestimation of the effects of 
her previous bias. It seems that people tend to underestimate their own susceptibility 
to contamination: people seem to believe that information is more contaminating in 
the hand of others than in their own hands. Significantly, though, they also usually 
do not know how to calculate the correct adjustment necessary to counteract the halo 
effect. 
Fourth, people need to take effective steps and have the ability to adjust their 
responses in a non-contaminated way. One of the problems besetting this is that 
people tend to overestimate their capacity for mental control. Otherwise, why did 
participants in the experiment above choose to see both reports, even when they did 
not want to be influenced by one of them? Another experiment's results are similar. 
Participants were to hire someone. Even though many of them did not want to be 
influenced by the applicant's gender and they agreed that knowing the applicant's 
gender might influence them more than they would wish it to, 87% still chose to 
know the gender of the person (only 5% declined the knowledge). 
One possible solution to this problem is to forewarn people about the 
contamination potential of certain sources102. This strategy's success is limited 
though: critically it depends on people's attitudes towards themselves. If I believe 
that I can exert control over my mind (as we normally feel we can), then being 
forewarned about the dangers of some influences will make no significant 
102 This strategy will be discussed with detail in Chapter 5 in relation to speech. The idea that `more, 
and better speech' can undo the costs of free speech is a familiar example. 
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difference. Even if a person wants to neutralise the bias, it might prove just too 
costly; lots of mental resources are required for 'policing'. 
In today's world, we are exposed to great amount of physical pollutants, such 
as asbestos, automobile emissions, and hazardous waste. We usually take action to 
avoid contact with these materials. Following the analogy, mental contamination 
might not be different. An appropriate response may suggest controlling exposure to 
the contaminant. This requires taking steps before contamination occurs, therefore 
saving mental resources for other purposes (rather than employing them in 
attempting to correct the effects of contamination 103). Among other problems this 
strategy may have (it might cause people to confirm their biases, it might be more 
useful only against external, rather than internal, influences), one is of particular 
importance: it seems to be too demanding insofar as it asks people to be `ever 
vigilant, ready to shut their eyes and cover their ears whenever they suspect that 
potentially unwanted information was in the vicinity' 104 
A possible solution is to delegate others to control the things to which we are 
exposed. The design of democratic and public procedures for controlling exposure to 
contaminant material might be critical in protecting individuals' autonomy. Notice 
though that contamination occurs at different levels, the scope of which ranges from 
the trivial (what flavour of ice cream to choose) to the meaningful (behaving 
aggressively to people because we have just watched a violent movie, treating people 
differently due to their physical attributes). It would be impossible to control every 
source of contamination; trying to do so assumes unrealistic mental capacities. 
103 This is what we do with physical pollution; we avoid being exposed to it, rather than correcting its 
effects. 
104 Wilson and Brekke. `Mental Contamination and Mental Correction', 135. 
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Autonomy as non-contamination needs to categorise the risks and weights of 
different types of contamination. Controlling exposure to the serious sources of 
biasing might be a necessary condition for autonomy. Autonomy seems to require 
that social relations are sensitive to contamination, and that the exposure to its 
sources be more or less socially controlled. 
F) Revised Rationality 
There is much evidence now suggesting that people fail to satisfy the normative 
criteria of classical rationality. As explained in Chapter 1, people usually fail to 
apply the rules of logic and probabilistic reasoning when presented with problems. 
Rather, they make decisions based on rules of thumb and heuristics 105 While some 
authors retain the normative criteria of decision theory, and argue that humans are 
beset by many kinds of irrationality, other have abandoned this model and instead 
sought a revised account. One of these revisions is the idea of `ecological 
rationality' 
106 
One of the main contrasts between classical and ecological rationality relates 
to the ideal of maximisation: whereas the former allocates it a fundamental role, the 
latter excludes it altogether. In this respect the ecological model is a form of bounded 
rationality. It is even more modest than satisficing rationality. 
To make the contrast clearer, imagine someone who is deciding for which 
degree she will apply. There are many different options to choose from: medicine, 
105 See Chapter 1; classic studies appear in Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (eds. ) Judgment under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases; Kahneman and Tversky (eds. ) Choices, Values and Frames; 
Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin and Daniel Kahneman, (eds. ) Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology 
of Intuitive Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
106 Gigerenzer, Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World; Gigerenzer and Selten (eds. ) 
Bounded Rationality: Gigerenzer and Todd, Simple Heuristics that Make Us Smart. 
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politics, economics, philosophy, sociology, and so on. Each department has some 
`open days' to provide information about the degrees, careers etc. An individual 
deciding which degree to choose can follow (roughly speaking) one of two 
strategies. The first, which is consistent with classic, maximising rationality, consists 
in visiting every open day, weighing every piece of information, assigning numerical 
value to each one according to its expected utility and so forth 107. Strategy two is 
more simplistic: it consists in fixing `an adjustable aspiration level and ending the 
search for alternatives as soon as one is encountered that exceeds the aspirational 
level' 108. This strategy is especially suitable for making decisions when time is 
scarce or when uncertainty is high. 
Although this idea is attractive, according to Gigerenzer and Todd, it 
sometimes still demands a large amount of computational capacities. For example, it 
might be that even setting the aspiration level is hard to achieve, or `calculating how 
the option compares with the aspiration level' might demand a great amount of 
attention and capacities'°9 So, in order to cope with these problems their proposal, 
`ecological rationality', develops the idea of `fast and frugal heuristics', which 
`employ a minimum of time, knowledge, and computation to make adaptive choices 
in real environments1110 , sets easy stopping rules 
in searching for information and 
exploit the environmental structure to yield adaptive decisions. 
Ecological rationality highlights the fact that rational decisions are taken in 
specific environments. Whereas classical rationality focuses on internal logical 
107 There is also option 1'. This is similar to strategy one, but here individuals stop attending open 
days when attending them outweighs the benefit of the new information given in the open days. This 
strategy refers to `optimisation under constraint'. 
108 Gigerenzer and Todd `Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive Toolbox'. 13. 
'09 Ibid. 14. 
110 Ibid. 14. 
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standards, such as internal coherence, transitivity, etc., ecological rationality requires 
being `adapted to the structure of environment' 111 The life of real organisms consists 
in dealing with changing, challenging environments. These organisms must attempt 
to make rational decisions; that is, decisions that allow them to survive and 
reproduce112. It is in this sense in which the standards of rationality move from 
internal coherence to environmental fitness. The idea is to match decision-making 
strategies with the structure of the environment 113: they exploit the recurrence of 
some environmental structures in order to reach `better' results than unbounded 
versions of rationality. An example of fast and frugal heuristics is the `recognition 
heuristic'. Imagine that you are asked which city has a larger population, San Diego 
or San Antonio. The recognition heuristic tells you that `if you recognize one object 
and not the other, then infer that the recognized object has the higher value on the 
target variable; if you do not recognize either object, then guess" 14 
Another problem with classical versions of rationality is their assumption that 
rational processes are general-domain rules for decision. It is in this respect in which 
classical rationality is not ecological, the rules are assumed to work in any 
environment. Ecological rationality, by contrast, assumes rationality as being 
essentially an evolutionary adaptation for solving specific problems, rather than an 
ability to make abstract computations. Adaptations `are mechanisms or systems of 
properties crafted by natural selection to solve specific problems posed by the 
regularities of the physical, chemical, developmental, ecological, demographic, 
111 Ibid. 12. 
1 12 Ibid. 18. 
113 Gerd Gigerenzer, 'The Adaptive Toolbox', in Gigerenzer and Selten, Bounded Rationality. 
114 Valerie Chase, Ralph Hert\vig, and Gerd Gigerenzer 'Visions of Rationality', Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 2 (1998), 208. Cf. Daniel Goldstein and Gerd Gigerenzer, 'Models of Ecological Rationality: 
The Recognition Heuristic', Psychological Review, 109 (2002), 75-90. 
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social and informational environments encountered by ancestral populations during 
the course of a species' or population's evolution' 1 15 In order to be successful, 
adaptations tend to be domain-specific rather than general because specificity allows 
them to respond more efficiently to environmental pressures 116 Rather than the laws 
of formal logic, individuals tend to employ different heuristics which allow them to 
solve problems successfully. 
Contrast the different approaches of general rules and domain specificity. 
According to the former, there are only a few all-purpose rules (essentially those of 
formal logic) which must solve every problem we encounter. Whether we are trying 
to engage in social exchange, choosing habitat, or finding a mate, we should make 
the decisions in accordance with these general rules. It is merely a matter of applying 
them regardless of the specific content of the problem. On the other hand, the 
adaptive approach suggests that rationality resembles a `toolbox', where there are 
different rules and strategies specific to particular problems. The advantage of the 
adaptive toolbox seems to be that it is able to respond more efficiently to the 
regularities of the environment. Because organisms face situations that are not 
altogether new, they can employ the same strategies that have proved to be 
successful in the past, rather than devising them from scratch. It is important, 
however, to bare in mind that the specific tools need to be flexible and simple so as 
to cope with environmental variations 117 
1 15 Tooby and Cosmides, `The Psychological Foundations of Culture', 62. 
116 This seems to be the evolutionary reason that explains the existence of the fast and frugal 
heuristics discussed in the section above. 
117 It is interesting that artificial intelligence works in terms of domain specificity rather than with all- 
purpose tools. There is software specific for text working, a different one for sound editing, etc. 
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There is some empirical evidence that supports the existence of the adaptive 
toolbox 118. Think about an animal whose food usually appears scattered around at 
random. This animal will develop a heuristic mechanism for finding food which will 
consist in looking around randomly for it. In contrast, another animal's food appears 
in hidden places that can be discovered by learning and inference from cues. This 
animal will use a different heuristic, employing memory and inferences between 
food and cues 119. In another example, people are very good at recognising other 
people's faces but not so good at recognising hands (although hands are as unique as 
faces), and also better at recognising people's faces than horses' faces. Recall 
Lawrence Hirschfeld's theory of race cognition, he suggests that we have a domain- 
specific module to conceptualise human kinds, and that module is distinct from 
concerns of natural kinds or living things 120 
To sum up, the ecological notion of rationality is a version derived from the 
idea of bounded rationality. As such it abandons completely the ideal of 
maximisation. It has two dimensions. On the one hand it acknowledges the mind's 
limits in terms of mental and computational abilities and the time constraints which 
affect decision-making. On the other hand, it pays particular attention to the structure 
of environments within which agents interact. According to this theory, there are 
heuristics and strategies that are suited to solving specific adaptation problems and 
which have evolved by natural selection. This view of rationality also holds that the 
Its Gigerenzer, Adaptive Thinking; Gigerenzer and Selten, (eds. ) Bounded Rationality; Wilson, 
Strangers to Ourseli'es. 
119 Gigerenzer and Todd 'Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive Toolbox'. 13. 
120 Chapter 1; Hirschfeld, Race in the Making. 
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criteria for assessing the rationality of behaviour is not internal consistency, but 
rather its fit with reality and `ecological' success121 
III 
Relations between Conditions and Challenges 
In this section I will relate briefly the condition of autonomy with the 
aforementioned different challenges. Although the discussion is not exhaustive, the 
goal of this section is to provide an overview of how the conditions relate to each of 
the threats discussed above. 
This table illustrates the relations between conditions and challenges: 
Threats to Autonomy 
A B C D E F 
1 - - - - x - 
2 X X X X X X? 
Conditions 
for 
3 X X X X - X? 
autonomy 4 - - x - - x 
5 X X - - X? 
6 X X - X - X 
1) Identification, 2) Right Processes of Formation, 3) Critical Ketlection, 4) Content- 
Neutrality, 5) Adequate Options, 6) Classical Rationality. A) Adaptive Preferences 
Formation, B) Abnormal Belief Formation, C) Oppressive Socialisation, D) Automatic 
Behaviour, E) Mental Contamination, F) Ecological Rationality. 
121 Cf. `The Standard Social Sciences Model requires an impossible psychology [... ] A psychological 
architecture that consisted in nothing but equipotential, general-purpose, content-independent, or 
content-free mechanisms could not successfully perform the tasks the human mind is known to 
perform or solve the adaptive problems humans evolved to solve [... ]. The alternative view is that the 
human psychological architecture contains many evolved mechanisms that are specialized for solving 
evolutionary long-enduring adaptive problems and that these mechanisms have content-specialized 
representational formats, procedures, cues and so on. These richly content-sensitive evolved 
mechanisms tend to impose certain types of content and conceptual organization on human mental 
life and, hence, strongly shape the nature of human social life and what is culturally transmitted 
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1E) Identification encounters an obvious challenge from mental contamination. 
Recall that the latter is the `process whereby a person has an unwanted response 
because of mental processing that is unconscious or uncontrollable' 122. A person 
whose responses are contaminated cannot identify with them. The teacher who wants 
to be fair but who nevertheless (unconsciously) gives a higher mark to a student 
because he likes her (the `halo effect') cannot identify himself with his automatic 
response. The very definition of mental contamination is incompatible with the 
identification condition. Even though the definition of mental contamination is 
worded only in terms of products, it also applies to the outcomes of processes people 
reject. Imagine that after watching a violent movie in the cinema you respond 
aggressively to the bus driver. The aggressive response was caused automatically by 
the `chameleon effect' 123. It is not only that you regret harbouring the process which 
prompted you to react aggressively, but also that you regret the response itself' 24 
Mental contamination then needs not be restricted only to processes; it can also 
encompass their outcomes. In both cases it conflicts with identification. 
Right Causal History 
2A) Adaptive preferences are primarily and foremost in conflict with the condition 
of `right' causal history. Autonomy requires our desires and preferences to be shaped 
by reasons and by the right mental processes. However, as stated in the last section, 
122 Wilson and Brekke, `Mental Contamination and Mental Correction', 117. Emphasis added. 
123 For a discussion on the links between violence in media and automatic behaviour see Hurley, 
'Bypassing Conscious Control'. 
124 This does not mean that both go necessarily together; there might be cases in which you regret 
having the process but not the outcome (someone manipulates you into exercising more often than 
you normally do, and you feel quite happy about the result, nevertheless you still reject being 
manipulated). 
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individuals sometimes adapt their preferences in order to avoid cognitive dissonance; 
a `painful' or `distressing' psychic phenomenon consisting in having a set of mental 
states which does not cohere with a different set of mental states. For instance, in the 
case of sour grapes, cognitive dissonance results when someone's desires are not 
likely to be satisfied due to beliefs regarding external circumstances. The mechanism 
is triggered in order to avoid the frustration involved in knowing that certain things 
one desires will not happen. It is fundamental to remember, however, that what 
threatens autonomy is not the existence of cognitive dissonance, but the mechanism 
by which the mind reduces it: that is, the processes by which our desires and 
preferences are shaped. This mechanism is purely causal as opposed to being 
operated by the agent's intentions12s 
Contrast this phenomenon with instances of character planning, in which a 
person deliberatively decides to abandon desires that he could not fulfil. Although 
their phenomenology might be difficult to pinpoint (people can always rationalise 
their adaptations), in the case of sour grapes preference change occurs due to drives, 
in the case of character planning it is caused by meta-preferences 126. A means of 
perceiving the difference is that adaptive preferences usually downgrade the 
inaccessible options. In the case of Beto, he probably would say: `Anyway, life in 
England surely is horrible! '. Whereas character planning tends to upgrade the 
accessible options: if I am not entirely happy in the University for which I work, I 
could try to reduce the cognitive dissonance by focusing on the (few) positive 
elements of my situation. 
125 Elster, Sour Grapes, 110. Strictly speaking this is not true. Intentions are also causally effective in 
bringing about actions. The distinction means that intentional causes play no role in reducing 
cognitive dissonance. 
126 Ibid. 117-9. 
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Another process which, in terms of results, resembles adaptive preference 
formation is precommitment. In this case an agent deliberatively shapes the set of 
available options in order to make his preferred choice within the set to coincide 
with his preferred option in a wider range of conceivable possibilities. Ulysses' 
strategies are an illustration of these mechanisms127. Someone can pay the whole 
dental treatment in advance in order to make it very costly for him to withdraw. 
Notice that both character planning and precommitment also reduce cognitive 
dissonance, but they do so in a rational, autonomy-friendly fashion. 
2B) Similarly, poor belief formation and wishful thinking violate the 
condition of mental states been brought about in the `right' way. For instance, in the 
case of wishful thinking, a person's beliefs are shaped by the desire for something to 
be the case, not by salient evidence. In order to be autonomous and respond 
rationally to the world our beliefs need to be shaped by external inputs, or more 
specifically reasons, not merely by our desires. 
2C) It is not clear whether oppressive socialisation threatens the right 
processes of belief and preference formation, but there seems to be a prima facie 
contradiction between them. While the right history is purely procedural and 
content-neutral, oppressive socialisation is usually cast in substantive terms. This 
leads to a dilemma, we can either endorse a substantive account of autonomy, 
rejecting content-neutrality 
128, or we could deny that oppressive socialisation is a 
"' Cf. ibid. 1 14-5. Cf. Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984). 
128 Paul Benson, 'Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization'. Social Theon, and Practice, 17 (1991). 
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problem for autonomy. A possible solution may be to formulate a procedural yet 
content-neutral sense in which some forms of socialisation thwart autonomy. We 
could describe some forms of upbringing as autonomy enhancing: we must educate 
children to appreciate evidence, to respond to it in the right fashion, and to form 
rational preferences, not to react only on whim. 
2D) Although automatic responses are an essential part of our cognitive 
architecture, they can, nevertheless, threaten the history of our preferences and 
beliefs. Sometimes we form goals and manifest preferences which have not been 
produced through rational processing, but only through automatic associations. 
Although in many cases automatic and rational processes might overlap (as when we 
automatically categorise the thing in front of us as a `living' rather than as a 
`nonliving thing'), sometimes they go awry; we form social and racial stereotypes 129, 
we make judgments based on the halo effect, and so on. It is this sense in which 
external influences can trigger automatic responses that have not been thought 
through in the right way. 
2F) It is unclear whether ecological rationality can provide an answer to 
which processes of belief and desire formation should be considered 'right'. If 
rationality is relative to specific environments, then perhaps processes of formation 
are also relative. It could be that a determinate process A is only adequate in 
environment B. If this is the case, we might need to describe the right way in which 
385-408. 
1 29 The relation between racial stereotypes, mental contamination and autonomy will become clearer 
in the following chapters. 
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beliefs and desires are formed not in general terms, but domain specifically. These 
are hard questions, and it seems that there is still important research to be done 
regarding the relationship between these processes and different features of the 
environment13o 
Critical Reflection 
3A) Adaptive preferences can challenge the condition of critical reflection in an 
important way, as the phenomenon suggests agents cannot revise and assess their life 
plans in a normatively significant fashion if `some' 131 of their desires have been 
adapted by these wrong processes. This is so because the very standards of critical 
reflection might themselves have been distorted. For instance, if an agent revises his 
conception of the good by accommodating adapted goals and desires, then this 
critical revision would have no normative force whatsoever. When Beto decides that 
playing for Arsenal is not attractive and he revises his life plan accordingly, it is 
already defective insofar as it is the outcome of (or has been contaminated by) 
adapted preferences. If the goals that prompt and lead to critical reflection are 
themselves adapted the exercise of reflection is normatively empty. For autonomy it 
is important to have reflection that is free from such flawed processes. 
Two remarks are of note here. First, usually agents ignore that their 
references have been adapted in this manner. Think about Beto's case; he believes 
(probably through a process of rationalisation) that his not attending his trial is 
130 See the collection of essays in Carruthers, Laurence, and Stich, (eds. ) The Innate Mind I. Structure 
and Contents; Carruthers, Laurence. and Stich, (eds. ) The Innate Mind II: Culture and Cognition. 
131 The word `some' here refers to both quantity and quality of the preferences adapted. While having 
adapted preferences about lollipops' flavours might not be very worrying, being subject to those 
processes regarding the whole domain of gastronomy and nutrition certainly is. 
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caused by the reasons he provides (London is grey and cold, he will miss his 
mother's culinary talents, and so on), when in fact his desires have been shaped by 
his lacking the economic resources to travel. In this example, he is not aware that his 
preferences have been shaped to conform to his circumstances. In this respect 
adaptive preference formation is an automatic response, and it is easy to see why it 
threatens autonomy. However, and this is the second remark, things can be more 
complicated. Imagine that we explain to Beto what has affected his thinking, and he 
answers that that he does not regret having this response, because somehow the fact 
that he (falsely) believes that his decision is due to his reasons is more comfortable 
than acknowledging that his not travelling in London is due to poverty' 32. 
Some have argued that eliminating of adaptive preferences requires an 
`ability to do otherwise' 133. An interpretation holds that people should be able to 
actually act in a different fashion. This interpretation, however, is problematic 
insofar it opens us to `Frankfurt-style cases' 134 Imagine that Pepe (the priest in 
Beto's town) does not want Beto to go to London. In order to prevent it, Pepe 
implants a device in Beto's brain, such that if Beto decides to go the device will 
make him reject the offer on the grounds that London is cold and grey, that he will 
miss his mother, etc. In the end, there is no need for the device to work, Beto decides 
not to show up and misses the chance to play for Arsenal. Frankfurt's intuition 
132 In this case, his adapted preferences would not count as a form of mental contamination. But we 
need to ask, whether this response is not itself the outcome of an adapted preference, which obviously 
opens the door to a regression ad infinitum. Nevertheless, I think most people would regret having 
their preferences adapted. People have an interest in responding to the right reasons, not just to reduce 
cognitive dissonance. 
133 Elster, Sour Grapes, 128. This condition has been the source of many important debates regarding 
responsibility. I cannot do justice to these controversies in this thesis. 
134 Harry Frankfurt, 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility', The Journal of Philosophy. 66 
(1969), 829-39. 
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shows that the fact that Beto could not have acted otherwise makes no difference in 
our assessment of Beto's action135 
So, it does not seem to matter whether Beto could have acted otherwise; the 
relevant question is whether he would have. But, turning the choice into a 
hypothetical one does not seem to solve the problem either, as hypothetical choice 
can also be the victim of processes of adaptation' 36 Imagine we want to know 
whether Maria's preferences are adapted. A requirement of hypothetical choice 
suggests that if she would choose to have the preferences she has and to live the 
lifestyle she does, then her preferences are not adapted. However, a weakness of this 
requirement is that hypothetical choices can also be the product of adaptation. Her 
circumstances might be such that she cannot even imagine, or respond, to other, very 
different, ways of life137 
3B) Abnormal processes of belief formation threaten critical reflection in a 
very similar fashion. Reflection requires that agents are able to evaluate relevant 
evidence, but most of the processes that ill-shape beliefs preclude agents from 
executing exactly those evaluations. Recall Ernesto, the hippie from Mid-Wales. 
Imagine that when he is revising his life plans a significant part of his beliefs are the 
product of wishful thinking, so that the outcome of his critical exercise merely 
mirrors the way he wishes the world to be. In terms of autonomy his revising his life 
135 Cf. Susan Hurley, Justice, Luck, Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 
Chapters 1-2. 
136 Cf. ibid. 28-30. 
137 Some authors try to eliminate the problem of adaptive preferences by using 'informed preferences' 
instead; preferences that people would have if they had perfect information and were not influenced 
by illegitimate processes. However, these preferences are problematic, as they require far too much in 
terms of mental resources. Cf. Mozaffar Qizilbash, 'Well-Being. Adaptation and Human Limitations'. 
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements. 81 (2006), 83-110. 
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plan is meaningless; a wrong process has constrained him since the beginning. 
Importantly, autonomy is concerned with acting for reasons in the sense that our 
actions and responses are motivated by the latter rather than by delusion and self- 
deception. In difficult circumstances we can plan our character, and try to use 
rational strategies to reduce cognitive dissonance, but `sour grapes' and `wishful 
thinking' do not allow us to be autonomous in terms of fulfilling the critical 
reflection condition. 
3C) How does oppressive socialisation challenge critical reflection? First it is 
clear that individuals are socialised during childhood and the values inculcated in 
them by nurture (non-critically unless this is encouraged) form the standpoint from 
which future critical judgement and reflection will be undertaken. This does not 
mean that individuals cannot step back and criticise the values they were taught, but 
it does suggest that the value system inculcated during childhood has a special place 
in people's conception of the good. Imagine Amy, a woman who has had a very 
traditional upbringing. As an adult she is expected to get married and give up her 
career to become a housewife. After deep thinking, she realises that she cannot 
embrace those values. She decides to get married, but also to keep her job. Her 
decision is not easy, she feels guilty for disappointing her parents and her 
community. What this example shows is that values inculcated during childhood 
have an impact on how adults lead their lives 138 
Oppressive socialisation poses an important problem for autonomy because 
of its connection to critical reflection. Autonomy seems to require that both the 
138 Cf. Cohen, If You 're an Egalitarian Hoyt' Come You 're so Rich?, Ch. 1. 
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outcomes and standpoint of critical reflection are exercised freely or rationally. In 
the case of oppressive socialisation, however, the standpoints are defective139. What 
is required, then, is a starting point (a basic socialisation) that fosters, rather than 
inhibits, the capacities for critical judgement. The task is to identify what sorts of 
upbringing are compatible with autonomy and what kind of socialisation children 
can legitimately engage with. Although this question has no easy answer it seems 
that socialisation needs to be targeted, at least towards the development of those 
capacities that are needed for critical reflection and for neutralising distorting 
influences, such as adaptive preferences, wishful thinking and mental contamination. 
There might be two different approaches to addressing this problem. On the 
one hand we could try to set up a purely procedural method of upbringing. Under 
this strategy, we should focus only on cultivating capacities for autonomy, such as 
the ability to link means and ends, make congruent plans, resolve internal conflicts in 
an intelligible way, etc. Notice that this strategy says nothing about the content of 
education: it claims only that socialisation is acceptable (regarding autonomy) 
insofar is it inculcates the capacity for autonomy. 
On the other hand, a more robust strategy might be that socialisation should 
include more stringent requirements. For instance, we could also demand that 
socialisation satisfies certain criteria of justice, so that children can learn and develop 
a sense of it140. Or, even more controversially, we could argue that upbringing 
should satisfy constraints of public reason141 These are important questions, but I 
139 Cf. Christman, `Autonomy and Personal History', 19-20. 
140 Okin, Justice. Gender and the Famih'. 
141 Clayton, Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing. 
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shall leave the discussion here for a moment. I shall say a bit more about this in 
Chapter 6. 
3D) Automatic responses can jeopardise critical reflection by interfering with 
the processes of reasoning. As we have seen, implicit associations and concept 
activation are difficult to control, and might make us react in ways that conflict with 
our reasons. Moreover, there are a number of cognitive failures that make critical 
reflection harder to achieve. For instance, as I shall explain in Chapter 5, we have a 
tendency to treat information we know is false as if it were true, and on occasions we 
act based on this information. An individual might find these responses `alienating', 
in the sense that they are not the product of her values and beliefs but rather of 
mental processes that she does not control. 
3F) It is not clear how ecological rationality threatens critical reflection. On 
the one hand, we usually think that critical reflection is subject to general domain 
constraints, such as internal consistency, transitivity, etc. However, ecological 
rationality does not require such conditions; it relies on fast and frugal heuristics and 
domain specific procedures. This means that, in an important sense, critical 
reflection outsources ecological rationality. On the other hand, it may well be the 
case that critical reflection needs to be relative to the structure of environments. A 
possibility is that rationality has two tiers: a lower-level which is automatic, 
ecological, domain-specific, and fast and frugal, and a higher-level which is 
intentional, costly, domain-general, and slow 142. Although this seems an 
142 Hurley, The Public Ecology of Responsibility'. 
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oversimplification, we need to know more regarding the architecture of rationality to 
provide more definitive answers 143 
Content-Neutrality 
4C) The fundamental question in this section is whether there is a content-neutral 
specification of the fashion in which oppressive socialisation might thwart 
autonomy. A possible strategy is to follow a bias neutralising approach 144. This 
approach holds that 
we can often know that certain biasing influences tend to undermine 
knowledge, even when we make no politically controversial assumptions about 
the truth. Moreover, we do not need to know what precise relationship between 
the truth and belief makes for knowledge in order to know that certain factors 
tend to defeat knowledge145 
As noted above, some processes of poor belief formation, such as wishful thinking, 
have a negative impact in the search for knowledge by creating cognitive biases. 
Similarly under certain conditions people are less able to reflect upon the 
information they are given146 The manner in which it is framed can also bias their 
responses towards certain reactions147. Moreover, environmental conditions might 
trigger associations that do not contribute to knowledge such as reliance on racial 
and gender stereotypes 148. This condition seems compatible with content-neutrality 
143 Chater and Oaksford, 'Human Rationality and the Psychology of Reasoning'. 
144 Susan Hurley, 'Cognitivism in Political Philosophy', in Crisp, R., and B. Hooker (eds. ) Well-Being 
and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), 177-208; Hurley, 
Justice, Luck, and Knowledge, Ch. 10. 
ßa5 Hurley. Justice, Luck, and Knowledge, 257. 
14" Gilbert, `How Mental Systems Believe'. Cf. also Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
147 Kahneman and Tversky `Choices, Values and Frames'. 
148 Devine, 'Stereotypes and Prejudice'. See also Chapter 5 in this thesis. 
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because it does not make any claims about the truth; it merely specifies that certain 
influences will jeopardise the truth, regardless of its content. 
A second feature of a cognitivist approach claims that `we should develop 
and use effectively certain capabilities of citizens. The cognitive capabilities of 
individuals to respond appropriately to relevant reasons are valuable both in their 
own right and to the social search for knowledge of that should be done' 149 This 
feature is more controversial because it claims that certain capacities are more 
desirable than others, and it arranges institutions to promote these, but not other, 
capabilities' 50 Although this feature is not neutral towards the capabilities required 
for having an autonomous life, it is, nonetheless, neutral towards its contents 151 
4F) Ecological rationality is domain-specific in terms of content, whereas 
autonomy requires content-neutrality. How are these two ideas related? The first 
thought is that, if ecological rationality cannot be detached from specific contents 
then it may be the case that autonomy cannot, after all, be content-neutral either. 
This suggests that we may have to distinguish between different domains, and that 
the possibility of neutrality might be tied to those particular domains. This 
distinction could imply that we must differentiate between two levels. First, we 
might ask whether neutrality is possible between domains. To which it seems that the 
most plausible answer is 'no'. It is difficult to see how we could make `trade-offs' 
tag Hurley, Justice, Luck, and Knowledge, 257. 
150 Notice that Hurley believes that her bias-neutralising approach is not neutral; when applied to 
political institutions she claims it endorses a form of liberal perfectionism. Cf. ibid. 258. 
51 It is very likely that citizens who develop these capabilities will reject some forms of life. 
However, this is not a worry; neutrality requires that we do not impose some contents on autonomy, 
not that we give every form of life an equal chance. Cf. Chapter 4. 
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between them. If rationality is essentially linked to certain domains we might not be 
able to step back and be neutral towards them. 
On the other hand, the second question is whether we might be neutral within 
different domains. Neutrality may be possible regarding some domains, but not 
others. The answer here may be determined by the structure of the domain itself152 
This distinction somewhat resembles one that has become popular in discussions 
about free speech. Some people claim that although protection of speech need not be 
neutral regarding categories of speech, it must be neutral within those categories'53 
For instance, we do not need to be neutral between political and commercial speech, 
and can, therefore, give greater protection to the former, in virtue of some `domain' 
specific features (political speech is more important vis-ä-vis autonomy, or 
democracy, or truth, etc. ). Nevertheless, neutrality might be required within those 
categories; we should not grant more protection to libertarians than to Marxists, for 
instance. The point here is not to defend the strategy of categorisation, but merely to 
illustrate how there might be some links between domain-specificity in ecological 
rationality and discussions about content neutrality in free speechls4 
Adequate Options 
5A) Adaptive preferences do not shape the conditions of choice directly. 
Nevertheless, they can affect the manner by which agents assess their options and 
choices. For example, Beto sees the option of playing at the Emirates Stadium as less 
152 These answers are tentative. One the one hand we still do not know enough about ecological 
rationality, on the other, we are too familiar with the classical conception of rationality, making the 
shift hard. Nevertheless, asking the questions might help us to clarify some ideas, even if we do not 
have answers yet. 
153 Scanlon, 'Freedom Of Expression and Categories of Expression', 84-112. 
154 1 will say more about the presumption about content-based regulations on Chapter 5. 
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attractive than staying in his hometown, and Ernesto thinks that living a non-hippie 
life would conflict with his conception of the good. More importantly, the distortions 
these processes cause have important consequences in the options agents face later. 
For instance, after failing to attend the trials (due to his adaptive preferences) Beto 
will not have the option of visiting London and encountering the choices it offers, 
and Ernesto will not have the choice of experiencing an urban life. 
5B) Poor belief formation affects the right options requirement in a very 
similar fashion to adaptive preferences. We act on beliefs, and we take them as 
reasons for actions. Those actions, then, affect the options we have in the future. 
When we form beliefs in the wrong way we do not act on right reasons, and the 
options we encounter are not the right options. Autonomy does not (and cannot) 
require that we assess those consequences at every juncture, but it does demand that 
when we make important decisions, we do so by assessing the options in a `right' 
way. That is, at least the assessment should not be distorted by adaptive preferences 
and ill-shaped beliefs (as the paragraph (3A) on critical reflection above 
discusses) 155 
5F) Does an ecological account of rationality threaten the idea that autonomy 
requires the right options? Ecological rationality is relative to environments, and to 
the options it offers. Maybe this means that autonomy would inherit some ecological 
relativity. If so, then we might need to judge the options agents encounter not in 
general, but according to certain environments. And it may be the case that some 
'55Cf. Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays; Elizabeth Anderson, 'John Stuart Mill and Experiments in 
Living'. Ethics, 102 (1991), 4-26. 
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environments offer options that are plainly incompatible with autonomy, while other 
environments are richer and more autonomy-friendly. 
Optimising Rationality 
6A) In general, classical rationality is concerned primarily with finding the best 
means for given goals. Adaptive preferences are beyond the reach of this approach, 
because it lacks the conceptual tools to assess the causal history of ends 156. Two 
persons with equally satisfied preferences will score equally in terms of rationality, 
even if one of them holds adapted preferences but not the other. Similarly, this 
assumption fails to make sense of how people can alter their preferences. It cannot 
distinguish between changes in preferences that are due to meta-preferences, or other 
rational processes, and adaptations caused by drives. 
Not accommodating for the causal history of preferences into account has 
well-known implications in political theory: a natural reading of this assumption 
produces a form of welfarism (be it utilitarian or not), which assumes that the most 
important variable in social choice is the rate at which people satisfy their 
preferences. This view, however, has some perverse incentives, such as giving more 
value to a state of affairs in which everyone harbours adapted preferences, rather 
than one in which open opportunity creates expectations that lead some people to 
frustration 157. Another well-known problem is that sometimes it recommends giving 
more resources to people with expensive tastes (however formed) than to people 
with cheaper ones'58 
156 Elster, Sour Grapes, 30,121. 
'57 Ibid, 136. 
158 There is a vast amount of literature on the topic. Cf. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, Chapter 1; Ronald 
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6B) Poor belief formation might thwart the processes by which agents are to 
decide the best way to realise their goals. Classical rationality is fairly demanding in 
this sense, for it requires agents to maximise their expected utility functions. If 
someone forms beliefs in a poor fashion, then his actions will not be the most 
appropriate means to pursue his goals. For instance, rationalisation might work this 
way in cases of cognitive dissonance. An agent can alter the perception of the 
situation he is in, forming a belief that might not be instrumentally effective in 
achieving his goals. If someone does not attain the promotion he is hoping for, he 
might think that there is a conspiracy against him. By believing this, he might miss 
future chances of achieving the promotion he wishes' 59 
6D) Automatic behaviour presents a challenge to this conception of 
rationality by highlighting that much significant behaviour is not under instrumental 
control. Moreover, automatic processes affect goals, not only means for action. 
Classical rationality works under the assumption that agents control the processes 
which lead to their actions, by choosing the best means to achieve their goals. But, 
by contrast, phenomena such as implicit cognition, the chameleon effect, and 
concept activation show that some of these processes are not controlled. 
Dworkin, 'Sovereign Virtue Revisited', Ethics, 113 (2002), 106-43; G. A. Cohen, 'On the Currency of 
Egalitarian Justice', Ethics, 99 (1989) 906-44; G. A. Cohen, 'Expensive Tastes Ride Again', in Burley, 
J. (ed. ) Dworkin and His Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 3-29. 
159 He could also reduce the cognitive dissonance by adapting his preferences. He might say that, after 
all, he did not fancy the new post. 
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6F) Ecological rationality is a response to the failures of classical rationality, 
so its relation is straightforward. The contrast should now be clear. The latter argues 
that agents' rational behaviour consists in maximising their utility function16o 
Maximisation functions on three levels: the action must be the best possible mean to 
achieve the purposed end, the belief for the action must be the best belief given the 
available evidence, and the evidence must be the best possible given the constraints 
(primarily time and space). And ideally, an explanation according to rational choice 
theory `[w]ould show that the action is the (unique) best way of satisfying the full set 
of agent's desires, given the (uniquely) best beliefs the agent could form, relatively 
to the (uniquely determined) optimal amount of evidence' 161 
As a result of much evidence showing that agents fail to satisfy these 
conditions, ecological rationality abandons the ideals of optimisation and internal 
consistency. Instead, rationality is defined as relying on fast and frugal heuristics that 
exploit cues in the environment. This form of rationality can be extended to 
incorporate more than single individuals; it can function at the level of different 
units162. It essentially holds that rationality and environments are embedded. 
160 The conditions defining `preference ordering' and `utility function' are the following: Reflexivity: 
For any bundle A, A=A. This condition demands that each bundle of goods is always as good as 
itself; Completeness: For any two bundles, A and B, either A>B, or B>A, or A=B. This means that 
every available good is subject to be ordered and compared with another available good; Transitivity: 
if A>B, and B>C, then A>C; Continuity: if A>B, and A undergoes a very small change, then A>B 
and -(B>A); Imagine that someone prefers to eat a sandwich while watching a football match (A), 
over having the same sandwich while watching a Rugby Union match (B). His preferences are 
continuous if he still prefers A, even if the lettuce is taken from the sandwich. When someone's 
preferences satisfy (i-iii), we can say that he have a consistent and complete preference ordering, 
when additionally his preferences satisfy `iv' as well, they can be represented by a utility function. 
The utility function permits us to assign numbers to the preferences and, thus to say that while 
choosing, he is maximizing his utility function. Shaun Hargreaves Heap, et. al. The Theory of Choice: 
A Critical Guide (Oxford: Blackwell. 1992), 6,368. 
161 Elster. 'The Nature and Scope of Rational Choice Explanation', 7 1. 
162 Hurley, 'Social Heuristics that Make Us Smarter'. 
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Another set of problems that plague classical rationality relate to the use of 
general rules of logical inference. Wason tasks have been used to show that people 
systematically fail to make simple logical operations of the form `if P then Q'. In the 
standard form of the experiment, `the rule concerns cards, which have a number on 
one side and a letter on the other'. A classical rule is `if there is a vowel on one side 
(p), then there is an even number on the other side (q)'. Four cards are presented to 
the participants, so that they can only see one side. The visible faces show an `A' (p 
card), a `K' (not -p card), a2 (q card) and a7 (not-q card). `Participants then select 
those cards they must turn over to determine whether the rule is true or false'. 
Normal results are: `p and q cards (46%), p card only (33%), p, q, and not-q card 
(7%), and p and not-q card (4%)' 163 Obviously (or not, given the results of the tests), 
the right result is turning over the p and the not-q cards, but it is usually only 4% of 
people who get this right. 
These results have been interpreted in a variety of ways. Among others is the 
idea that there are domain-specific cognitive modules' 64. However, when the content 
of the Wason task is presented in different terms, participants tend to perform better. 
This is remarkable when the propositional content is related to social contracts in 
which cheating and free riding is possible. Instead of pairing vowels with even 
numbers Leda Cosmides and John Tooby used the rule `if a person is drinking beer, 
then he must be over 20 years old' 165 With the different content, about 75% of 
participants picked the correct cards. These results suggest that people are good at 
163 Chater and Oaksford, 'Human Rationality and the Psychology of Reasoning', 195. 
164 See my remarks in Chapter 1. 
'' Cosmides and Tooby `Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange'. 183. Cf. also discussion in 
Gigerenzer. Adaptiere Thinking, Ch. 10. But for alternative explanation see Chater and Oaksford. 
'Human Rationality and the Psychology of Reasoning' 206-7. 
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making deductions of this type when facing certain problems in particular 
environments. In the case of Cosmides and Tooby's theory, people are good at 
detecting cheating because they have a cognitive module that is content- and domain 
specific. 
Conclusions 
Toward Ecological Autonomy 
What kind of autonomy remains once all these challenges have been considered? 
Clearly we cannot ignore the fact that many of our activities are non-autonomous. 
The aims of sections two and three has been to note how general automatic 
behaviours and other forms of biases are, and to highlight how deeply they threaten 
the ideal of autonomy. There seem to three possible responses to this problem. First, 
we could abandon the idea of autonomy. We could argue that, because many of our 
actions are non-autonomous, we should say that autonomy is impossible, or merely 
an illusion. Or, we could say that it is so difficult that we should not regard it any 
longer as an ideal of political morality. 
Second, we could revise and adjust some of the conditions for autonomy in 
light of this information. For instance, we could argue that autonomy requires a 
different conception of rationality, one that is ecological rather than general-domain 
and purely internalist. Or perhaps, we could suspend the condition of content- 
neutrality. These revisions, however, still maintain the fundamental intuition about 
autonomy; the idea of a self-governing agent. Conditions other than content- 
neutrality and the assumptions of classical rationality seem sufficient for that. 
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Third, consistently with the second response, we can think about ways to 
minimise our propensity to be beset by processes of mental contamination (and 
forms of irrationality). These include controlling certain features of the environment 
that trigger those reactions and maintaining the social conditions which facilitate the 
development of autonomy. I suggest that a mixture of the second and third options is 
the most attractive response to the challenges described above. In this regard, my 
suggestion is to abandon the assumptions of classical rationality, and embrace a 
more ecological, yet not substantive, account. The content-neutral clause should be 
suspended temporarily, until we understand exactly how it relates to the structure of 
environments. Regarding the first three conditions, I suggest that we need to take 
positive steps to neutralise unwanted influences which might thwart them. In order to 
do so, it is important to recognise that autonomy is a function of two variables. On 
the one hand, people's deliberative capacities need to be developed and exercised in 
an appropriate possible fashion. On the other hand, social environments must be 
sensitive to the way in which they influence people. We should not rely on people's 
capacity for mental control. We know we are not very good at it. In this respect the 
condition of `right options' has considerable force. Social environments need to be 
carefully assessed regarding the impact they have on autonomy. 
Ecological Autonomy and Free Speech 
After considering the conditions of autonomy and some challenges which threaten it, 
we can begin to see why the autonomy defence of free speech is so strong. First, free 
speech can be an important source for avoiding and rebutting adaptive preferences 
and wishful thinking. Being exposed to other people's expression can lead us to plan 
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our characters better and to evaluate evidence in a successful way, thus overcoming 
self-deception and delusion. Expression is an important means of fostering critical 
reflection and deliberation regarding one's life plans and conception of the good. 
Moreover, free speech might itself be a component of the right options we must hold 
in order to lead an autonomous life. 
Nevertheless, we cannot neglect the costs of speech. As noted in Chapter 1, if 
there is a principle of speech, it must recognise that it goes beyond harm and provide 
reasons for protection independently. Speech can be highly contaminating: we can 
be misled into believing false things, it can trigger automatic and unwanted 
processes, we can be manipulated, and our processes of reflection can be impaired 
by information we do not want to receive. Much information can also saturate our 
deliberative capacities, triggering collective biases and cognitive failures, from 
which, perhaps with less speech available, we would not suffer. 
Some might object that the conception of autonomy developed in this chapter 
is too `thick', and that a `thinner' one could function better, or at least equally well 
with less work. This objection, however, is not convincing. Remember that we need 
to find positive reasons for justifying the free speech beyond the scope of the harm 
principle: a thin conception fails to provide the extra justification necessary. 
Autonomy understood as the absence of coercion, for instance, provides little ground 
for protecting free speech. 
Imagine that we want to decide whether tobacco advertisement on TV should 
be protected. We can distinguish between the different parties involved and consider 
how their autonomy is affected or promoted by the regulation in question166. First, 
166 1 will employ and discuss this strategy at length in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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from the point of view of an audience, it is not clear that autonomy (as non-coercion) 
gives a definite answer. For, in what sense is an audience more or less coerced by the 
possibility of watching tobacco ads on TV? Regarding audience's autonomy 
regulations on advertisement (or its protection) does not seem to make a difference. 
Second, restrictions on advertisement certainly affect would-be speakers. It is 
clear that those who wish to advertise their products on TV are coerced (and to that 
extent less autonomous) if not allowed to. Nevertheless, this response fails to capture 
some of our intuitions about both coercion and free speech. It is plausible that some 
degree of coercion is acceptable for the sake of speech 167. Imagine that TV 
companies decide to broadcast only chat shows on the basis that they maximise 
profits. The government might, for instance, legitimately force them to broadcast 
some programs on political campaigns, on the grounds that citizens have an 
autonomy-based interest in being informed on political controversies (say, in order 
to develop their sense of justice) 168. Notice, though, that audiences are neither more 
nor less coerced when the regulation is in place than when it is not. If autonomy (as 
absence of coercion) were the basis of freed speech, then the government would be 
wronging TV companies. Moreover, sometimes it is acceptable to impose some 
coercion in order to warrant fair access to speech169 For instance, governments 
might force broadcasters to give some airtime to unpopular or disfavoured views, 
which would not have access to speech otherwise. 
167 Cf. Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech, in which he describes how the state (through coercion) can be 
the `friend of speech'. 
168 Cf. Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?, 150-154. 
169 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue. Chapter 10; Scanlon, `Freedom of Expression and Categories of 
Expression', 103-4. 
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These remarks suggest that coercion is not a bad thing per se. It is acceptable 
when it brings about certain outcomes (for instance, a robust debate on important 
political issues, or the dissemination of controversial lifestyles) and when it is 
justified in certain ways (for instance through public, democratic procedures, or by 
reasons no one could reasonably reject). If these remarks are plausible, then 
autonomy as non-coercion cannot be the benchmark of free speech. These remarks 
suggest, though, that the initial appeal of the absence of coercion is due to a thicker 
notion of autonomy, one that is captured by the conditions discussed in this chapter. 
With those qualifications and conditions addressed let us now turn to two 
influential defences of free speech. In the next chapter I will discuss Thomas 
Scanlon's `Millian Principle'. In Chapter 4,1 will discuss Ronald Dworkin's 
defence. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE MILLIAN PRINCIPE AND AUDIENCES' INTERESTS 
A common strategy for defending free speech involves first distinguishing the 
different interests that free expression serves. Given that speech has benefits on some 
persons and costs on others, `[a]ny decision [... ] must be made by considering how 
[it] would affect these interests by weighing the interests against one another and by 
considering their significance for the affected parties' 1. Imagine that an individual 
wishes to protest against nuclear weapons at 3: 00AM in a residential area. According 
to this strategy, we should identify a) the interest this person has in speech, b) the 
interests people who live in the area have in sleeping undisturbed, and c) reaching a 
balance. In this example, it is reasonable to suppose that the protestation could occur 
equally well at a different time, or at a different place, in order to protect the interest 
of residents. In the case of autonomy-based defences of speech, the relevant interests 
involved are all autonomy- related. 
In this chapter I explore the interests of audiences in speech. I will consider 
the interests of speakers in the next chapter. It will suffice to say here that a speaker 
has an expressive interest in communicating her views to a wide audience: she might 
1 McKinnon, `Should We Tolerate Holocaust DenialT, 16. 
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want to bear witness to matters of justice, or about important features of her 
conceptions the good. Besides, she also has deliberative interests in speech, 
articulating a voice might be a valuable way to exercise critical reflection. 
Although, by definition, audiences do not have expressive interests, being 
exposed to speech serves their autonomy in several ways. First, an environment in 
which speech is protected provides people with a variety of alternative views, from 
which they can choose the most convincing. Second, people have an interest is being 
presented with (or at least having access to) different evidence and valuable 
information to make up their minds about certain issues. In order to take a stance on 
the merits of the Labour Party (before an election, for instance), I need access to its 
manifesto, to its leaders' speeches, and to information on its position regarding 
policies I consider important. I also need to witness the responses its representatives 
give when questioned on controversial issues. I may even need access to writings on 
political and moral theory to compare and contrast Labour policies with the 
viewpoints I have reasons to endorse. This is true not only for important political 
decisions but also for everyday choices, such as what brand of clothes I wear and 
which Internet supplier I pay for their service. Third, free speech serves people 
insofar as exposure to expression sometimes triggers critical reflection regarding 
their own commitments and beliefs, inducing them to reassess and critically examine 
their convictions. The condition of critical reflection, discussed in Chapter 2, 
demands that people be predisposed to evaluate their views when available evidence 
requires this. And it is likely that this requirement is better satisfied within an 
environment in which free speech prevails than one in which it does not. This seems 
to be what John Stuart Mill had in mind when he wrote: `... if opponents of all 
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important truths do not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them, and supply them 
with the strongest arguments which the most skilful devil's advocate can conjure 
up, 2 
In addition to the interests of audiences we must also consider those of 
bystanders. First, bystanders have an interest in not suffering the undesirable effects 
of some acts of expression3: people protesting against war in the streets, for instance, 
produce noise, traffic jams, pollution (in the forms of leaflets and graffiti), and so on. 
Second, speech can have undesirable effects on members of the audience who 
change their behaviour: as a result of much campaigning, consumer behaviour can 
alter to make a particular brand of junk food go bankrupt, or some people might be 
convinced that a social group has certain undesirable features and change their 
attitudes towards its members accordingly4. Generally speaking, the first type of 
bystanders' interests is addressed through regulation regarding the `time, place and 
manner of speech'. Governments minimise the noise and pollution of protestations 
by planning them in non-residential zones, scheduling them for weekends to keep 
traffic jams and commuter disruption to a minimum, loud music might be prohibited 
in the early hours, and so on5. The second kind of bystander interests is harder to 
minimise, and their protection is more controversial. As we shall see in this chapter, 
Thomas Scanlon produces an argument against restrictions of speech if they are 
justified on the basis that some people might be harmed because a speaker convinces 
an audience to act on certain reasons. 
2 Mill, On Liberty and other Essays, 43. 
3 Scanlon, `Freedom if Expression and Categories of Expression' 92-3. 
4 An example of this are the existence of social and gender stereotypes. See my discussion if this topic 
below in section II, and also in Chapters 1,2,5 and 6. 
51 discuss the difference between content-based and content-neutral regulations in Chapter 5. 
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Although often the interests of speakers and audiences converge, 
occasionally they might conflict: someone lies about someone else, thus harming his 
reputation, or some people are misled into believing that brand A is better than brand 
B, and so on. In cases such as these, we need to balance the interests at stake and 
judge how interests overall are best served6. There are some controversies about the 
relative weight of different interests. For instance, Larry Alexander believes that 
issues of free speech are primarily concerned with the interests of audiences7, while 
Ronald Dworkin believes that speakers' interests are enough to warrant its 
protections. 
In this chapter I consider a very influential argument produced by Thomas 
Scanlon9. His position mainly targets the interests of audiences in protecting 
speech1°. Although Scanlon himself later revised and rejected this argument, it 
remains a classical autonomy-based defence of speech". In this article, Scanlon 
defends speech by establishing `more stringent constraints then the minimal 
principle of liberty [i. e. the harm principle] by positing that the government is barred 
certain reasons for prohibiting speech' 12. In this respect, Scanlon's principle is a 
proper principle of free speech: it provides positive reasons for allowing agents to 
6 Sometimes, the strategy for defending speech gives a clear and straightforward answer: people who 
hold a minimalist view would discount the costs of speech as almost non-existent, or always 
redeemable. Maximalists would hold that the benefits of speech always trumps its costs, however big 
they are. 
Larry Alexander, Is There a Right to Freedom of Expression? (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 8. 
8 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 160-1. 
9 Scanlon, `A Theory of Freedom of Expression', 6-25. 
10 Notice, though, that in this argument Scanlon does not distinguish between the different interests 
involved. 
11 Cf. David Strauss, 'Persuasion, Autonomy and Freedom of Expression', Columbia Law Review, 91 
(1991), 334-71. Thomas Nagel Concealment and Exposure (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 43. 
12 Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language, 9. 
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bring about harm to third parties through speech, harm which, had it been produced 
by other means would certainly warrant governmental regulation. 
Section 1 of this chapter presents Scanlon's principle of free speech. His 
argument is divided into two parts: one attending to the role of responsibility of 
speakers in bringing about harm to third parties through acts of expression, and the 
other appealing to an account of the proper relation between autonomous citizens 
and governments. After the presentation of his `Millian Principle', I will offer some 
criticisms that, presumably, led him to revise, and later reject, this principle 13. These 
criticisms form sections 2 and 3. The former includes criticisms to Scanlon's first 
argument. The latter discusses his second argument and contrasts it with Rawls's 
account of citizens' interests. In the last section I conclude that audiences' autonomy 
can be better protected by restricting speech in certain ways. 
I 
The Millian Principle 
Scanlon's Millian Principle holds that 
There are certain harms which although they would not occur but for certain 
acts of expression, nonetheless cannot be taken as a part of a justification for 
legal restrictions on these acts. These acts are (a) harms to certain individuals 
which consist in their coming to have false beliefs as a result of those acts of 
expression; (b) harmful consequences of acts performed as a result of those acts 
of expression, when the connection between the acts of expression and the 
13 Scanlon, 'Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression', 84-112; Thomas Scanlon, 'Content 
Regulation Reconsidered', in The Difficulty of Tolerance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2003). 151-68. 
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subsequent harmful acts consist merely in the fact that the act of expression led 
the agents to believe (or increased their tendency to believe) those acts to be 
worth performingla 
The principle is based on two different, albeit interrelated and not clearly 
distinguished arguments 15. One is based on a notion of agency and responsibility. 
The other is based on a contractualist theory. 
The Discontinuous Responsibility Argument 
According to Scanlon, the reason speech should be protected beyond the harm 
principle is that there are actions whose harmful consequences are not imputable to 
those to whom the restriction of speech would apply. A person should not be 
prevented from communicating some thoughts because she is not responsible for the 
harm other people cause when motivated by those ideas. The first part of the Millian 
Principle, then, denies the possibility of restricting speech is cases of being misled by 
others' acts of expression, or acting upon those misleading reasons. The rationale is 
that my being an adult `in full possession of [my] faculties"6 implies that I have the 
actual capacity of rationally assessing the content of others' expression. Regarding 
myself as a rational autonomous agent requires that I bear full responsibility for my 
beliefs. And, at the same time, it seems that my being responsible for them means 
that other people cannot also be (even partly) so. 
In Scanlon's view, responsibility for beliefs cannot be shared between 
different people. There seems to be a gap between the casual history of someone's 
14 Scanlon, `A Theory of Freedom of Expression', 14. 
15 Brison, `The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech', 328; Robert Amdur, 'Scanlon on Freedom of 
Expression'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9 (1980), 209. 
16 Scanlon, `A Theory of Freedom of Expression', 13. 
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beliefs and her responsibility for holding them. Scanlon's argument suggests that the 
only person responsible for one's beliefs is the agent herself, independently of the 
processes by which she came to posses them (their casual history). It is assumed that 
either the agent is responsible for her beliefs or somebody else is (namely, those 
whose acts of expression resulted in the agent's holding those beliefs). In this view, 
it is not possible for both to be responsible for them'7. If one is to count as a rational 
autonomous agent (in the relevant sense) then she must be the only person 
responsible. The first part of the Millian Principle is a consequence of this notion of 
personal responsibility: the agent herself is the only one that can be held responsible 
for her beliefs and, moreover, she seems to be the only one responsible for the 
processes that led her to form such beliefs. 
The second part of the Millian Principle addresses the harmful actions 
motivated by those beliefs communicated through acts of expression. Scanlon 
assumes as a baseline the difference between . reasons and means 
for actions. 
Accordingly, underlying his theory of free speech is the difference `between 
expression which moves others to act by pointing out what they take to be good 
reasons for action and expression which gives rise to action by others in other ways, 
e. g. by providing them with the means to do what they wanted to do anyway' 18. This 
difference limits the realm of the principle of free speech insofar as it only protects 
reasons for actions, not means. 
" Scanlon does not hold the bucket-theory of responsibility, according to which there is a fixed 
amount of responsibility to be distributed. If person A is held fully responsible for an act X, then there 
is no more responsibility available for person B. Cf. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 130. See 
also Chapter 1 in this thesis. 
18 Scanlon, `A Theory of Freedom of Expression', 13. 
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It is important to note that Scanlon does not provide further explanation 
regarding how to understand the difference between means and reasons. Consider 
the following description of an action: `I flip the switch, turn on the light, and 
illuminate the room. Unbeknownst to me I also alert a prowler to the fact that I am 
home' 19. This example demonstrates a clear ambiguity in how we perceive means 
and ends in relation to descriptions of actions. Essentially, qualifying as an end or a 
means is not an absolute distinction, but a `perspectival' one; it is description related. 
In the traditional dichotomy, reasons and beliefs are instrumental to desires 
and intentions20. If Scanlon has this picture in mind, then the Millian Principle would 
only protect expression regarding the latter, leaving speech about reasons and beliefs 
unprotected. But it is unlikely that he would accept this consequence because he 
argues that reasons are primitive, they are not instrumental or reducible to other 
mental states2 1. 
According to Scanlon, `our normal views about legal responsibility'22 
suggest that individuals might be held responsible when they provide the means for 
committing, say, a crime, whilst they cannot be considered responsible just for 
providing reasons about the worthiness of such an act. According to Scanlon's 
argument, then, if I convince you that looting the British Museum is a good idea 
because the works of art contained there belong to everybody, I could not be held 
legally responsible for your crime. On the other hand if I (additionally or only) 
provide you with means (information about security plans, narcotics to poison the 
19 Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events, 4. 
20 Cf. Chapter 2 on classical rationality. 
21 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 7. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether he had reached this 
conclusion at the time he developed the Millian Principle. 
22 Scanlon, 'A Theory of Freedom of Expression', 13. 
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guards, and hidden passages to escape) then we could both be condemned for `your' 
('our'? ) crime. 
The argument relies on the assumption that reasons (but not means) are 
filtered, so to speak, by the autonomous agent's judgement. In a short, Scanlon 
claims that 
a person who acts on reasons he has acquired from another's act of expression 
acts on what he has come to believe and has judged to be a sufficient basis for 
action. The contribution to the genesis of his action made by the act of 
expression is, so to speak, superseded by the agent's own judgement23 
This could be named the `discontinuous responsibility argument'. It holds that 
although there is a harmful consequence which is causally connected to an act of 
expression, attribution of responsibility cannot follow the causal connection all the 
way back because it is mediated by the agent's judgement. Although Scanlon 
restricts this form of responsibility to free speech, its usage can be generalised to 
other realms. People might argue that the environmental harms produced by big 
SUVs are attributable only to consumers of those cars, and not to the producers. 
Similarly, corporations selling junk food should not be held responsible for the 
health damages suffered by people who eat their products, the consumers are 
responsible for their choices. Moreover, this notion of responsibility can be used to 
defend the right to buy and bear arms by claiming that gun providers are not 
23 Ibid. 13 
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responsible for the uses their products are put (murder included); it is only the agent 
(who fires the gun) who is responsible for this. 24 
Citizen's Autonomy 
The second component of the Millian Principle appeals to a different aspect of 
autonomy. Whilst the first is based on an account of personal autonomy derived 
from the concepts of agency and responsibility, the second derives governmental 
constraints based on the view that citizens' autonomy is incompatible with the state's 
right to prohibit the expression of reasons. This argument claims that the relation 
between autonomous citizens and a legitimate government must be compatible with 
the view that citizens can recognise the government's authority `while still regarding 
themselves as equal, autonomous, rational agents'25. It is motivated by a concern for 
the interests of audiences in speech. Whereas the argument in the previous section 
suggests that speakers cannot be held responsible for the harms bystanders might 
suffer from audiences, this one claims that the latter group have an autonomy-based 
interest in speech which warrants its protection. 
Scanlon argues that individuals who regard themselves as equally 
autonomous, rational agents would not, under a hypothetical contract, grant the state 
the right to decide which kind of information should be restricted. According to 
Scanlon, giving the government the right to impose restrictions on speech (contrary 
to the Millian Principle) would be tantamount to waiving the presumption of 
autonomy, insofar as `an autonomous person cannot accept without independent 
24 I owe this last example to Hurley. `The Public Ecology of Responsibility'. 
25 Scanlon, 'A Theory of Freedom of Expression', 14-5. 
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consideration the judgement of others as to what he should believe or what he should 
do' 26 
There are, however, circumstances under which citizens do bequeath 
responsibility for regulating what they can express to the state. In a trivial case, 
individuals are rightly prevented from of shouting `fire' in a theatre. According to 
Scanlon, such circumstances are cases of permissible paternalism. Without 
digressing into his discussion of this subject, he argues that there are exceptions to 
the Millian Principle; namely when its grounds are undermined. When audiences 
lack the capacity of judgement (and therefore are presumably not autonomous) 
restrictions on expression are acceptable. As the example of shouting `fire' 
demonstrates, the justification is that individuals would not react in a rational, 
judicious way. In such situations acts of expression seem not to be `superseded by 
the agent's own judgement'27. This example is highly illustrative. Forms of 
expression that do not fall within the remit of autonomy are not considered `speech' 
in the technical sense necessary for a free speech principle to be invoked. They 
become subject to the same regulations of the harm principle. Shouting `fire' in a 
theatre is not a protected act of speech because it is not covered by autonomy; and it 
is not so because people tend to react non-autonomously. According to Scanlon, in 
rare cases of foreseen irrationality (presumably, when expression will not be judged 
with independent consideration) citizens would form `voluntary agreements'28 
These are examples of what Elster calls `Ulysses strategies': individuals sometimes 
26 Ibid. 16. 
27 Ibid. 13. 
28 Ibid. 19 
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decide rationally to protect themselves from their own future irrationalities by 
limiting the set of feasible choices open to them29. 
Even though citizens can occasionally employ such strategies, they would 
not, according to Scanlon, grant to the state the capacity of deciding what they ought 
to believe or hear as a part of its normal powers30. In fact the Millian Principle 
demands such agreements are to be reached only in very special cases. In defence of 
his principle Scanlon asks 
could an autonomous individual regard the state as having, not as part of a 
special voluntary agreement with him, but as part of its normal powers qua 
state, the power to put such an arrangement [restrictions on speech] into effect 
without his consent whenever it (i. e. the legislative authority) judged to be 
advisable ? 31 
Clearly, Scanlon's answer is no. However it is important to highlight a distinction 
Scanlon appears not to have noticed. It seems clear that Scanlon's argument applies 
to considerations about the content of acts of expression, but it might be problematic 
regarding the processes triggered by them. 
Scanlon's answer can be explained recalling his principle of contractualism: 
An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be 
disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation of behaviour which 
no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general 
agreement32 
29 Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens. 
;0 Scanlon, 'A Theory of Freedom of Expression'. 19. 
31 Ibid. 19. 
32 Scanlon, `Content-Based Regulation Reconsidered'. 132. Definitions of contractualism appear 
slightly modified several times in his later book What We Owe to 
Each Other, 170,189. 
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Regarding the content of `what to believe', Scanlon suggests that a principle that 
requires citizens to forgo the right to decide to which acts of expression they wish be 
exposed would be reasonably rejected. It would not be reasonable for citizens to 
waive the right to make independent judgments by weighing one's reasons and 
reaching one's conclusions in favour of the view that the state's judgments are 
always correct. There are exceptions to this general proviso, notably circumstances 
under which paternalism is legitimate. The argument regarding processes of 
judgment, decision-making and preference formation, however, might be different. It 
seems that intervention would not be reasonably rejected when addressing well- 
known cognitive defects of the sort discussed in the previous chapter. As we have 
seen, people suffer from biasing influences, such the halo effect, their judgments are 
distorted by framing, they get anchored with irrelevant information, they tend to 
believe propositions they know to be false, concepts can be activated triggering 
different automatic responses, and so on. If this is accepted, then it can be said that 
we are concerned here with a relatively weak form of paternalism insofar as it 
operates for the individual's interests (namely helping them to achieve independent 
judgment) by neutralising distorting processes and influences that function outside 
their control33. It is important to notice that although someone might reject the 
principle of weak paternalism, nevertheless the distinction between content and 
processes still holds, and they must be treated as different (but interrelated) 
questions. 
Scanlon's view of rationality is in stark contrast to the ecological version 
described in the last chapter. In particular, individuals are prima facie autonomous 
33 Robert Goodin, No Smoking: The Ethical Issues (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 23. 
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and rational, and therefore a legitimate government faces autonomy as a constraint 
on its powers. This account is not concerned with the social ecology of autonomy. 
Essentially, autonomy and rationality are considered to be a status that does not 
allow degrees. The Millian Principle was defended, Scanlon writes, 
by showing it to be a consequence of a particular idea about the limits of 
legitimate political authority: namely that the legitimate powers of government 
are limited to those that can be defended on grounds compatible with the 
autonomy of its citizens- compatible, that is, with the idea that each citizen is 
sovereign in deciding what to believe and in weighing reasons for actions34 
II 
Criticisms of the Millian Principle 
This section focuses on three points. First, I show that the Millian Principle has some 
unreasonable consequences regarding paternalistic policies. Second, I discuss 
whether the distinction between means and reasons upon which Scanlon's principle 
is based, is tenable. Third, I assess the notion of autonomy assumed by the Millian 
Principle and conclude that it is not appealing. 
Paternalism 
Recall the argument for permissible paternalism that the Millian Principle allows: it 
states that only in cases of `extremely brief' 
35 severe diminished rationality or 
;' Scanlon, 'Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression', 95. 
35 Scanlon, 'A Theory of Freedom of Expression', 20. 
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judgment can a government legitimately place restrictions on expression. From a 
citizen's point of view, paternalistic restrictions are legitimate only when she can 
foresee circumstances in which her agency is extremely diminished. In contrast, we 
sometimes restrict other forms of liberty while retaining the presumption of 
rationality: for instance, compulsory use of helmets and seat belts, restrictions on 
tobacco smoking and laws against false advertisement. Regardless of the 
controversies that such policies involve, generally they do not suppose that people 
cease to regard themselves as rational agents. 
Two kinds of paternalism can be distinguished: a weak and a strong version. 
The former `works within the individual's own theory of the good and merely 
imposes upon him a better means of achieving what after all are only his own 
ends' 36. The latter, by contrast, works from outside his theory of the good, imposing 
upon him both, means and ends. As an example, think about a state in which the 
practice of religion is compulsory (atheists are obliged to attend religious services 
and lead a religious life), defended on the basis that people's souls must be saved 
from eternal damnation. This policy can be reasonably rejected by those who do not 
hold a religious viewpoint37 as it cannot be accommodated within their own 
conception of the good. Notice that this policy might also be unacceptable to a 
religious person, on grounds that a religious life requires free endorsement, and it is 
incompatible with coercion38. This is an extreme case. An example of weaker 
paternalist policies is the compulsory use of seat belts in cars. We assume that it is in 
people's interests to be safe while on moving vehicles, and that sometimes, due to, 
36 Goodin, No Smoking, 23. 
37 It might also be unacceptable to those who hold one. Cf. Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?, 
Chapter 3. 
38 Thanks to Andrew Walton for this point. 
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say, weakness of the will or laziness they do not fasten them. Mandatory seat belt 
legislation generates extra incentives overriding the momentary inconvenience of 
fastening them, thus making people more likely to do it39. The reason for accepting 
these regulations is that, in general, it is in people's own interest to be safe and that 
reasonable conceptions of the good value personal safety40. Notice, though, that we 
can accept these regulations without giving up the presumption of rationality; surely 
there is a big difference between laziness and weakness of the will and severe 
diminished mental capacities. Not all forms of paternalism need to be justified from 
a first person perspective. Some cases of acceptable paternalism might be justified 
from the third person. Rawls argues that when we do not know enough about 
people's settled preferences and interests, but we know that some forms of 
irrationality might occur (they need not be as acute as the Millian Principle requires, 
though), paternalistic policies should be guided by the principles of justice and an 
account of primary goods. This case is clear in the example of children, where we act 
on their behalf even though we do not follow their own conception of the good 
(because we do not think that they satisfy a threshold of autonomy)41 
The Millian Principle proposes restrictions that are too strong for 
paternalistic policies regarding expression. Take the case of the regulation of 
misleading or false advertisement, for example. Imagine an ad which says that a low- 
fat cheese has only 3% fat, while in fact it has 25%. We can accept laws forbidding 
this ad without endorsing the view that people are severely rationally diminished 
39 Cf. Lawrence Lessig, 'The Regulation of Social Meaning'. The University of Chicago Law Review, 
62 (1995), 943-1045. He notes that governments can change the social meaning of some paternalistic 
policies making them look not paternalistic. 
° Of course this is not the only manner in which compulsory seat belt use might 
be defended. One 
can appeal to the costs that accidents have on the NHS, 
for instance. 
41 Rawls,, A Theory of Justice. 218-20. 
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when tempted to buy cheese. We can justify it on the grounds that the costs of 
deciding for oneself (reading independent consumers' magazines, consulting 
scientific research reports, etc) are too high in comparison with the costs of allowing 
the state to intervene on this issue. Assuming that it is in people's interest to be 
exposed to as much information as possible (even false or misleading information) 
seems to embrace a mistaken notion of our mental capacities: we do not have 
unlimited mental resources to judge every piece of information when making 
decisions on every issue. Instead, it seems reasonable to grant the government the 
power to filter out information which would not help us pursue our own ends. 
There is a way to accommodate this worry within the Millian Principle, for 
Scanlon could argue that regulations on false advertisement can be accepted within if 
they concern only means for doing what people want to do (say, getting low-fat 
food), but not reasons (say, having a healthier life). As we will see in the next section 
this distinction is untenable. Assuming temporarily that it is viable, Scanlon still 
encounters a problem as the distinction between means and ends does not cover all 
cases in which we would accept regulations on advertisement. Think, for instance, of 
tobacco ads, which are regulated even though people need not regard their rational 
capacities as severely diminished. This example conflicts with to the Millian 
Principle42. 
According to Scanlon, any plausible theory of paternalism must take into 
account a concern for the importance of choice, or, in his own words, the `value of 
42 Although, again some might retort that tobacco ads concern only means, rather than reasons to 
something else, say getting pleasure in life. 
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choice'43. Choice, Scanlon argues, is valuable in a number of senses. Instrumentally, 
we want to choose the means by which we attain our ends. Moreover, sometimes we 
want to be able to choose certain things not because of the outcome of the choice 
itself but rather because what matters to us is the act of choosing. The outcome of the 
choice might have a different meaning if chosen by me than if by somebody else. 
Furthermore, choice might be valuable in a symbolic sense; `in a situation in which 
people are normally expected to make choices of a certain sort for themselves, 
individuals have reason to value the opportunity to make these choices because not 
having or not exercising this opportunity would be seen as reflecting their judgment 
(their own or someone else's) that they are not competent or do not have standing 
normally accorded an adult member of society'44. The significance of choice and the 
relative weight that each of the above senses holds, varies according to 
circumstances, such as the agent's knowledge and self control, his aims and 
attachments, and the groups and society in which he lives4s 
It is important to see how narrowly the Millian Principle construes the 
importance of choice, for it suggests citizens are only interested in not being 
interfered with when forming beliefs. On this reading it overlooks the various 
different senses in which choice is meaningful. Regarding free speech, then, we need 
a nuanced account of the relation between the interests that speech serves and the 
meaningfulness of choices. This account is necessary in order to understand the 
difference between bans on junk food, alcohol or tobacco advertisements on the one 
43 Scanlon defines the `value of choice' by saying that `what matters is the value of the opportunity to 
choose that the person is presented with'. See Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 258. 
as Ibid. ? 53. 
45 This worry opens the door to the idea that regulations on speech must be sensitive to different 
categories, and the way they relate to different the interests people have on speech. Cf. Scanlon, 
'Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression' and `Content Regulation Reconsidered'. 
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hand, and bans on religious, political or artistic speech on the other. Unfortunately 
the Millian Principle offers no room for such concerns because it sets the conditions 
for justification too strictly. 
Reasons and Means 
As we noted in the first section of this chapter, Scanlon thinks that the difference 
between reasons and means is central to understanding the remit of a principle of 
free speech. In his words, the important distinction is `between expression which 
moves others to act by pointing out what they take to be good reasons for actions [on 
the one hand] and [on the other] expression that gives rise to action by others in 
other ways, e. g. by providing them with the means to do what they wanted to do 
anyway' 46 
According to this distinction, arguments for restricting speech are illegitimate 
if they are focused on the `reasons' for actions, but could be acceptable if focused on 
the `means' for actions. This difference, Scanlon argues, is based on `our normal 
views about legal responsibility'47. 
As a general structure, the difference between means and ends seems to be 
less secure than Scanlon thinks. For instance, last night before going to bed I went to 
the kitchen, turned the light on, poured a glass of water, and scared a drunken man 
who was walking past my window. It seems that, with the exception of frightening 
the man, all the things I did were means to a further end (namely, to quench my 
thirst). But on a closer inspection we could also say that I went to the kitchen in 
order to turn on the light, which, in turn, was only a means to pouring the water from 
46 Scanlon, 'A Theory of Freedom of Expression', 13. Emphasis added. 
47 Ibid. 13. 
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the tap. We can describe my action in several ways, and the features we characterise 
as `ends' or `means' are always relative to the description itself. The distinction is 
perspective-dependent rather than absolute. 
Another feature of the supposed means/ends dichotomy is that it is relative to 
other ends and other means. Recall the example discussed above of looting the 
British Museum. There the action's goal was to loot the museum because the pieces 
of art, supposedly, belong to everybody and the action's means were the poison 
recipe for the guards and the plans of the museum. Imagine, however, that the 
looting is only a means towards another goal, say, to improve global justice by 
recovering everybody's belongings (looting all of the world's museums). According 
to the Millian Principle, under the first description the reasons for the looting are 
protected, under the second description they are not. 
Moreover, the generic `means-ends' structure requires an ultimate goal 
towards which all other actions are instrumental. If individuals had such an ultimate 
end, then the Millian Principle would only protect expression related to that goal (all 
other reasons would be just means to it). But this is a problematic supposition. In 
general individuals have a plurality of ends and means, and they are not arranged in 
a perfectly consistent, transitive order48. 
There is also a different approach by which the means/goals distinction, 
which the Millian Principle depends upon, can be undermined. Means and goals are 
related psychologically through automatic processing that bypasses autonomous 
48 For problems of this kind of presuppositions see criticisms to the Rational Choice Theory. 
Especially Elster, `The Nature and Scope of Rational Choice Explanation'; Jon Elster, Rational 
Choice Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); Jon Elster, `Some Unresolved Problems in the Theory of 
Rational Behaviour' Acta Sociologica, 36 (1993), 179-90; Hargreaves Heap, et. al. The Theory of 
Choice; Amartya Sen, `Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic 
Theory' in his Choice, Welfare and Measurement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982). See also Charles 
Taylor, `The Diversity of Goods' in his Philosophical Papers. 
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control. The idea, then, is that `stimuli in the environment can directly activate a 
goal, which will then become operative and guide cognitive and behavioural 
processes within that environment, without any need for conscious decision'49. In 
particular, an active goal automatically triggers mental representations usually 
associated with attaining that goal, making them more accessible. Searching for 
something to eat activates concepts related to that end, such as restaurants and 
bodegas50. The relation also works in the opposite direction: an active concept that is 
usually a means towards an end can activate that goal. In an experiment, people 
primed with words related to success strived for longer to finish a task than people 
who were not primed51. Moreover, the source of activation is irrelevant to the goal 
activated; it does not matter whether the stimuli is conscious or not, goal-activation 
is likely to occur automatically 52. 
The Millian Principle is able to accommodate restrictions on speech only if 
those restrictions concern means to do what people have reason to do. It cannot 
manage a concern with people's goals. This restriction is untenable for two reasons. 
First, conceptually the means/goals distinction is not tenable because both 
components are description-dependent. Second, psychologically, means and ends are 
linked automatically, insofar as expression regarding one might activate the other 
directly, bypassing autonomous control. 
Autonomy and Responsibility 
49 Bargh, 'The Automaticity of Everyday Life', 30. 
50 John Bargh, 'What Have We Been Priming all these Years? On the Development, Mechanisms, and 
Ecology of Nonconscious Social Behavior', European Journal of Social Psychology, 36 (2006), 158. 
51 Bargh, 'The Automaticity of Everyday Life', 39. 
52 Ibid. 35. 
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Scanlon holds that his Millian Principle is supported `by our normal views about 
legal responsibility' 53. However, there is an oddity here as some of our moral 
intuitions seem to point in the opposite direction. It is not sufficient to demonstrate 
that our normal views of legal responsibility accord with Scanlon's theory, it is also 
necessary to show that the latter is consistent with our views on moral responsibility. 
At the very least, Scanlon must show that they do not conflict, or, if they do, which 
set of intuitions has priority. 
Imagine these two examples. In the first, Owen convinces Carol to murder 
the president of the company for which she works. He does so using only rational, 
valid arguments. Carol is an autonomous lady, capable of rational judgment and very 
much able to balance reasons for action, critically comparing beliefs and so on. After 
a long discussion, Carol is convinced by Owen to kill the boss and some hours later 
she cuts his throat. According to Scanlon, we have no reasons to hold Owen 
responsible for the harm done by Carol. The second example is quite similar, but, 
here, Owen uses fallacious and deceptive arguments. He frames the arguments 
differently in order to exploit some of her cognitive biases and failures. Perhaps he 
appeals to emotional features or shows her violent movies54, or manipulates her in 
other ways. 
How would the Millian Principle treat both cases? Remember that the second 
part of the Millian Principle holds that: 
harmful consequences of acts performed as a result of those acts of expression, 
when the connection between the acts of expression and the subsequent harmful 
acts consists merely in the fact that the act of expression led the agents to 
5' Scanlon, `A Theory of Freedom of Expression'. 13. 
54 Cf. Hurley, `Bypassing Conscious Control' 
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believe (or increased their tendency to believe) those acts to be worth 
performing55 
The Millian Principle does not assess the manner in which acts of expression 
lead the agents to believe (or increases their tendencies to believe) in the worthiness 
of the expressed reasons. In this sense, for the Millian Principle the examples above 
are similar. It does not include a qualitative criterion to discern between autonomous 
or non-autonomous tendencies and influences. If this is tenable, then the reason for 
protecting speech loses its strength. Remember that a principle of free speech poses 
more stringent conditions than the harm principle; it claims that, even if speech 
brings about harm, the latter cannot be used as a reason to regulate expression 
because audiences are autonomous in respect to those acts of expression. An agent's 
ability to judge speech independently is the basis for the special free speech 
principle. However, if speech bypasses that ability (through mental contamination), 
then autonomy cannot be used as an exception to the harm principle56. Scanlon's 
failure to make the distinction between autonomous and non-autonomous tendencies 
of belief and preference formation render his Millian Principle an inadequate defence 
of free speech. 
Consider, for instance, some forms of mental contamination associated with 
social stereotypes. Stereotyping is an automatic process by which traits that 
purportedly describe social groups are integrated57. Stereotypes seem to occupy a 
similar psychological function to schemas and categories; they help to us to 
ss Scanlon, `A Theory of Freedom of Expression', 14. Emphasis added. 
56 Hurley. `Bypassing Conscious Control', 321. 
57 Dijksterhuis and Bargh, 'The Perception-Behavior Expressway', 9. 
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complete missing information about a person or event and also to `generate 
expectancies about what is going to happen next'58. As such, they form an important 
component of implicit knowledge furnishing people with more efficient information 
about groups. A beneficial consequence of stereotypes and categories is that they 
allow people to devote cognitive resources to other activities. However, there is a 
cost to this efficiency. In most cases, social stereotypes are inaccurate: they integrate 
concepts which have little to do with the group in question59, or, in some cases, 
represent merely the result of prejudice. The content of racial and gender stereotypes 
are well known in Western societies. For instance, traits associated with black people 
are poverty, aggressiveness, criminality, low intelligence, lack of education, laziness, 
sexual perversity, athleticism and rhythm among others60. People with both high and 
low levels of prejudice highlighted some of these traits, and all singled out 
aggressiveness 61. For example, a classical experiment described by Devine shows 
how stereotypes are applied to assess situations. People were shown a short film in 
which a man behaved in an `ambiguously aggressive way'. After the film they had to 
complete a report qualifying the man's behaviour from `very aggressive' to `not 
aggressive'. Not surprisingly, when the role was played by a black actor people 
tended to interpret his behaviour as being much more aggressive than when it was 
played a white actor62. 
58 Mark Chen and John Bargh, 'Nonconscious Behavioral Confirmation Processes: The Self-Fulfilling 
Consequences of Automatic Stereotype Activation', Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33 
(1997), 541. 
59 Ibid. 542. 
60 These traits were the most prominent among 40 white students who participated in the experiments 
reported in Devine, 'Stereotypes and Prejudice', table 1,8. 
61 The level of prejudice is measured according to the Modern Racism Scale, ibid. 7. 
62 Ibid. 9. 
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As with other concepts, social stereotypes can be automatically activated in a 
variety of ways. For instance, recall the experiments in which Bargh and others 
primed students with concepts related to the stereotype of the elderly. Participants 
were primed with concepts such as `Florida', `Bingo', `Grey', `Retired', and so on. 
After the experiment, those who were primed walked along the corridor slower than 
those who were not. The concepts associated with a stereotype also automatically 
activated other related traits63. In a subsequent experiment, Bargh and his colleagues 
decided to prime participants with the `African American' stereotype. In this case the 
students were asked to perform a tedious and boring task on a computer. Without 
knowing, they were subliminally shown pictures of African American faces (the 
pictures were displayed just for a fraction of a second so the participants were not 
aware of witnessing them at all). After some time performing the task a message 
appeared in the computer screen telling the students that the computer had broken 
down. The experimenter then told the participants that they had to begin the task 
again. The result shows that people who were primed pictures of black people 
reacted more aggressively to the request than those who were not primed. This 
experiment is another example of the perception-behaviour link discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 2: a perception associated with aggression directly increases an 
individual's tendency to behave aggressively 64. 
Moreover, stereotypes can also generate self-fulfilling prophecies: imagine a 
person who interacts with a member of a stereotyped group. The first person has 
certain expectations about the second person's behaviour. Given these expectations, 
he behaves towards her as if the stereotype were true. Then she might respond in a 
63 Bargh, Chen and Burrows, `Automaticity of Social Behavior', 236. 
64 Ibid. 238-9. 
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consistent way with his behaviour, thus confirming the original stereotype65. Notice 
that the personal expectations need not to be conscious. John Bargh and Mark Chen 
argue that automatic stereotype activation can produce self-fulfilling prophecies of 
the same kind as those produced when the expectations are conscious. In this 
experiment, they combined two paradigms: stereotype activation and behavioural 
confirmation. Pairs of participants played a game in which one had to get the other to 
guess each of several target words. This game tends to create some frustration in 
both players (one because he cannot understand the other's ineptitude at representing 
words, the other at the inability of his partner to guess the words given such good 
illustrations). In this experiment, the participants were in different rooms and 
communicated via headphones and microphones. Prior to playing the game, one 
member of the pair was primed with pictures of young black persons (as in the 
experiment described above). One member of the pairs was randomly assigned the 
role of `perceiver' and the other the role of 'target'. Only half of the perceivers were 
primed with the black faces, the other half and all the targets were primed with white 
faces. After the game, each participant judged their partner on a variety of traits, 
including aggressiveness. Independent judges (unaware of the goals of the 
experiment) also listened to the audiotapes in a random order, and were asked to 
evaluate the person on hostility (among other traits). The `audiotapes ratings showed 
that [ ... ] 
both the perceiver and the target participants in the stereotype-primed 
condition were rated as being more hostile than their counterparts in the no-priming 
condition'. This confirms that subliminal priming automatically increased hostility. 
`Finally, [ ... 
] perceiver participants primed with subliminal black faces rated their 
65 Chen and Bargh, Nonconscious Behavioral Confirmation Processes', 542. 
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interaction partners as being more hostile, compared to nonprimed perceivers' 
ratings of their partners'. This remark suggests that stereotypic confirmation 
occurred66. Social stereotypes have costly effects not only to the stereotyped targets 
(costs such as discrimination in employment opportunities and the elicitation of self- 
fulfilling prophecies67), but also for the stereotype holders. The existence of these 
sorts of social stereotypes presents a strong form of mental contamination for many 
people who reject the fact that they are victims to those processes (though not for 
those who endorse the contents of the stereotype). 
Responsibility for What? 
The relation between acts of expression and resultant harmful consequences might 
also be problematic in another way. If we read again the example involving Owen 
and Carol, it is clear that Carol is responsible for the murder. It is also obvious that 
Owen is responsible for convincing her into that act. Nevertheless, Scanlon would 
argue that Owen cannot be held responsible. But it is unclear what Owen is not 
responsible for or why this is so. If, after committing the murder, Carol said `I am 
not responsible, Owen made me do it' we would not be convinced. But, the relevant 
question here is if, after the murder, Owen said `Carol is a rational adult, she made 
her own decision, and my hands are clean', would we be any more convinced? 68. 
The important issue is not the positive claim that Owen could be held (partly) legally 
responsible for the crime, but the negative claim that he could not. This point returns 
66 John Bargh, 'The Cognitive Monster: The Case against the Controllability of Automatic Stereotype 
Effects', in Chaiken, S., and Y. Trope (eds. ) Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology (New York: 
Guildford Press, 1999), 374-5. 
67 Christian S. Wheeler, W. Blair G. Jarvis and Richard Petty, 'Think Unto Others: The Self- 
Destructive Impact of Negative Racial Stereotypes', Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37 
(2001), 174. 
68 Cf. Amdur, `Scanlon on Freedom of Expression', 296. 
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to the discontinuous responsibility argument, according to which, people are not 
responsible for the harm other people do based on the reasons communicated by the 
former. As I claimed above, if the harms caused by speech operate non- 
autonomously, the discontinuous responsibility argument falters. 
The Millian Principle leaves another possibility open. It might be that we do 
not think Owen is responsible for Carol's murder. However that does not mean that 
we think that Owen is free from any wrong doing. In particular, he is guilty of 
convincing Carol to commit a murder. An appealing notion of responsibility needs to 
be sensitive to the fashion in which people acquire and respond to the reasons they 
act upon. 
Elsewhere Scanlon distinguishes between two different senses of 
responsibility: `substantive responsibility' and . 
`responsibility as attributability'69 
According to the latter, being responsible means to be `properly subject to praise or 
blame for having acted in such way', while, according to the former, being 
responsible is to say `that the person cannot complain of the burdens or obligations 
that result' from her actions70. This difference implies, among other things, that, on 
occasions, one can be subject to blame for doing something wrong without bearing 
the consequences of such actions. For instance, despite the fact that drug addicts are 
subject to blame for their addiction, it does not follow that they are properly 
burdened with (all) the costs those addictions generate. Society still has a duty to 
help them with rehabilitation treatments, and unemployment benefits (if required) 
and so on. 
69 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 248-9, 
70 Ibid. 290. 
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Using this distinction, it seems that the discontinuous responsibility argument 
can be rephrased as follows: An individual X should not be held substantively 
responsible for the harms done by other people who act based on reasons expressed 
by X (note though that X may still be subject to blame). It seems that there is an 
ambiguity in this argument; from the claim that Owen cannot be held responsible for 
a murder, it does not follow that he should be free of any burdens. 
It may be we consider that Owen is properly held substantively responsible 
for some wrongdoing (in this case, of convincing someone to murder her boss), and 
thus we might impose upon him some burden. Imagine a similar example: an 
inebriated man arrives at an off-license asking for a bottle of cognac. He gets the 
bottle, and after drinking half of it while driving knocks down a couple that are 
leaving the theatre. Although the shopkeeper cannot be held responsible for the 
murder of the theatregoers, it may be the case that he is held responsible for some 
wrongdoing, and accordingly we might agree to impose some burdens upon him 
(maybe a fine, a caution, or a licence cancellation) 71. Returning to the Millian 
principle, then, the point of import is not whether Owen can be properly charged 
with murder, but why he should be left free of any burdens. 
The discontinuous responsibility argument links (or more specifically, fails to 
link) speakers with bypassers72 through audiences' autonomy. However, recall that 
features in the environment can trigger automatic responses that are beyond people's 
control. It seems that insofar as speakers participate in the social environment's 
71 Scanlon seems to suggest that the difference between legal and moral responsibility arises at this 
point. According to him, our intuitions about legal responsibility point towards the discontinuous 
responsibility argument. In contrast it may well be that we do not hold people responsible for 
wrongdoings based on pragmatic considerations such as efficacy or costs. The point then is that we 
would hold them prima facie responsible, but there are practical considerations that weigh more. 
72 Bypassers described as those who suffer the consequences of the change of attitudes that audiences 
experiment in virtue of speakers' acts of expression. 
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construction they are in a situation in which they could be held responsible for the 
ecology of those environments. 
Following Amdur, we can also claim that, if the responsibility basis for the 
Millian Principle was adequate, then the principle would prove too much. If our 
normal views about responsibility were as Scanlon argues, then it is not clear why 
the government can legitimately restrict expression of means for actions at all. 
Remember that the means/goals distinction underlies the Millian Principle. It is 
difficult to see why Scanlon thinks that autonomy implies the capacity for weighing 
reasons but not means. The Millian Principle holds that when Owen argues about the 
worthiness of murdering the boss Carol's judgement supersedes the causal 
connection between her beliefs and Owen's acts of expression. However, it is not 
clear why when Owen gives Carol the recipe for the poison which will be used her 
judgement does not supersede Owen's act of expression as we1173. What in the 
expression of reasons differentiates them so starkly from the expression of means? 
Remember that the difference between them is description dependent and, therefore, 
not absolute. If Amdur is right in this suggestion, then Scanlon should not accept this 
consequence of his principle: if the distinction between goals and means is not as 
Scanlon suggests then governments would need to protect every form of speech 
insofar as every expression would be superseded by an agents' rational judgement. 
Conceptions of Autonomy 
The last point I wish to make regarding the conception of autonomy implied by the 
Millian Principle is that its initial appeal is due to a different conception of 
73 Amdur, `Scanlon on Freedom of Expression'. 298. 
139 
CHAPTER 3 The Millian Principle and Audiences' Interests 
autonomy, namely one that values independent judgment as a good to be promoted74. 
According to the Millian Principle, autonomy is only a constraint on governmental 
action which protects people from being interfered with in forming beliefs. There is 
a proviso which applies to a few special cases (such as individuals with severely 
rationally diminished capacities) and to special circumstances (brief moments of 
panic in crowded theatres). As discussed in the previous chapter, for autonomy to be 
achieved we require some criteria to assess the quality of critical judgment and a set 
of principles to neutralise some of these challenges (such as mental contamination). 
The problem with the Millian Principle is that it fails to promote the autonomy- 
related interests citizens have in speech, and therefore it cannot be a justification for 
its protection. 
To sum up the problems found in the notion of personal autonomy assumed 
by Scanlon in this article, let me highlight to three key difficulties that have been 
discussed in this section. First, autonomy's appeal is due to a more basic conception 
of `self-governance' or `critical deliberation', which has not been defined by 
Scanlon. Second, as a result, the notion employed lacks the qualitative criteria 
necessary for assessing tendencies and processes of belief formation and decision 
making, so we cannot adequately distinguish between rational, irrational and a- 
rational processes. Third, if this notion were satisfactory then, as Amdur argues, it 
would prove too much, insofar as we could argue that every act of expression could 
be superseded by the agent's judgement, making any restriction on speech 
unacceptable. 
74 Scanlon, (2003) 'Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression', 97. 
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III 
The Millian Principle, Contractualism and Audiences' Interests 
In this section I shall discuss the part of Scanlon's argument which relates to 
citizens' autonomy. In order to do so, I will briefly sketch John Rawls's idea of 
moral persons choosing principles of justice behind a veil of ignorance, and ask 
whether it would be reasonable for the parties to choose the Millian Principle. 
Scanlon thinks that citizens would not surrender the right to decide for 
themselves to which information they are willing to be exposed. Although they 
would allow that in exceptional circumstances, the state could regulate speech 
(shouting `fire' in a theatre), it would not be within its normal powers. Scanlon does 
not provide great detail in his argument, making it difficult to follow his reasoning. 
Nevertheless, I will sketch why I think his conclusion is not convincing based on a 
Rawlsian framework. 
Rawls's Conception of the Person 
Rawls thinks that the social role of a political conception of justice is to provide a 
scheme of mutually acceptable shared institutions, which must be based upon 
publicly recognised principles. In order to establish the principles of justice 
governing the basic structure of society Rawls begins from the `basic model- 
conceptions' 75: the concept of well-ordered society, the concept of moral person, and 
the intermediate model of the original position. 
75 John Rawls, 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory' in his Collected Papers, 308. 
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A society is `well-ordered' if its basic institutions satisfy the requirements of 
a political conception of justice, there is public knowledge that this is the case, 
people accept the conception and principles of justice, they believe their society to 
be just, and are motivated to act according to its rules76 
In a well-ordered society citizens are seen as `free and equal moral 
persons'77. This conception of the person underlines Rawls's justice as fairness, but 
it is also important in the Millian Principle (if the conception is not exactly the same, 
the main features are shared), 
The members of a well ordered society are moral persons in that once they have 
reached the age of reason, each has, and views the others as having, an effective 
sense of justice, as well as an understanding of a conception of their good. 
Citizens are equal in that they regard one another as having an equal right to 
determine, and to assess upon due reflection, the first principles of justice [... ] 
Finally, the members of a well-ordered society are entitled to make claims on 
the design of their common institutions in the name of their own fundamental 
aims and highest-order interests78. 
This conception of the person includes two moral powers. First, persons have the 
capacity for a sense of justice: `the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from 
(not merely in accordance with) the principles of political justice that specify the fair 
terms of social cooperation' 79. This sense must be effective in securing citizens' 
motivation to act for reasons of justice. The second moral power is `the capacity to 
have, to revise, and rationally, to pursue a conception of the good. Such a conception 
76 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 5-6, Samuel Freeman, Rawls (Oxford: Rutledge, 2007), 242. 
" Notice that the conception of the person described by Rawls here is a political conception of 
citizens. 
78 Rawls, 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', 309. 
79 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 18-9. 
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is an ordered family of final ends and aims which specifies a person's conception of 
what is of value in human life' 80. Citizens have two highest-order interests in 
exercising these moral powers, which are `supremely regulative as well as 
effective' 81. 
In addition to these two interests, Rawls assumes that individuals are `full 
developed moral persons', entailing that they have, at any given time, `a determinate 
scheme of final ends, a particular conception of the good' 82. Consequently, they have 
a higher-order interest in pursuing and advancing their own conception of the good. 
It is important to notice, though, that the latter interest is subordinated to the former 
set. 
Citizens are equal `in that they regard one another as having an equal right to 
determine, and to assess upon due reflection the first principles of justice by which 
the basic structure of their society is to be governed'83. 
Finally, citizens are free in two respects. First, `they conceive of themselves 
and of one another as having the moral power to have a conception of the good' 84 
This implies that they are not tied to particular conceptions, but are able to revise and 
change their values and final aims. `As free persons, citizens claim the right to view 
their persons as independent from and not identified with any particular conception 
of the good, or scheme of final ends85. The second sense in which citizens are free is 
that they are regarded as `being self-authenticating sources of valid claims' 
86, that is, 
they are entitled to make claims to social institutions in order to pursue their 
80 Ibid. 19. 
81 Rawls, `Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', 309. 
82 Ibid. 313. 
83 Ibid. 309. 
" Rawls, Justice as Fairness. 2 1. 
, 15 Ibid. 21 
86 ibid. 23. 
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conceptions of the good (provided those conceptions are permitted by the political 
conception of justice)87. 
Another feature of the political conception of the person is that persons are 
reasonable88. According to Rawls, 
reasonable persons are ready to propose, or to acknowledge when proposed by 
others, the principles needed to specify what can be seen by all as fair terms of 
cooperation. Reasonable persons also understand that they are to honour these 
principles, even at the expense of their own interests as circumstances may 
require, provided others likewise may be expected to honour them89 
Being `reasonable' is a moral idea that includes elements of reciprocity in fair terms 
of social cooperation according to which `all who cooperate must benefit, or share in 
common burdens, in some appropriate fashion as judged by a suitable benchmark of 
comparison' 90. These elements situate persons symmetrically in respect to the claims 
they are expected to make regarding the basic structure of society. It is important to 
notice that being reasonable places a constraint on the variety of ends and 
conceptions of the good that citizens are allowed to pursue and endorse within a just 
society91 
In the original position parties choose the principles of justice behind a veil 
of ignorance. The function of this device is to neutralise the influence of morally 
arbitrary social and natural circumstances. The parties ignore their place in society, 
social class, fortune in distribution of natural assets and abilities, intelligence or 
87 Ibid. 23. 
88 I will discuss the demands of reasonableness in Chapter 6. Cf. James Boettcher, 'What is 
Reasonableness', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 30 (2004), 597-621. 
89 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 7. 
90 Rawls, 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', 316. 
91 Cf. Rawls, A Theory' of Justice, 17. 
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strength, sex and race. They also ignore the content of the particular conception of 
the good which they endorse. Moreover they ignore certain facts about their 
psychological dispositions, such as the level of risk aversion or their (likely) 
susceptibility to the types of cognitive failures discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. They 
are, however, aware of some general facts about human society, principles of 
economic theory and the `laws of human psychology' 92. 
The parties behind the veil of ignorance choose principles for the distribution 
of primary goods, which include, first, the basic liberties that form the 
background institutions necessary for the development and exercise of the 
capacity to decide upon and revise, and rationally to pursue, a conception of the 
good. [Second, ] freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a 
background of diverse opportunities [... ] required for the pursuit of final ends. 
[Third, ] powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility [... ] 
needed to give scope to various self-governing and social capacities of the self. 
[Fourth], `income and wealth, understood broadly as they must be, [as] all 
purpose means for achieving directly or indirectly almost any of our ends, 
whatever they happen to be. [Finally, ] the social basis of the self respect 
[which] are those aspects of basic institutions which are normally essential if 
individuals are to have a lively sense of their own worth as moral persons and 
to be able to realize their higher-order interests and advance their ends with zest 
and confidence93 
This theoretical background relates to autonomy in two important respects: 
According to Rawls, the parties are autonomous insofar as in `their deliberations 
92 Ibid. 118-9. 
93 Rawls, 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory' 314-5, see also John Rawls, `Social Unity and 
Primary Goods' in his Collected Papers, 362-3. 
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they are not required to apply [ ... ] any prior antecedent principles of right and 
justice' (entailing that justice as fairness is a pure procedural theory). Additionally 
they are said to be moved solely by the highest-order interests in their moral powers 
and by their concern to advance their determinate but unknown final ends'94. The 
account of the index of primary goods addresses the latter aspect of autonomy. 
Scanlon's Contractualism and the Millian Principle 
Scanlon's contractualist argument for the Millian Principle is based on a theoretical 
perspective not vastly different to that of Rawls95. According to Scanlon, the parties 
in the original position would not adopt restrictions on speech except in the very 
special cases of severely diminished capacities. 
According to the model presented above, it would be unreasonable to choose 
principles that are either based on determinate conceptions of the good96 or that do 
not advance our moral powers. It does not follow from this, however, that rejecting 
the Millian Principle would be an unreasonable choice. To make this claim Scanlon 
must show either that the Millian Principle is the one that best serves our highest- 
order interests or, conversely, that not to choose it would diminish the probability of 
fulfilling those interests. 
It is certainly not obvious why the Millian Principle could be the best way to 
advance our moral interests. In particular, not paying attention to the ecology of 
speech, that is, to the ways in which speech affects people non-autonomously, seems 
to inflict a high cost. It is not unreasonable to think that the parties could choose a 
94 Rawls, 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', 315. 
95 Scanlon, `A Theory of Freedom of Expression', 15-21; Brison, The Autonomy Defense of Free 
Speech', 329 Amdur, 'Scanlon on Freedom of Expression', 290. 
96 For the role of neutrality see Chapter 5. 
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principle of speech whose intention is to neutralise the possible triggering of mental 
contamination. This latter strategy could place, for instance, content-neutral 
restrictions on highly contaminating speech. 
However, it is possible that the distinction between the content of speech and 
the mental processes which produce mental contamination are linked in a more 
intimate way: it may be that certain contents trigger procedures automatically. One 
of the suggestions of a domain-specific theory of rationality is that this is most 
probably the case. If, for instance, racial thinking is linked to a domain-specific 
module of human kinds, then it is likely that the content of such thought and some of 
the cognitive processes of this module cannot be disentangled that easily. Although 
this possibility is contentious, it does suggest that neutralising mental contamination 
might be linked indirectly to certain content-based regulations97. In this respect, and 
contrary to Scanlon's arguments, it seems plausible `to suppose that rational 
autonomous hypothetical contractors would agree to allow governments to protect 
them from certain harms wrought by people acting autonomously or 
nonautonomously' 98. 
Contractualism and the Ecology of Speech 
According to Scanlon's contractualism, `an act is wrong if its performance under the 
circumstances would be disallowed by any systems of rules for the general 
regulation of behavior which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, 
unforced general agreement'99. It is important to highlight two basic differences 
97 Cf. Chapter 5 
98 Brison, The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech', 329. 
99 Thomas Scanlon, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', in The Difficulty of Tolerance, 132. 
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between Scanlon's and Rawls's model of contractualism: while the rationale for the 
latter is to devise principles that are reasonably adopted under uncertainty, 
individuals in the former model have a direct reason for finding non-rejectable 
principles because the very basis for moral principles is that they must be justifiable 
to other people. As Scanlon writes, we must be concerned with other people's points 
of view not because `we might occupy their positions in some other possible world, 
but in order to find principles that they, as well as we, have reason to accept' loo The 
second difference is that Rawls's contractualism is political (at least in its later 
development), while Scanlon's is comprehensive 101 
It seems that it would be reasonable to reject the Millian Principle insofar as 
it ignores the ecology of free speech. After all, the `central audience interest in 
expression [... ] is the interest in having a good environment for the formation of 
one's beliefs and desires' 102. In not seeking to neutralise mental contamination, it 
places audiences in a situation in which they cannot respond to their circumstances 
in an appropriate manner. For instance, reasonable persons would be motivated to 
neutralise the effects of aversive racism which is defined as 
a modern form of prejudice that characterizes the racial attitudes of many 
Whites who endorse egalitarian values, who regard themselves as 
nonprejudiced, but who discriminate is subtle, rationalizable ways. According 
to the aversive perspective, many Whites who consciously and sincerely 
support egalitarian principles and believe themselves to be nonprejudiced also 
unconsciously harbor negative feelings and beliefs about Blacks, which may be 
100 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 191. 
101 Another difference is that while Rawlsian principles must be acceptable to all reasonable persons, 
Scanlon's requirement is weaker; they must be non-rejectable. Cf. ibid. 154-5; Scanlon, 
'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', 133. 
102 Scanlon, `Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression', 91. 
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based in part on almost unavoidable cognitive, motivational, and sociocultural 
processes [... ]. These unconscious negative feelings and beliefs may be implicit 
attitudes, whereas the conscious, self-reported egalitarian attitudes of aversive 
racist may represent explicit attitudes103 
In contrast with old-fashion, explicit racists, aversive racists endorse fair treatment of 
all groups. However, despite their good intentions they still display feelings of 
uneasiness towards black people and tend to avoid interracial interactions. When 
they interact, they tend to display anxiety and discomfort 104 and/or to automatically 
respond in a fashion consistent with the stereotype they consciously reject (for 
instance, making self-fulfilling prophecies possible). 
As audiences, it is in our interests to reduce forms of mental contamination 
that might threaten the development and exercise of our sense of justice. Aversive 
racism is one example of the problems people with the right motivation have in 
responding in the appropriate way. The effectiveness of justice is highly diminished. 
The second moral power of audiences might also be compromised by mental 
contamination. It matters, in particular, not only that we have the capacity for a 
conception of the good, but also the manner in which this capacity is exercised105. As 
Scanlon himself writes, `[e]xpression is a bad thing if it influences us in ways that 
are unrelated to relevant reasons, or in ways that bypass our ability to consider these 
reasons' 
106 
103 John Dovidio, Kerry Kawakami. Craig Johnson, et. al., 'On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and 
Controlled Processes', Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33 (1997), 51'?. 
104 John Dovidio and Samuel Gaertner, 'Aversive Racism', Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology, 36 (2004). 8. 
105 I will distinguish the relation between persons and the way in which they affirm their conceptions 
of the good regarding liberal institutions and the demands of neutrality in Chapter 6. 
106 Scanlon, `Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression', 90. 
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Reasonable persons could also reject the Millian Principle based on the 
interests of the victims of speech. In an environment in which racial stereotypes are 
widely harboured victims suffer from discrimination and unequal opportunities, not 
because the structural arrangements are explicitly discriminatory, but because people 
who make important decisions might be (and often are) aversive racists. Moreover, a 
social environment rife with implicit (and explicit) racial prejudice might affect the 
way in which the social basis of self-respect is distributed. According to Rawls, 
among the list of primary goods, perhaps the most important is this one107. The basis 
of the self-respect has two aspects. First `it includes a person's sense of his own 
value, his secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth 
carrying out'. Second, `respect implies a confidence in one's abilities, so far as it is 
within one's power, to fulfil one's intentions' 108. It seems clear that the importance 
of this primary good is that without it nothing would seem worth doing; an 
individual with no self-respect will lack the motivation to pursue her ends and goals. 
Rawls concludes: `therefore the parties in the original position would wish to avoid 
(at almost any cost) the social conditions that undermine self-respect' 109 The harms 
brought about by hate speech undermine the self-respect and self-esteem of their 
victims, providing persons a with pro tanto reason to minimise the effects of these 
harmsllo Similarly, a principle that allows the protection of some forms of hate 
107 Rawls, A Theory, of Justice, 386. 
108 Ibid. 386. 
109 Ibid. 386. 
110'A pro tanto reason has a genuine weight, but nonetheless may be outweighed by other 
considerations. Thus calling a reason a pro tanto reason is to be distinguished from calling a prima 
facie reason, which I take to involve an epistemological qualification: a prima facie reason appears to 
be a reason, but may actually not be a reason at all, or may not have weight in all cases it appears to. 
In contrast a pro tanto reason is a genuine reason -reason with actual weight- but it may not be a 
decisive one in various cases'. Shelly Kagan, The Limits of , 11orality (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), 17. 
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speech `does not serve the basis for mutual recognition"". According to Scanlon `a 
person [... ] acts wrongly when she or he simply fails to take notice of considerations 
that [ ... 
] principles [which no one could reasonably reject] hold relevant' 112. Social 
situations in which some are treated as inferior, or as having less worth than others, 
are an objectionable component of the social arrangements of that society. Beliefs in 
racial superiority, and the stereotypes it produces, present a reason to alter the 
institutions that preserve them 113 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I divided Scanlon's principle into two parts. The first I called the 
discontinuous responsibility argument. The second is an account of how autonomous 
agents would regulate speech. I claimed that the Millian Principle relies heavily on 
the distinction between means and goals and on a particular account of personal 
responsibility. 
I argued that the difference between ends and means is untenable (at least in 
the terms Scanlon suggests). I also criticised the Millian Principle for not assessing 
the influences and processes to which people are exposed when making judgments. 
Some of the difficulties of Scanlon's principle reappear in his discussion about 
paternalism. I tried to rephrase the discontinuous responsibility argument using 
Scanlon's later distinction between substantive responsibility and responsibility as 
111 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 194. 
112 Ibid. 269. 
113 Thomas Scanlon, 'The Diversity of Objections to Inequality', in The Difficulty of Tolerance, 204. 
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attributability. I argued that on the one hand, it is the case that sometimes people 
should not be held responsible for the acts performed by others based on the 
former's acts of expression. On the other hand, however, that does not mean that 
they cannot be held substantively responsible for some wrongdoing or that we 
cannot impose certain burdens upon them, in this case, restrictions on speech. 
The discussion of citizen's autonomy was first contrasted with the Rawlsian 
original position. I also tried to accommodate the Millian Principle within Scanlon's 
own version of contractualism. I claimed that people could reasonably reject a 
principle that does not attempt to neutralise (at least some) cases of mental 
contamination. It seems that conditions for justifiability demand such evaluations. 
From this analysis of the Millian Principle we can deduce two conclusions. 
First, this version of the autonomy defence of speech is untenable. If speech 
bypasses autonomy, the later cannot be employed as a reason to go beyond the harm 
done through speech. Second, it is in an audience's autonomy-based interests to 
minimise grave cases of mental contamination, and these interests might be in 
conflict with free speech. Serious cases of mental contamination (such as aversive 
racism) and the harm it brings on third parties need to be taken into consideration 
when establishing principles of free speech. We cannot operate under the assumption 
`that having been exposed, an audience is always free to decide how to react: what 
belief to form or what attitude to adopt' 114 In this respect I suggest that there is a pro 
tanto reason to control the ecology of speech 
However, maybe this reason is not sufficient for restrictions on speech, we 
must also consider the interests of speakers. This is the task of the next chapter. 
114 Scanlon, 'Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression', 89. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RONALD DWORKIN AND THE INTERESTS OF SPEAKERS 
In the last chapter I argued that speech is not always positive in terms of audience 
interests. I suggested that the autonomy defence fails on two accounts. First, if 
speech bypasses autonomous processes, then it cannot provide the exception to the 
harm principle originally claimed. In this respect, it is unreasonable that the victims 
of speech must bear all its costs. Instead, we must look at how the social ecology of 
speech is built and distribute the costs accordingly. Second, I argued that, contrary to 
the indications of the Millian Principle, it is reasonable for persons to protect 
themselves from highly contaminating speech. I suggested that forms of mental 
contamination which are particularly troublesome for citizens are those which 
jeopardise the exercise of their two moral powers: the capacity for a sense of justice 
and the capacity to form, revise, and pursue conception of the good. The latter 
conclusion is stronger than the former insofar as it imposes a positive duty on 
government to take action aiming at neutralising the effects of these forms of mental 
contamination. 
However, even if it is in audiences' interests to be protected from the harmful 
effects of speech, this claim is still not conclusive. We need to look at the interests of 
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speakers' with respect to speech, and when there is conflict we must find a balance. 
A speaker has two important interests with respect to speech. First, she has an 
expressive interest in `being able to call something to the attention of a wide 
audience'2 for a number of reasons: she might want to `bear witness' to a viewpoint 
concerning, say, political justice or to articulate thoughts, attitudes and feelings on 
matters of personal or broader human concern' 3. An important dimension of having a 
sense of justice and being a moral person includes trying to persuade others about 
the validity of our convictions. Sometimes, speaking our minds is necessary for 
personal integrity; seeing justice not being done gives a strong reason to express our 
views and to try to rectify this. Similarly, we want to communicate the reasons we 
have for valuing our most cherished convictions because we feel that people would 
be better off if they reflected and also endorsed them. Expressive interests are not 
necessarily of such serious order; we also want to communicate to others our 
experiences and thoughts, even the trivial ones, and we want to amuse people and 
form bonds in which language and expression are important. 
Second, a speaker has also deliberative interests. Sometimes articulating and 
publicly expressing a viewpoint can be an important part of subjecting it to sharper 
assessment and critical analysis. Although these interests have different weight in a 
theory of free speech, they are both presumptions for expression. My interest in 
communicating my views about the worthiness of a religious life or about the 
1I refer as `speakers' to all participants who have interests in free speech, even though some of them 
are not speakers in the usual sense (they might participate by making films, or showing pictures, or 
painting graffiti, or burning flags). I believe that `speakers' is a better word than participants because 
audiences and bystanders are also participants in speech situations. The difference, though, is 
unimportant as it is only a matter of usage. 
2 Scanlon, `Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression', 86. 
Cohen `Freedom of Expression'. 224. 
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unreasonableness of right wing conservatism are generally thought to be far 
weightier than my interests in telling jokes, or chatting about what I had for lunch4. 
Ronald Dworkin has produced a number of important arguments defending 
freedom of speech. Although he has not systematically constructed a theory of free 
expression, his arguments are important and strong. Their assessment is the focus of 
this chapter. I will interpret his theory of speech as based mainly on speakers' 
autonomy. I am not suggesting that he believes that only speakers' are concerned 
with speech, for he also agrees that it serves audiences' autonomy. Nevertheless, he 
does suggest that the interests of speakers' alone are sufficient to warrant a free 
speech principles. 
I 
Free Speech as a Trump over Social Utility 
In Taking Rights Seriously6, Dworkin rejects a utilitarian account of rights in favour 
of the claim that `individuals have rights, when, for some reason, a collective goal is 
not a sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have 
or to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or injury upon 
them'7. In his earlier defence of free speech, Dworkin uses this framework to reject 
the view that the social benefits of regulating expression are sufficient justification 
for them. 
'A way of assigning weights to forms of speech consists in distinguishing between different 
categories of expression. Cf. Scanlon, `Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression'. 
5 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 160-1. He seems to agree with the U. S. Supreme Court in that speech 
might be curtailed only in cases of `clear and present danger'. 
6 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Serious/v (London: Duckworth, 1977). 
Ibid. xi. 
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In his discussion of obscenity and pornography, he holds that people have a 
right to moral independence, according to which, 
People have the right not to suffer disadvantage in the distribution of social 
goods an opportunities, including disadvantage in the liberties permitted to 
them by criminal law, just on the ground that their officials or fellow-citizens 
think that their opinions about the right way for them to lead their own lives are 
ignoble or wrongs. 
Dworkin argues that attempts to regulate or ban pornography or obscenity are based 
on an assessment of the intrinsic worth of these kinds of expression9. The motivation 
behind regulation is that, if citizens' preferences are to be given due weight, and the 
majority of citizens prefer to live in a pornography free society, then, there is case 
for banning such material10. A social policy that satisfies most preferences would 
support a ban on pornography. Dworkin's defence of a right to moral independence 
provides a constraint on this justification: he argues that the `moral pain' and the 
moral offence that pornography and obscenity can produce on people do not provide 
a reason for their regulations l 
Another way in which Dworkin's argument can be understood is to 
distinguish between two types of preferences that might affect the distribution of 
burdens and benefits in a utilitarian society. He argues that an individual has a 
personal preference when she desires some goods or opportunities for herself. 
Clearly a person might want to have access to education and income, to sport and 
cultural venues, and she wants these opportunities to be open to her. On the other 
8 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 353. 
9 The presumption against content-based regulation will be addressed in the next chapter. 
10 The same argument can be applied to a variety of issues including homosexuality, divorce, racial 
segregation, hate speech, etc. 
11 He acknowledges that it could justify its restriction in certain times and places (through zoning, or 
by selling pornographic magazines only in specialised shops, or by selling them with black covers). 
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hand, a person has external preferences when she prefers some opportunities and 
goods to be open (or closed) to others12. Someone might prefer a swimming pool to 
be built in his town rather than a theatre, not because he enjoys swimming more than 
plays, but because he does not want theatregoers to have a good time. Or he might 
prefer more funding to be allocated to hospitals than schools because he wants his ill 
friends to be able to get better treatment. An implication of the moral independence 
idea is that external preferences should be discarded when making political 
decisions, because a person's rights and opportunities should not depend on how his 
fellow citizens regard how he leads his life. 
Although compelling, this argument does not prove that a strong principle of 
free speech is to be protected. In particular, it does not provide reasons to protect 
speech regardless of the harmful consequences it may have. Dworkin's argument 
shows only that offence and moral pain, in general, are not sufficient justification to 
restrict a person's action. In this sense, Dworkin's argument is a form of minimalism 
which attempts to show that the alleged harms of speech are, in fact, not harms in the 
relevant sense. For instance, contrast an effort to regulate the publication of obscene 
material with an attempt to forbid the practice of homosexuality. Imagine that in 
both cases the `bare knowledge' that these phenomena occur in a society produces 
enough discomfort and moral reprobation in its members to motivate them to forbid 
such activity. Now, the reason these attempts should fail is the same, namely that 
discomfort and reprobation are not valid justification for prohibition. In short, 
Dworkin's argument fails to defend a principle of free speech; it merely shows that 
external preferences and moral offence cannot be used as a justification to curtail 
people's activities. 
2 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously. 234. 
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It is remarkable that Dworkin backs this minimalist strategy in his 
discussions about the effects of pornography. He argues that as yet, there is no 
respectable study linking pornography with sexual violence13 and that, more 
generally, pornography does not harm women in the sense required for the harm 
principle to apply 14. So, Dworkin concludes, given that pornography does not harm 
women, the only reasons to ban it are based on either external preferences (people 
who would prefer others not to read pornographic material) or on considerations of 
offence and moral distress 15 
II 
Authenticity and Equality of Resources 
This is not the only defence available to Dworkin, for he could concede that 
pornography indeed harms women but maintain that there are, nevertheless, reasons 
to protect it. That is, he could change his minimalist for a maximalist strategy. In his 
later work, he seems to adopt this tactic. 
Another defence of free speech is derived directly from Dworkin's defence 
for equality of resources16. Dworkin believes that the fundamental goal of 
government is to adhere to the abstract egalitarian principle according to which, `[it] 
must act in a way that makes the lives of those it governs better lives, and it must 
13 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 206. But see 
Hurley, `Bypassing Conscious Control' which could provide an explanation for the direct link 
between exposure to violent pornography and violence against women. 
k See Dworkin, Freedom's Law. 206-7,217,219-20,230. 
15 A critical assessment of Dworkin's views on pornography is Rae Langton, 'Whose Rights? Ronald 
Dworkin, Women, and Pornographers', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19 (1990), 311-59; see also 
Brison, The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech', 324-5. 
16 Equality of resources is presented and defended in Sovereign Virtue, Chapter '_'. 
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show equal concern for the life of each' 17. Dworkin thinks that a defence of free 
choice (including freedom of speech) can be directly derived from his account of 
equality of resources. He argues that equality and liberty are not two different values 
which may potentially conflict, but, rather, that in a satisfactory account of equality 
of resources `liberty becomes a [constitutive] aspect of equality' 18. Or, in other 
words, `liberty is necessary to equality [ ... ] because liberty, whether or not people 
value it above all else, is essential to any process in which equality is defined and 
secured' 19 
Dworkin thinks that an equal distribution of resources must be sensitive to 
people's preferences20. He imagines a situation in which all impersonal resources are 
to be distributed through an auction. People bid for the resources they desire, until no 
one `would prefer someone else's bundle of resources to his own bundle'21. This 
4 envy test' is a necessary condition of an egalitarian distribution22. 
The auction-based device involves people taking responsibility for the costs 
of their own ambitions and projects, because the costs of any given resource will 
fluctuate according to how much others bid for it. How much I bid for the 
availability of places of worship will be a function of how much I and others value 
the practice of religion23. 
'7 Ibid. 128. 
18 Ibid. 123. 
19 Ibid. 122. 
20 Notice that while Rawlsian primary goods are derived from citizens' needs (in terms of their two 
moral powers), Dworkin's resources accommodate individuals' preferences 
21 Ibid. 67. 
22 It is not sufficient, though. An egalitarian distribution still needs to neutralise the effects of `brute' 
luck in the distribution of personal resources through a hypothetical insurance device. Cf. ibid. 73-82. 
23 People can bid for the availability of religious services but not for the right to practice religion. So, 
although religion is to be tolerated, the number of churches available will vary according to other 
people's bids. 
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Because the envy test might be satisfied in a variety of ways24, Dworkin 
thinks that we need a bridge between it and the egalitarian principle: one of such 
bridges is the principle of abstraction, which provides an account of true opportunity 
costs, thus ensuring that the auction is fair. This principle `recognizes that the true 
opportunity cost of any transferable resource is the price others would pay for it in an 
auction whose resources were offered in as abstract as possible, that is, in the form 
that permits the greatest possible flexibility in fine-tuning bids to plans and 
preferences' 25. This principle allows liberty to figure in the auction because it is 
necessary for discerning the true opportunity costs of different resources, which is 
necessary information if government is to treat everyone under its command with 
equal concern and respect. The principle of abstraction, then, limits free choice under 
circumstances in which a person's actions would harm third parties (or put them at 
significant risk); perfectionist or paternalistic restrictions are in principle 
disallowed26. The principle of abstraction ensures neutrality of justification by 
describing the resources to be auctioned in as abstract a way as possible and by 
insisting that `the resources people have available [ ... ] 
be fixed by the costs of their 
having these to others, rather than by any collective judgment about the comparative 
worth or projects or personal moralities'27 
Another principle that bridges the envy test and the egalitarian principle is 
the principle of authenticity. This principle gives guidance regarding which liberties 
are more important than others and, importantly, explains why a speakers' interests 
24 Imagine that, before the auction, all resources are traded for plovers' eggs and pre-phylloxera 
claret. After the auction, although someone who does not like plovers' eggs or pre-phylloxera claret 
may not want to change her bundle for someone else's, the government fails to satisfy the abstract 
egalitarian principle because it does not treat every person with equal concern. Ibid. 67-8. 
2 Ibid. 151. 
26 Some other permissible restrictions aim at correcting the externalities of the auction. Ibid. 156. 
27 Ibid. 154. 
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based principle of free speech is constitutive of equality of resources. The concern 
for authenticity derives from the notion that the auction must be sensitive to parties 
preferences and life plans. In order to respect the parties as equals, any permissible 
auction 
requires [... ] some baseline principles specially protecting the parties' freedom 
to engage in activities crucial to forming and reviewing the convictions, 
commitments, associations, projects, and tastes that they bring to the auction, 
and after the auction, to the various decisions about production and trade that 
will reform and redistribute their initial holdings28. 
A general protection of free speech clearly figures in this account of authenticity, for 
it is advantageous to the parties to express their commitments and beliefs to a wide 
audience. The principle of authenticity captures the basic idea underlying the 
autonomy defence of free speech by insisting that speakers have an interest in having 
6 an opportunity to influence the corresponding opinions of others, on which their 
success in the auctions in large part depends' 29. Restricting the opportunity a person 
has to influence others is an arbitrary way of distorting the opportunity costs of that 
person's lifestyle; such a distortion constitutes a breach to the egalitarian principle of 
equal respect. For instance, a person who is not allowed to convince others to bid for 
sport facilities in her community will find that the costs of exercising are higher than 
they would have been if she had been free to convince her neighbours to bid for 
those facilities. If she must invest more resources for securing the sport facilities 
because she was not allowed to convince others then the auction would not have 
28 Ibid. 159. 
' Ibid. 160. 
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been fair30. It is from this perspective that Dworkin thinks authenticity establishes a 
free speech principle based on speakers' interests. 
However, Dworkin believes that we must also constrain authenticity because 
it allows too much. As stated, it does not distinguish between different kinds of 
preferences and might deliver results that fail to treat some members with equal 
concern. The principle of independence corrects this failure. Just as some lifestyles 
have higher costs (resulting from wrong interferences, such as restrictions on speech, 
or policies that deliberately increase their costs based on an account of their intrinsic 
merits31), a person's life can be inflicted with distorted opportunity costs if other 
people's bids reflect contempt or dislike for her. A clear example could be a situation 
in which members of a racist community bid for areas of land and build segregated 
zones, leaving members of others races with fewer resources and opportunities than 
they would have had in the absence of such a prejudice. The principle of 
independence limits the principle of abstraction by imposing protections to persons 
who `are the objects of systematic prejudice from suffering any serious or pervasive 
disadvantage from that prejudice'32 
How should hate speech be accommodated at the intersection of the 
principles of authenticity and independence? It appears from Dworkin's writing that 
authenticity takes priority over independence in the sense that the harms done 
through speech are not sufficient to restrict the authenticity of speakers. This can be 
defended in two ways. 
30 Even though the distribution might be envy-free. She may still prefer to pay the extra resources in 
order to exercise than being in others' situation. 
1 Of course this does not mean that Dworkin thinks that all ways of life must equally costly. He does 
not appeal to neutrality of impact. Ibid. 154.281-3. 
32 Ibid. 161. 
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First, Dworkin can take a minimalist approach and claim that independence 
does not apply here because speech does not distort the opportunity costs of victims. 
On this view, the costs of speech are similar to other costs which are not condemned 
by equality of resources. For instance, Bob enjoys playing baseball but because he 
lives in the UK, the cost of doing so is higher than in the US. The higher cost, of 
course, is a function of others people choices and preferences (in the UK most 
people bid for football and cricket). Nevertheless, Bob has neither been wronged nor 
disadvantaged in a justice-based sense. 
Now, contrast this case with John, a person who suffers due to other people's 
racist attitudes. Although John is protected from discrimination in employment, he 
nevertheless is not protected from the effects of hate speech (or, as I shall discuss in 
Chapter 6, from the effects of discriminatory associations). Based on a minimalist 
approach, Dworkin can argue that the effects of speech and association are not 
detrimental to justice: they are akin to those suffered by Bob. However, this strategy 
does not seem promising for two reasons. On the one hand, a robust defence of free 
speech cannot ignore its costs, and, as we have seen, the automatic effects of speech 
can have grave consequences: someone can fail to obtain a job due to racial 
stereotypes and implicit associations, people might react aggressively towards her 
with no good reason, and so on. On the other hand, equality of resources cannot be 
neutral about those effects, because they flow from racial or sexist prejudice. 
Equality of resources must condemn `the attitudes that create disadvantage' based on 
racial or sexual prejudice33 
The second strategy available to Dworkin is a maximalist defence, according 
to which authenticity takes precedence over independence. This strategy has the 
33 Ibid. 162. 
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advantage of recognising the costs of speech, but, it insists, these are not sufficient to 
restrict expression. 
Notice, though, that, from the perspective of authenticity the interests 
involved in free speech are not equally situated. As noted in the previous chapter, it 
makes sense for audiences to seek protection from mental contamination, especially 
from those forms that threaten aspects of our lives to which we attribute great 
importance, such as the way we treat others. In this sense, the principle of abstraction 
could be limited so as to accommodate the ecology of speech. It would not be 
unreasonable to hold that the auction must be sensitive to the environment in which 
people form and revise their personalities when those limits are established with the 
intention of realising circumstances in which people are all treated with equal respect 
and concern. 
Although Dworkin could argue that equality of resources already places a 
limit on public actions that fail to treat everyone with equal respect and concern by 
prohibiting state-sponsored racism or legal forms of sexist and racial discrimination, 
this does not accommodate restrictions on private actions. The effects of mental 
contamination, therefore, undermine this objection, for the harmful impact of 
aversive racism and similar processes bypass the public/private distinction34 
Although deliberate governmental distortions of opportunity costs might be worse 
than those resulting from private actions, there is no reason to suppose that the latter 
is irrelevant for the purview of justice. Dworkin himself recognises that discrete 
actions of private actors have serious (intended and unintended) effects on victims 
and audiences. In his discussion of Mackinnon's claim that pornography harms 
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women he argues that, given that only a minority of men consume pornographic 
material35, other forms of sexism can be more influential. In this respect, he 
acknowledges that 
[c]ommercial advertisement and soap operas create images that are subtle and 
ubiquitous, and it would not be surprising to learn, through whatever research 
might establish this, that they indeed do great damage to the way women are 
understood and allowed to be influential in politics36 
Indeed, the idea of mental contamination and the empirical evidence that gives it 
support highlight the harmful effects of gender and racist stereotypes and implicit 
associations. Nevertheless, Dworkin thinks that these harms (even if real and 
important) do not provide sufficient justification to restrict speech. 
It is important to bear in mind that the claim defended here is not an example 
of `cultural paternalism' of the sort Dworkin rejects. Instead it is based on an 
assessment of how exposure to certain forms of speech might be detrimental to the 
authenticity of audiences and to the independence of both them and the targets of 
hate speech. The claim I defend is also not paternalistic in another sense: I am not 
arguing that it would be better for speakers' authenticity if they were not allowed to 
express their views because they are immoral or unpopular. The argument is merely 
that, from the point of view of authenticity, it is not clear why a speakers' right to 
hate speech necessarily trumps that of audiences' and targets'. Moreover, equality of 
resources cannot be neutral towards the effects of racial and sexist prejudice37. In 
this respect I argue that a fair distribution of resources must be sensitive to the 
;` This is itself a controversial claim, many men are exposed to pornography involuntarily. 
36 Dworkin, Freedom's Law, 220. 
37 Dworkin thinks that equality of resources might treat the disadvantages created by prejudice as 
handicaps in the sense that justice must be sensitive to those differences. Nevertheless, he 
acknowledges that in one respect, disadvantages created by prejudice are worse than handicaps. 
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 162. 
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ecology of speech. Dworkin could still give paramount weight to the interests of 
speakers, but he cannot do so with the strategies addressed here. The next two 
arguments addressed are both attempts to find an alternative strategy of sustaining 
this position. 
III 
Dignity and Integrity 
Critical and Volitional Interests 
In contrast to political liberals, who think that political institutions must be justified 
(or justifiable) independent of a person's ethical convictions, Dworkin thinks that 
liberalism must be justified by appealing to some non-political values38. In order to 
do so, Dworkin thinks that we should find values at a sufficiently abstract level that 
most people would endorse. Once such values are found, we must show that certain 
political institutions are their best interpretation. Political liberals, Dworkin argues, 
attempt `to reduce liberal convictions to the public sphere'. For them, `liberalism 
seems to be [ ... 
] only a theory of right, totally unconnected to the problem of the 
good'. In contrast, Dworkin `tr[ies] to connect ethics and politics by constructing a 
view about the nature and character of the good life that makes liberal political 
morality seem continuous [ ... 
] with appealing philosophical views about the good 
life' 39. Or, as he describes one of the goals of his recent book, `I shall argue [ ... ] that 
in spite of the popular opinion [that there is unbridgeable divide], we actually can 
38 Cf. Rawls, Political Liberalism, especially `Introduction to the Paperback Edition', xxxvii-lxii; 
Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
39 Dworkin, 'Foundations of Liberal Equality', 191. 
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find shared principles of sufficient substance to make a national political debate 
possible and profitable. These are very abstract, indeed philosophical, principles 
about the value and the central responsibilities of a human life'40 
Dworkin distinguishes between two different kinds of interests possessed by 
people. One the one hand, a person has interests in achieving things she wants to 
achieve; interests she harbours only because she wishes to satisfy them. If she 
obtains what she desires, her life will go better. For instance, eating fish for supper 
tonight will improve my well-being only because I desire that meal. Dworkin terms 
this dimension of well-being `volitional well-being' and the interests we have in 
securing it `volitional interests'41. On the other hand, a person has `critical' interests 
in achieving certain things, not because she wants them but because their 
achievement will improve her life. Dworkin cites, as examples, a close relationship 
with one's children, some success in our professional lives, and moderate grasp 
about the state of advanced science. The thought here is that these things improve 
one's critical well-being independently of whether we want them or not: well-being 
in this sense is `improved by [a person's] having or achieving what he should want, 
that is, the achievements or experiences that it would make his life a worse one not 
to want'42. Ideally these interests match each other: a person usually wants to obtain 
what is good for her life in the critical sense and sometimes it is critical for a person 
to get some degree of success in the goals she wants to achieve. Obviously, however, 
40 Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?, 7-8. In the next chapters I defend a qualified version of 
political liberalism in two ways: one argues that a partly comprehensive liberalism is necessary for 
legitimacy (Chapter 5). The other argues that `public reason' is complete enough to give legitimate 
answers to political decisions (Chapter 6). 
41 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue. 242. 
42 Dworkin, 'Foundations of Liberal Equality', 230. Although one can question this distinction (e. g. 
some hedonistic utilitarians can argue that both kind of interests necessarily collapse together), I will 
grant the validity of the distinction for the sake of the argument. Notice also that what counts as a 
critical interest depends, in part, on each person's circumstances. To me, playing football well 
increases my volitional well-being, whereas it is critical to Wayne Rooney's life. 
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sometimes they also come apart: myopia, weakness of the will, and addictions all 
seem to be forms of a person's wants and actions that do not serve her critical well- 
being. On the other hand, some people simply do not care about how well or badly 
their lives go43. It is not that they are mistaken about their critical interests, but rather 
that they disregard the quality of their lives: according to Dworkin, `we think that 
[ 
... 
] their lives are defective in a particular and demeaning way: they lack dignity' 4 . 
Dignity and Political Equality 
The idea of dignity is appealing, according to Dworkin, because it embodies values 
that most people share regardless of their particular viewpoints on more concrete 
issues in politics. It is an example of the `continuity' strategy for justifying 
liberalism. According to Dworkin, dignity has two aspects. First, human life has an 
inherent value, and that value is `axiomatic and fundamental. It is important for no 
further reason than that [people] have a life to live'45. Now, if someone's life has 
intrinsic value for himself, then he must concede that everyone else's life has the 
same intrinsic value. The first person's perspective does not make his life more 
important than others. If this is true, then we are committed to the view `that it is 
objectively important that once any human life has begun, that life go well and not 
be wasted. [We] must also accept that this is equally important for each person 
43 Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?, 14. 
4' Ibid. 14 
15 Ibid. 15. Cf. what he calls the 'sacredness' of life 
innate value; [... J human life is sacred just in itself' 
Vintage, 1994), 11. 
According to him `human life has an intrinsic. 
Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion (New York: 
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because [we] have no ground for distinctions of degree any more than for flat 
exclusions' 46 
The second dimension of human dignity holds that 
Each of us has a personal responsibility for the governance of his own life that 
includes the responsibility to make and execute ultimate decisions about what 
life would be a good one to lead. We may not subordinate ourselves to the will 
of other human beings in making those decisions; we must not accept the right 
of anyone else to force us to conform to a view of success that but for coercion 
we would not choose47. 
This principle of `special responsibility' grounds the argument that people must be 
treated not only with concern, but also with respect, and will figure prominently in 
this version of Dworkin's defence of free speech. 
Given that a person has a critical interest in living a good life, Dworkin is 
able to connect the abstract egalitarian principle with the idea of dignity. Recall that, 
according to Dworkin, `government must act in a way that makes the lives of those it 
governs better lives'48 and that it must do so in a manner consistent with their 
dignity. This implies that government attempts to increase its subjects' critical well- 
being are constrained by two factors: first, in all its actions it must show equal 
concern to all people (as embodied by the principle of equal value of everyone's 
life), and second, it must treat them with equal respect (as embodied by the idea of 
special responsibility). A government that fails to satisfy these conditions loses, to 
that degree, its legitimacy49 
46 Dworkin, Is Dernocracy Possible Here?. 16. See also Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 5.240. 
4' Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?, 17. In Sovereign Virtue Dworkin clarifies that his use of 
`responsibility' is similar to Scanlon's `substantive responsibility'. Sovereign Virtue, 489, n. 4. 
48 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 1? 8. 
49 On legitimacy. Dworkin writes that citizens 'assume [... J political obligations only if and so long as 
the community's government respects their human dignity. Only so long [... J as it accepts the equal 
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There are two avenues for defending free speech based on the notion of 
human dignity. The first is a direct argument premised on the idea of responsibility, 
the other emanates from a conception of political equality and democracy. I will 
briefly explore each here. Dworkin argues for a `constitutive' version of free speech 
(as opposed to a consequentialist version) on the grounds that free speech is an 
`essential [... ] feature of a just political society 'S0. In this respect, free speech is 
necessary to protect the responsibility each person has to determine their own values, 
to form convictions, and to communicate them `out of concern for others, and out of 
a compelling desire the truth be known, justice served, and the good secured 51 In 
other words, there is an intimate relation between a person's special responsibility 
and her leading an authentic life52: 
preventing someone from speaking his conscience and conviction to other people 
is a particularly grave harm. People develop their ethical and moral personalities 
most effectively in conversation and exchange with others. Speaking out for what 
one believes -bearing witness and testimony- is in any case for most people an 
essential part of believing; it is part of the total phenomenon of conviction. 
Identifying oneself to others as a person of particular beliefs or faiths is part of 
creating one's identity, part of the process of self-creation that is at the centre of 
our personal responsibility 
53 
Free speech is, then, a condition government cannot fail to secure if it is to promote 
and respect its citizens' critical well-being. 
importance of their lives and their personal responsibility for their own lives... ' Is Democracy 
Possible Here?, 97. 
50 Dworkin, Freedom's La't', 199-200. 
51 Ibid. 200. 
52 The relation is also between her responsibility and her ethical integrity. I will discuss the latter in 
the next section. 
53 Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?, 153. 
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The second approach by which free speech can be defended here is based on 
the idea of political equality, and is linked to the defence of democracy. Dworkin 
argues that institutions are democratic `to the degree that they allow citizens to 
govern themselves collectively through a partnership in which each is an active and 
equal partner'54. Democracy, understood as such, rejects that majorities per se have 
any moral significance; democracy is a system of collective decision-making that 
must satisfy certain conditions, conditions mainly aimed at guaranteeing that 
institutions treat citizens with equal respect and concern, that is, in a manner that is 
compatible with their dignity 55 
Certain considerations need to be accommodated in order to understand the 
relation between democratic equality and freedom of speech. Some of these are 
captured by the idea of `moral membership'. First, in order to be a member in a 
community in which each individual is treated with respect and concern, an element 
of reciprocity is needed. Accordingly, Dworkin claims that `a person is not a 
member unless he is treated as a member by others, which means that they treat the 
consequences of any collective decision for his life as equally significant a reason for 
or against that decision as are comparable consequences for the life of anyone 
else'56. Second, democracy requires a space of discourse in which collective 
deliberation takes place. Citizens must be free to discuss and present their views as 
individuals57 before any collective decision is taken, `and the deliberation must 
51 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 362. See also `democracy means that people govern themselves each as 
a full partner in a collective enterprise so that a majority's decision are democratic only when certain 
further conditions are met that protect the status and interests of each citizens as a full partner in that 
enterprise'. Is Democracy Possible Here?, 13 1. 
55 For the rejection of the majoritarian premise see `Introduction' in Freedom's Lary. and Sovereign 
Virtue, Chapters 4,10. 
56 Dworkin, Freedom's Law, 25. 
57 As opposed to as citizens': For Dworkin, individuals come furnished with all their comprehensive 
views and convictions. Political liberals, on the other hand, claim that political deliberation must be 
conducted in terms of public reasons, that is, they must put some of their beliefs to one side. Cf. 
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centre on reasons for and against that collective action, so that citizens who lose on 
an issue can be satisfied that they had a chance to convince others and failed to do 
so, not merely that they have been outnumbered'58. Democracy also requires citizens 
to be independent from the collective decisions made by the community: dignity 
requires that a community does not impose their views on citizens but, on the 
contrary, it must `provide circumstances that encourage them to arrive at beliefs on 
these matters through their own reflective and finally individual conviction' 59. A 
government that imposes the views of the majority on its citizens fails to secure that 
each can live authentic and integrated lives and, to that extent, it compromises its 
legitimacy. Independence is one of the bridges between our shared convictions 
regarding the value of human life, equality of resources and our political beliefs. 
Another bridge is found in the principle that government must promote three 
different goals within a democratic society. First, it must secure `distributive goals' 
that are fair: for instance, those recommended by equality of resources. Second, it 
must promote `symbolic goals' in which the community asserts the equal moral 
status of its citizens, for instance allocating each person one, and only one, vote is a 
declaration of the equality of all citizens. Third, it must also secure citizens' `agency 
goals', because, 
[w]e cannot make our political life a satisfactory extension of our moral life 
unless we are guaranteed freedom to express our opinions in a manner that, for 
us, satisfies moral integrity. Opportunity to express commitment to our 
Rawls, `The Idea of Public Reason Revisited'; Kent Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public 
Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press. 1995). 
58 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 364-5. 
59 Dworkin, Freedom's Law. 26. 
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convictions is just as important, for that purpose, as the opportunity to 
communicate those convictions to others60 
It is clear why Dworkin believes that free speech is a necessary condition of political 
equality, and why he gives such an important weight to our expressive interests: a 
person whose expressive interests are not protected is treated neither with equal 
respect nor with equal concern. It is important to note that, although Dworkin's 
defence of free speech appeals to the deliberative interests of both speakers and 
audiences, he asserts that our expressive interests are sufficient to secure a free 
speech principle. This perhaps explains why Dworkin seems reluctant to categorise 
speech. In contrast to other liberals who believe that some forms of speech warrant 
greater protection because they are better captured by the relation between speech 
and autonomy61, Dworkin supports an extreme form of maximalism, according to 
which `the wrong [of censorship] is just as great when government forbids the 
expression of some social attitude or taste as when it censors explicitly political 
speech'62. In other words, even if speech contributes nothing to processes of 
deliberation, the fact that a person has an expressive interest in speech suffices for its 
protection63 
This view, however, seems too strong. Autonomy defences of speech are 
distinctive due to the emphasis they place on deliberative processes and critical 
reflection. If speech does not serve anyone's deliberative interests then the 
autonomy-based reasons for its protection are weakened to a considerable degree, for 
60 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 201-2. 
61 Cf. Scanlon, `Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression', `Content Regulation 
Reconsidered'. 
62 Dworkin, Fre'edom's Latit', 200-1. 
63 Dworkin is not an absolutist about free speech. He thinks that some content-neutral limits can be set 
on, for instance, political campaigns and donations. Nevertheless he objects to any kind of content- 
based restrictions. I address this distinction in Chapter 5. 
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it is clear that self-expression alone is not sufficient to protect speech. There are 
many ways in which a person can express herself which are best accommodated 
within a principle of free speech. On the one hand, in the case of harmless actions 
self-expression is usually best captured by a right to privacy. If I decide to grow a 
goatee, my right to fashion my facial hair according to my desires is better defended 
this way than by a right to free expression. On the other hand, self-expression is not 
sufficient (and perhaps not necessary64) in the case of harmful actions: `Nero was 
presumably expressing himself aesthetically when he (perhaps apocryphally) spilled 
fresh human blood on green grass' 65 
The Model of Challenge, Ethics and Integrity 
There is another argument that Dworkin employs to justify free speech, this one 
based on the idea of ethical integrity. Dworkin provides a controversial defence of 
liberal equality based on an ethical conception of the good life66. Rather than 
justifying liberalism with political reasons, he thinks that his approach strengthens 
the case for a liberal political morality67. In contrast to this account, the case built on 
the argument from dignity is less demanding and less controversial. Dworkin does 
not believe it is necessary to accept this account of ethics to accept liberal equality, 
but there is, nonetheless, an important connection between the two. His strategy 
consists in defending his preferred account of political morality as the best 
interpretation of non-political values. 
Recall the `abstract egalitarian principle', according to which government 
must make the lives of those under its command better, with the constraint that it 
64 Not necessary, at least, if a condition of `sincerity' is attached to self-expression. 
65 Hurley, `Bypassing Conscious Control', 318. 
66 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 239. 
67 Ibid. 241. 
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treats everyone with equal respect and concern. An important question for this 
approach is, then, how to measure the value of a human life? What standards can we 
employ to know whether a person's life goes better or worse? In answer to these 
questions Dworkin presents his `model of challenge', which `supposes that a life is 
successful insofar as it is an appropriate response to the distinct circumstances in 
which it is lived'68. The model employs the idea of a skilful performance as a 
paradigm of what it means to live well, and claims that `living a life is itself a 
performance that demands skill, that it is the most comprehensive and important 
challenge we face, and that our critical interests consist in the achievement, events, 
and experiences that mean that we have met the challenge well 69 
To assess the success of a performance it is important to take into account the 
circumstances in which it was executed. We need to know certain things about the 
challenge's conditions in order to decide whether it was addressed with skill and 
mastery. Circumstances, however, vary greatly in importance depending on the 
challenge we face. Some, Dworkin claims, need to be considered as `limitations' - 
others are 'parameters'. Limitations are circumstances that do not figure in the 
description of the challenge people encounter. Examples of limitations are 
languages, talents, wealth, etc70. Essential for a circumstance to be limitation is that 
it is an aid or a constraint on acting as we have a reason to, but it is not a component 
of the description of that reason71. My life would go worse, for instance, if I did not 
68 Ibid. 240. 
69 Ibid. 253. The model, as a conception of the good, has generated a number of controversies. Cf. 
Richard Arneson, `Cracked Foundations of Liberal Equality', in Burley, J. (ed. ) Dworkin and his 
Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 79-98. 
70 As N 'e will see later, wealth is a limitation only if it does not contradict what justice allows. 
Dworkin concedes that the same item might be a limitation for one person, but a parameter to another; 
this of course depends on the sort of life each person leads. 
71 Cf. Matthew Clayton, `A Puzzle about Ethics, Justice and the Sacred' in Burley, J. (ed. ) Dworkin 
and his Critics, (Oxford: Blackwell), 102. 
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have some understanding of Borges's poetry (given I think that reading Borges 
belongs to my critical, rather than to my volitional, well-being), but, when I define 
the challenge of my life, reading Borges does not enter into the definition. 
By contrast, there are other circumstances which necessarily are components 
in the definition of a challenge. Imagine Roger, a deeply religious person. For him, 
his faith is not an aid or a limit for what his life means. When he `decides' what 
challenge his life presents, religion occupies an essential role. For him, then, religion 
is a parameter of the good life. He cannot define his life independently from 
religious practices. Consider what Dworkin writes regarding such instances: `[m]any 
of our parameters are normative: they define our ethical situation not in terms of our 
actual situation but of our situation as it should be. Our lives might go badly [... ] not 
just because we are unwilling or unable properly to respond to the circumstances we 
have, but because we have the wrong circumstances' 72. 
There are two fundamental parameters in relation to the model of challenge: 
one is the principle of `ethical integrity'; the other is justice. The former includes the 
idea that for an achievement to contribute to the ethical value of a person's life, the 
person himself must value it. When we consider the relation between a person's life, 
and his attitudes towards it, we can distinguish two different views. On the `additive' 
view, the value of a life is independent of the attitudes the agent has towards it. If the 
person endorses the value he has created, that fact contributes to it having greater 
value still. If he does not, then, its value remains the same73. On the `constitutive' 
view, by contrast, it is necessary for a person to identify with the value he has 
created if it is to contribute to his well-being at all. In Dworkin's words, this view 
72 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue. 261-2. 
73 It seems that under the additive view, attitudes towards one's life are not really parameters but 
limits. If my life can go well without my endorsement, but even better with it, then endorsement does 
not figure in the definition of living my life well. 
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rejects that `some event or achievement can make a person's life better against his 
opinion that it does not'74. This, of course, does not imply that the achievement loses 
its value all things considered; it might still be valuable to us and improve our lives. 
But it will not improve his life. Imagine Will, the mathematician genius, who 
advances maths to an incredible degree, but who also sees no value in this. He thinks 
that maths is so easy and simple that all his discoveries are just pure mediocrity. On 
the constitutive view his life is not improved by doing maths, until he reckons maths 
to be valuable. 
Identification, as described in Chapter 2, is clearly insufficient for integrity. 
Recall Tom, the hard-working student who identifies with his obsessive hard work 
but became so committed because his mother told him that achievement at school is 
the only source of self-respect. Identification is necessary, but not sufficient for 
ethical integrity; Dworkin insists that the latter requires some degree of rational 
revisability and critical reflection75. The principle of ethical integrity combines, then, 
a subjective and an objective aspect of living a good life: one the one hand, a life 
goes better only if an individual endorses her activities and plans; on the other, 
ethical integrity matters only in conjunction with critical well-being. Someone who 
pursues only her volitional interests cannot live a good life no matter how much she 
identifies with them. In this respect endorsement is necessary for ethical integrity 
because the latter `also requires the individual himself to identify, or choose, the 
central goals, projects, and relationships which make up his life'76. For Dworkin, 
ethical integrity `make[s] the merger of life and conviction a parameter of ethical 
4 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue. 249. 
's Ibid. 271. 
76 Matthew Clayton, 'Liberal Equality and Ethics'. Ethics. 113 (2002). 15. 
177 
CHAPTER 4 Ronald Dworkin and the Interests of Speakers 
success, and stipulate[s] that a life that never achieves that kind of integrity cannot 
be critically better for someone to lead than a life that does'77. 
The second fundamental parameter of the model of challenge is justice. 
Dworkin argues that `if living well means responding in the right way to the right 
challenge, then a life goes worse when the right challenge cannot be faced'78. If we 
accept the model of challenge, then it is difficult to refute that the distribution of 
resources and liberties must be a normative component of the way in which the 
challenge is defined. In this respect, people who have less or more than is required 
by justice lead, ipso facto, worse lives than they would have done if they had the 
proper allocation of resources: justice is not only a moral concept, but an ethical one 
too79. 
IV 
Hate Speech, Dignity and Integrity 
An Internal Conflict 
To what extent, then, is hate speech addressed by the ideas of dignity and ethical 
integrity? Remember that Dworkin has produced two arguments. First, he thinks that 
the principle of special responsibility demands that the government cannot curtail the 
expression of any view (unless there is a severe and imminent danger to third 
77 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 270. 
78 Dworkin, `Foundations of Liberal Equality', 260. 
79 Dworkin argues that resources are parameters rather than limitations 'because we cannot describe 
the challenge of living well without making some assumptions about the resources a good life should 
have available to it. [... ] We must [... ] find some suitable account of the way in which resources enter 
ethics as parameters of the good life. and we have. [... ] no alternative but to bring justice into that 
story by stipulating that a good life is a life suitable to circumstances in which resources are justly 
distributed'. Ibid. 259. 
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parties' security). Restricting expression is a violation of dignity. Second, he thinks 
that living a good life consists in encountering the right challenge, and that 
restrictions on speech create distortions on the challenge a person faces. Free speech 
is, due to its intimate connection with conviction, a parameter of living well; if 
someone is not able to speak her mind due to governmental restrictions her life goes, 
for that reason (and independently of the consequences), worse. 
The argument I defend here claims that both dignity and integrity fail to 
properly accommodate hate speech. In other words, the, characterisation of these 
notions given by Dworkin is compatible with the claim that speakers are not 
wronged when government restricts the expression of hate speech. 
The idea of reciprocity is connected with the idea of dignity in a critical 
sense. We established that dignity has two dimensions: personal responsibility and 
the fact that human life has intrinsic value. One of the conclusions of Dworkin's 
argument regarding the latter is that there is no justification for categorical 
exclusions; believing that your life has objective value implies that every other 
person's life has the same intrinsic worth. If this is so, `then it is impossible to 
separate self-respect from respect for the importance of the lives of others. You 
cannot act in a way that denies the intrinsic importance of any human life without an 
insult to your own dignity' 80. From this it does not follow that people can 
legitimately be coerced into not insulting their own dignity; this is a form of 
paternalism that Dworkin would reject. 
It is also the case, however, that dignity cannot be employed as a defence for 
hate speech. If a person loses her dignity by expressing racist views, then she cannot 
use dignity as a justification for free speech. Given that Dworkin thinks dignity 
80 Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?, 16. 
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requires you to recognise that other people's lives have equal intrinsic value, if you 
deny this, then your own dignity is compromised. So, a person who is prevented 
from harming his dignity (by committing harmful actions to third parties) cannot 
offer the dignity defence to reject the regulation because, had he been at liberty to do 
as he wished, his dignity would have been compromised then too. Dignity provides 
the basis for a qualified defence of free speech, one that requires free expression of 
the right view, or, as I will argue in the next chapter, expression restricted by a 
principle of reasonableness. 
It is possible to recast the concerns of dignity and integrity in terms of 
audiences' interests. Because some forms of speech result in mental contamination, 
they jeopardise audiences' critical well-being. On the one hand, as noted above, a 
person might react in a fashion that is inconsistent with her beliefs about justice and 
morality: aversive racists who think that everybody must be treated with equal 
respect might display racist behaviour and attitudes due to influences in their 
environment which they cannot control. This is merely one of the possible ways in 
which the ecology of speech might compromise the integrity of citizens. On the 
other hand, it may also be that a government, by its failure to neutralise the effects of 
hate speech, might show less concern for some of its subjects: citizens who are 
susceptible to aversive racism might feel that the government could do more to 
protect them. 
Dworkin could argue that the effects of speech, in terms of mental 
contamination, are similar to other impacts discrete actions have on people. As 
discussed earlier, according to equality of resources, we should not compensate Joe, 
a brilliant manufacturer of clepsydras who cannot sell them, because his talents are 
`unmarketable'. Similarly, we should not compensate people who suffer from 
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listening to other people's ideas (not matter how much they dislike them). As we 
have seen, though, disadvantages created by prejudice and those created by having 
non-sellable talents are different. Equality of resources is neutral only towards the 
latter but it cannot be towards the former. 
Hate speech is an injustice, then, in three respects. First, it fails to satisfy the 
minimal threshold of reciprocity required for political equality. Second, it has 
harmful effects on audiences by, for example, triggering processes of mental 
contamination which affect their ethical integrity. And third, these processes result 
from attitudes that liberal equality rejects. As Dworkin recognises, `[c]ommercial 
advertisement and soap operas create images that are subtle and ubiquitous, and it 
would not be surprising to learn, through whatever research might establish this, that 
they indeed do great damage to the way women are understood and allowed to be 
influential in politics' 81. 
However, it now seems that we have a prima facie conflict between the 
integrity of audiences and the integrity of speakers, for we have seen that a fully 
integrated life requires expressive freedom. The conflict is apparent: Dworkin thinks 
that living well requires we face the right challenge. A person whose life is not 
integrated because of government's coercive action leads a worse life than he 
otherwise would. But someone who lives in an unjust society82 also leads a worse 
life for that reason. Now consider Dworkin's comments about Hitler: `Of course it 
would've been better for everyone else if Hitler had died in his cradle. But on the 
challenge view it makes no sense to say that his life would have been better, as 
81 Dworkin, Freedom 's Lau', 220 
82 Notice that the parameter of justice applies to both people who commit injustices and people who 
live in unjust societies through no fault of their own. Although it is probably worse to actively create 
injustice than to be part of an unjust society, because justice is a parameter and not a limitation it is 
not clear how to `balance' these two situations. 
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distinct from no worse, if that had happened' 
83. This is so because both ethical 
integrity and justice are necessary conditions of living a good life84. One cannot 
compensate a lack of integrity with more justice, or viceversa: if one fails, well- 
being also fails. `Trade-offs do not arise' 85. 
Notice that integrity reflects critical well-being, rather than `volitional' well- 
being. Someone who thinks that he needs more resources than he has is not entitled 
to more (at least for that reason)86. Whether or not he is given more depends on an 
objective account of justice. `Someone has achieved ethical integrity [... ] when he 
lives out of the conviction that his life, in its central features, is an appropriate one, 
that no other life he might live be a plainly better response to the parameters of his 
ethical situation rightly judged' 87. In similar fashion, someone who claims that not 
being allowed to express his views regarding racial superiority makes his life worse 
has no claim of justice. The question is not how many resources you believe you 
should have according to your convictions, but how many you should have 
according to justice `rightly judged'88. Obviously someone who clams that theft is a 
constitutive component of his doctrine of the good has no right to steal things, not 
83 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 268. Emphasis added. See also Clayton, `A Puzzle about Ethics, Justice 
and the Sacred', 104. 
84 Dworkin thinks that justice and ethical integrity are both soft parameters: `Most of us believe that 
parameters that define the success of a life are all soft' Sovereign Virtue, 263. The distinction between 
soft and hard parameters is that, whereas the latter `are violated the performance is a total failure, no 
matter how successful it is in other respects', any violation of the former is a serious, compromising 
flaw [... ] that compromise is not fatal, and can be overcome'. Sovereign Virtue, 262. Dworkin is not 
clear about how soft the parameter of justice and ethical integrity are. 
85 Clayton, `A Puzzle about Ethics, Justice and the Sacred', 104. 
86 Cf. Dworkin's arguments about equality of welfare and defence of equality of resources in 
Sovereign Virtue, Chapters 1 and 2. 
87 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 270. Emphasis added. 
88 There seem to be two things going on here. Although Dworkin tries to defend the view I have just 
elaborated, there are strong criticisms as to what extent he has managed to provide a convincing 
argument. Clayton, 'Liberal Equality and Ethics'; Cohen, 'On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice', 
G. A. Cohen, 'Expensive Tastes Ride Again' in Burley J. (ed. ) Dworkin and his Critics (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2004). 3-29, claim that he has not. However, I do not need to go into such details here, my 
argument claims that Dworkin's defence of free speech fails, even if he is right in asserting that 
liberal equality follows from his account of ethics. 
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because abstaining from theft is better for him but because there are reasons of 
justice that allow governments to forbid such actions. As Matthew Clayton argues, 
[b]ecause justice is a parameter of the good life [... ], the liberal view that 
justice should be enforced by the government has a clear justification. Not only 
is justice an important ideal in its own right that warrants enforcement, its 
presence is also a requirement of people pursuing successful lives. So, to the 
extent that government has a duty to act with concern for its citizens, it must 
enforce justice as a necessary part of enabling people to face appropriate 
challenges in their lives 89 
Avoiding Cultural Paternalism 
Dworkin argues that his account of ethical integrity blocks paternalism. He thinks 
that the latter is made self-defeating; you cannot make someone's life better by 
forcing him to do something of which he does not approve. Regardless of whether or 
not this argument is tenable, it is irrelevant for my purposes here because I am not 
claiming that speech regulations are better for racists; just that their lives would not 
go worse (because justice is a parameter of living well). Dworkin has the following 
example regarding critical well-being. Imagine Franz, who wants to be a priest. 
Imagine also that we believe that a religious life is worthless and that we are correct 
in this. There are three possible solutions: a) we convince Franz to become a cricket 
player (which is a better life), b) Franz decides to become a priest, or c) Franz 
becomes a very good cricket player but regrets it bitterly, he would rather have been 
a priest. Dworkin has no doubt that a) is better than b), and b) is better than c). In this 
case the only parameter involved is ethical integrity. Now imagine that instead the 
89 Clayton, `A Puzzle about Ethics, Justice and the Sacred', 103. 
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decision concerned itself with justice (instead of the priesthood he wanted to be a 
murderer). In this case, option b) would not be worse than c) but it would also be no 
better (for him). And this is so because no life of injustice is a good life to live, 
regardless of its level of integration9o 
Dworkin also thinks that respecting ethical integrity blocks, what he calls, 
`cultural paternalism', which is defined as the assumption that `a political majority 
has a right to create a culture it wants to live in and raise its children in not for the 
sake of the minority who might protest but for their own sakes' 91 Is the argument I 
am presenting culturally paternalistic? First, it is important to recall that the 
argument is motivated by a concern for the automatic effects of environments on 
autonomy. Second, and more important for Dworkin's argument, the regulation of 
speech is motivated by reasons of justice, not by concrete and controversial reasons 
regarding a conception of the good life. No one can complain about justice being 
done because justice is required to have a good life and to ensure everyone is treated 
with equal concern and respect. Regarding the public ecology of speech, it seems fair 
to make citizens bear some of the costs of maintaining an environment in which 
people can develop and exercise their sense of justice and autonomy. These costs are 
especially important when the effects of speech challenge the fundamental 
assumption of liberal equality both directly (when racists deny equal status to their 
victims) an indirectly (through processes of mental contamination and aversive 
racism). This point does not commit us to the view that we should always externalise 
the costs of people's actions 9'. 
90 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 271-2 
91 Dworkin, R. (2006) Is Democracv Possible Here?, 74. 
92 Cf. Andrew Williams, 'Liberty. Equality, and Property', in Dryzek, J., B. Honig, and A. Philips (eds. ) 
The Oxford Handbook of Political Theortiy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 501-3. He 
distinguishes two forms of sufficientarian egalitarianism. On the one hand, we can internalise the costs 
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For instance, one way in which the harmful effects of speech can be 
externalised is by employing `more, better speech' to redress its costs. However, I 
will argue that this strategy is not attractive because racist speech bypasses rational 
control. On the other hand, we can internalise the costs of racist speech, by which I 
mean that non-racists should not bear the costs of racists' speech. The decision 
between these two might be ecological in the sense that neutralising mental 
contamination recommends avoiding exposure to highly contaminating speech. 
Nevertheless, some might argue that, even though there are reasons to internalise the 
costs of hate speech, we should compensate racists for not allowing them to express 
their views. This objection fails insofar as there is no reason to externalise the costs 
of actions which are unjust. In this respect, racist preferences (and the costs they 
have on racists) are to be treated as expensive tastes, not as disabilities93 
Justice and Autonomy 
There are two possible objections to the argument defended in this chapter. First, one 
can follow Dworkin, who argues that the challenge of living a good life cannot be 
made more interesting or a better challenge by `bowdlerising' some bad options. 
However, this claim is not obviously true: a person can think that the absence of 
certain choices has no detrimental impact on the challenge she encounters. She might 
deny that `our freedoms have value independently of the value we attach to the 
of actions by limiting liberty thus protecting `individuals from bearing the costs arising from others' 
decisions. On the other hand, we can externalise those costs making `defensible to force some 
individuals to bear the costs of others' decisions if doing so is necessary to avoid absolute deprivation 
without restricting individual liberty' (501-2). 
93 Racist preferences are similar to expensive tastes in the sense that justice recommends their costs be 
internalised. They are different in that pursuing expensive activities should not be restricted while 
racist speech should. 
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specific things they leave us free to do' 94. For instance, a person who affirms the 
specific value of freedom thinks that having the option of playing football is valuable 
only in as much as playing football is. Being free to play football adds nothing to the 
activity in question. Similarly, this view seems to entail that by not being free to do 
something I would not do anyway my life is not worsened. A ban on fox-hunting or 
bullfighting does not make my life any worse95. True, this is a general point, which 
only applies to people who do not want to express racists views and who would not 
make use of hate speech protection. It clearly does not apply to racists, because a ban 
would certainly affect them. I do not want to argue here that freedom has only 
specific value. The aim of these remarks is merely to rebut Dworkin's suggestion 
that having some options eliminated is per se bad. The difference is ultimately 
dependent on the means by which choice is restricted. It is a bad thing if people's 
choices are manipulated but it is not necessarily negative if people decide publicly 
and democratically to eliminate some bad options. In the next chapter, I will defend 
a robust publicity condition for legitimacy and demonstrate that it is consistent with 
the regulation of hate speech. If freedom has only specific value, restrictions on hate 
speech affect only racists and not, as it is sometimes argued, the entire citizenry. 
Nevertheless, the way in which racists are affected does not make their lives worse, 
because justice is a parameter of leading a good life and the former, in possession of 
rights to free expression, cannot hold the latter. 
94 The distinction between the `specific' and `non-specific' value of freedom is developed in Ian 
Carter, The Measure of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 33. Carter thinks that 
freedom has non-specific value and interprets Dworkin as a defender of the specific value of freedom. 
Cf. Charles Taylor, `What's Wrong with Negative Liberty' in his Philosophy and the Human 
Sciences, 211-79. 
95 More contentiously, it could make my life better, by providing the means to do things I have an 
independent reason to do. 
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The second objection builds on the first one, but is more specific. It holds 
that an important component of dignity consists in having the opportunity to reject 
bad options. Accordingly, living with dignity requires that a person be exposed to 
racist ideas, and that she rejects them; that she comes `clean'. If the objection is 
successful, restrictions on speech are in conflict with the dignity of non racists. The 
problem with this objection is that it overlooks the motivation behind the restrictions 
I support. The basis for such restrictions is not that those views are immoral or 
wrong, but rather that they affect us in non-autonomous ways: they contaminate our 
minds. In this respect, non racists have an autonomy-based interest in not being 
exposed to speech that bypasses their autonomy and threatens the effectiveness of 
their sense of justice. The regulations defended here are instrumental to autonomy in 
the sense that they are preferred over other `remedies' (such as having more, and 
better speech96) because they are more likely to neutralise expression's harmful 
effects, and do so in a legitimate and just manner. 
96 Problems related to this strategy are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER $ 
CONTENT REGULATIONS AND LIBERAL NEUTRALITY 
In the last chapters I defended the claim that a concern for autonomy supports the 
regulation of certain kinds of speech, in particular, racist and sexist speech which 
tends to automatically reinforce social stereotypes. I argued that qua audiences we 
have an interest in avoiding exposure to highly contaminating speech and in having 
an appropriate environment in which to develop and exercise critical reflection. 
Although speakers' integrity might be threatened by regulations on speech, this 
creates only a prima facie problem; if justice is a parameter of having an integrated 
existence, then the life of racist speakers cannot be made worse by restrictions on 
hate speech. 
In this chapter I address a different concern. I argue that content-based 
restrictions are compatible with a qualified version of political liberalism. This claim 
raises (at least) two sets of problems. On the one hand, defenders of free speech 
argue that content-based regulations are impermissible (in all but few exceptional 
cases). The strong presumption against this is motivated mainly by a concern for 
government neutrality. Accordingly, some might suggest that, because I am arguing 
for content-based restrictions on speech which expresses certain racist views, the 
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condition of neutrality should also be rejected. I cannot, it might be argued, have 
both. 
The defence I will elaborate here avoids this charge by suggesting that the 
content-based regulations supported are not based on the intrinsic merits of the views 
regulated, but rather on the distorting effects that such acts of expression have on 
individuals' autonomy. Therefore they do not constitute a violation of liberal 
neutrality. 
However, if this defence is successful a further problem arises: it might seem 
that I am covertly introducing a comprehensive doctrine beneath a smoke screen. 
The objection would allege that arguing for an autonomy-based liberalism is not 
neutral in the required sense. My conception of liberalism may seem as partisan as 
any other political theory based on comprehensive doctrines. People who raise this 
objection might say that my argument is a form of liberal perfectionism. 
These two problems together appear to create a dilemma: either neutrality is 
rejected for the sake of content-based restrictions on speech or the condition of 
neutrality is maintained thus making content-based restrictions impermissible. The 
aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the justification of content-based 
regulations suggested here avoids this dilemma. 
I 
The Problem of Content-Based Regulation 
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Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulations 
In American Free Speech doctrine Courts have accepted some forms of content- 
neutral restrictions on speech. Restrictions on the time, place and manner are usually 
assumed not . to threaten fundamental interests in speech, while they minimise the 
costs that expressive activities have on third parties. Sometimes people have an 
important interest in not being exposed to speech (regardless of its content), and it 
seems that this is sufficient to demand its restriction. This interest is satisfied by 
regulating the time or places of the expressive act. It is acceptable to restrict rock 
concerts in residential areas at 2AM; or loud conversations in hospitals and libraries; 
to limit the number of parades and rallies as well as the amount of leafletting 
included in political campaigns. All of these restrictions pay no attention to the 
content of speech; they focus solely on the context in which expression takes place. 
On the other hand, courts usually have a strong presumption against content- 
based regulation. For instance, banning a U2 rock concert because of the (lack of) 
quality music or restricting the sales of The Communist Manifesto because of the 
dangerous ideas it defends are clear examples of content regulations. Sometimes a 
further distinction is made between subject matter and viewpoint discrimination 
within content-based regulations: a law prohibiting discussion of the virtues of 
abortion is viewpoint discrimination, while a law banning discussion of abortion tout 
court is an issue of subject matter. Although this distinction is somewhat 
controversial, it is usually assumed that, from the perspective of free speech, 
viewpoint discrimination is worse than regulation of subject matter. However, the 
difference between the two is not as clear as we might hope. Content-based 
regulations might be acceptable in some contexts but not others. Think for example 
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about a law forbidding anti-abortion protests outside a clinic. Although this law is 
content-based (and for that matter, viewpoint-based) insofar as it targets 
demonstrations on the wrongs of abortion, in many cases it would be acceptable'. 
This law does not outlaw football fans cheering for their team, nor Anti-War 
protesters. Now, an ordinance that restricted every anti-abortionist demonstration 
would certainly be considered illegitimate. 
Although the presumption against content-based regulations is strong, it 
certainly is not absolute2. There are some categories of speech that Courts have been 
willing to prohibit based on their content, such as private libel3, direct incitement4, 
fighting words5 and obscenity6. In order to be acceptable, these restrictions need to 
satisfy strict scrutiny7. It is important to notice that they are motivated less by a 
desire to prevent the expression of certain ideas and more by a desire to prevent 
1 It might be acceptable in terms of security; protesters might jeopardise the safety of the clinic's 
employees and women who attend it. A further condition might be that there are other options (other 
Places and times) open to those who want to protest against abortion. See also Mill, On Liberty, 63. 
Cf. James Weinstein, Hate Speech, Pornography and the Radical Attack on Free Speech Doctrine 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 34-49. 
3 According to Dworkin, prohibition on libel was introduced not in order to restrict what is being said, 
but in order to allow 'offended citizens to restore their reputations. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, 198. 
4 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969). 
5 This category `refers to [expression] that is likely to provoke an immediate violent reaction by the 
persons to whom the words are addressed and that also conveys little by way of ideas and thus makes 
only the most limited contribution to public debate'. Fiss, Liberalism Divided, 113. 
6 As defined in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973). `A work may be subject to state regulation 
where that work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex; portrays, in a patently 
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and, taken as a whole, 
does not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value'. These three conditions are 
necessary. See Miller v. California 413 U. S. 15 (1972). The test is not uncontested, though, and some 
people think it is unworkable. Cf. Justice Stewart's remark that `he couldn't define obscenity but 
knew when he saw it' (quoted from Dworkin, Freedom's Law, 207). Dworkin is also sceptical about 
obscenity laws. 
`Under the scrutiny test, the government must show that the law is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest, and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end'. Weinstein, Hate Speech. 
Pornography and the Radical Attack on Free Speech Doctrine, 55. 
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imminent danger (in the case of incitement), to restore the reputation of offended 
citizens8, and so on. 
In the case of fighting words, for instance, the problem is not that certain 
ideas are expressed, but the manner in which they are delivered. In terms of free 
speech doctrine, they are only noise. In 1990 Robert Viktora allegedly burned a cross 
on a black family's lawn. He was charged with violating an ordinance against bias 
motivated crimes in St. Paul, Minnesota9. The ordinance stated that: 
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, 
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi 
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, 
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or 
gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor'0 
The Court decided that the ordinance was invalid, because it was viewpoint oriented. 
Justice Scalia, who delivered the Court's opinion, argued that `the reason why 
fighting words are categorically excluded from the protection of the First 
Amendment is not that their content communicates any particular idea, but that their 
content embodies a particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of 
expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey"'. Scalia objected that the 
ordinance does not treat each person fairly because it makes a special sub-class of 
fighting words (namely, fighting words targeting people on the basis of race, colour, 
creed, religion or gender) as deserving special punishment, while leaving other 
targets without protection. Someone using abusive language against bigots, for 
8 Dworkin, Freedom's Lagt'. 198. 
9 R. A. V V. City of St. Paul, Minnesota 505 U. S. 377 (1992). 
10 St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul. Minn., Legis. Code 292.02 (1990) 
11R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota 505 U. S. 377 (1992). 
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instance, would be not breaking the law12. He concluded: `Should the government 
want to criminalize certain fighting words, the Court now requires it to criminalize 
all fighting words' 13. Notwithstanding the difficulties of distinguishing between 
regulations that are content-based and content-neutral, it is usually assumed that the 
latter are acceptable insofar as accommodating competing interests is relatively 
simple. In this respect the special protection attached to speech is related primarily to 
its content rather than to its `manner, place and time'. 
Justifications against Content-Based Regulations 
There are various reasons that motivate such a strong presumption against content 
regulation. First, there is a widely shared mistrust of government according to which 
if it has the chance of abusing its power it is likely to do so; if government was given 
the power to silence criticisms of different views, it would probably use it14. Giving 
the government power to regulate speech risks the possibility of a slippery slope 
which will eventually result in the government silencing its critics and creating 
official dogma. There is some truth about this `fact of power' : `Most people - and 
12 Scalia writes: `St. Paul has no authority to licence one side to fight free style, while requiring the 
other to follow Marquis of Queenbury Rules'. 
13 R. A. V. i'. City of St. Paul, Minnesota 505 U. S. 377 (1992). Similarly, the Indianapolis ordinance on 
pornography, suggested by C. MacKinnon and others was struck down because it only condemned 
sexually explicit material that presented women as enjoying pain or humiliation or rape (among other 
things. See Mackinnon's definition of pornography in her Only Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1993) 121-? n. 32. Non-sexist sexually explicit material would not be outlawed by 
the ordinance. 
14 An example of this temptation is McCarthyism in the U. S. See also Scanlon, `Content Regulation 
Reconsidered', 156. 
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those with power in particular- do not like being criticised or disagreed with and 
are tempted to use the means at their disposal to avoid such possibilities"s 
Second, there is a concern regarding the proper relationship between 
autonomous citizens and government according to which the former would allow the 
latter to decide for them what forms of expression they should be able to hear. As the 
Millian Principle indicates, giving the government the power to make those 
decisions is incompatible with regarding oneself as a free and autonomous agent 16. 
Similarly, as we saw in Chapter 4, Dworkin argues that people are not treated with 
respect if they are not trusted to decide for themselves about ideas which the 
government finds offensive or dangerous'7 
Finally, the most direct rationale for holding content-regulations illegitimate 
is that governments must remain neutral towards different the conceptions of the 
good and ideas expressed in society' 8. Government neutrality is derived from a view 
of what it is for a state to treat everyone with equal respect and concern. According 
to this view, if the state bases its decisions on the relative merits or intrinsic 
worthiness of certain views, it will fail to treat people with equal fairness 19. The 
standard model of this argument holds that the proper role of government is to 
guarantee the marketplace of ideas (to use a favourite metaphor of free speech 
15 Cohen, `Freedom of Expression', 233. 
16 Cf. Scanlon, `Freedom of Expression'; see Chapter 3 for an assessment on this claim. 
17 7 'Because we are a liberal society committed to individual moral responsibility [... ] an), censorship 
on grounds of content is inconsistent with that commitment' Dworkin, Freedom's Law, 205. 
Emphasis added. 
18 The way in which I believe liberal neutrality should be understood will follow below. 
19 Cf. Ronald Dworkin, 'Liberalism' in Hampshire S. (ed. ) Public and Private Morality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978), 127. 
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advocates) and not to show bias with any particular view20. It is `[t]he people, not the 
state [who] should choose among competing viewpoints and their choice should not 
be manipulated by the state by skewing public debate in some special way' 21. The 
state, in this view, must refrain from making any judgement about the value, 
worthiness or truth of different forms of expression22. Neutral states, committed to 
avoiding restrictions on speech's content, however, need not fail to recognise the 
costs of speech. The usual strategy consists in correcting the wrongs speech 
produces by responding with `more, better speech'23. 
The Liberal Solution to the Costs of Speech 
It is sometimes suggested that some of the wrongs caused by speech can be corrected 
by providing public fora in which different views can be expressed. In discussions of 
hate speech, it is common to advocate a system where the state provides public 
spaces in which other views can be heard. Because the state recognises that access to 
media (and to the marketplace of ideas) is unequally distributed, it can subsidise the 
expression of disadvantaged groups24. An active state is the only legitimate way of 
combating the `silencing' effects of social inequalities25. The hope is that, by 
20 Cf. `Freedom of expression requires evaluative neutrality; granting free speech to those with whom 
the government agrees is not freedom of expression'. Alexander, Is There a Right to Freedom of 
Expression?, 148. 
2! Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech, 40. Cf. also FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978): `For 
it is a central tenet of the First Amendment must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideals'. 
22 See for instance Alexander's analysis of `low-value' speech. Larry Alexander, `Low Value 
Speech', Northwestern Unii'ersity Last Revietit', 83 (1989), 547-54. 
23 Cf. Justice Brandeis's remark: if there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and 
fallacies, to avert the evil by the process of education, the remedy to be upheld is more speech, not 
enforced silence'. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927). 
24 Although there is debate about the extent in which government has a positive duty to guarantee 
access to public opinion. 
25 For a defence of an active state (although sympathetic to content-based regulations) see Fiss, The 
Irony of Free Speech. See also Scanlon, 'Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression', 100. 
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providing fair access to expression disadvantaged voices will be heard, proper debate 
will take place and people will be convinced by the best reasons. 
A variant of this strategy suggests a system of warnings, in which audiences 
are alerted to the costs of the expression to which they will be exposed before it 
actually happens. Imagine a person living in a sexist society who, after exposure to 
pornography, has concluded that, in general, women enjoy rape. In order to correct 
this view, some liberals recommend debates with feminists be organised, in which 
the aim is to convince the sexists and pornographers that that have formed the wrong 
beliefs. After rational consideration, some (hopefully most) people will change their 
minds and will reject the sexist beliefs. Similarly, the state can impose a warning on 
pornographic material stating that `exposure to this material may persuade you that 
women enjoy sexual violence'. 
How likely is this strategy to succeed in eliminating sexist, racist and 
homophobic beliefs? In order to succeed, the satisfaction of (at least) two conditions 
is necessary. First, people must be motivated to change their minds: they must be 
predisposed to rational scrutiny and critical reflection. Second, they must be capable 
of altering their beliefs when there are good reasons to do so. Joshua Cohen believes 
this is the case. He lists a set of background anthropological and psychological facts, 
among which the `Fact of Reasonable Persuasion' is important: 
`People have the capacity to change their minds when they hear reasons 
presented, and sometimes they exercise that capacity'26. 
26 Cohen, `Freedom of Expression', 233. Emphasis added. 
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The Dynamics of Belief 
Liberals tend to accept the `fact of reasonable persuasion' uncritically, despite 
research in psychology which has shown we should be less confident of it. Evidence 
suggests that, although we have the capacity to change our beliefs, we tend not to 
exercise it as often as we might hope. As Susan Brison writes, many of the free 
speech doctrines presuppose `that one can always choose to accept or reject an ideal, 
but some ideas are contagious, insinuating themselves into our thoughts without -or 
even against- our will'27. 
There are two competing models which attempt to explain how mental 
systems believe. According to the `standard' Cartesian framework28, belief formation 
consists of two parts. First we understand the content of propositions and later we 
either accept the content as true or reject it as false. The second process is allegedly 
independent of the first. According to this model we have a reasonable amount of 
control over what we believe or disbelieve. Schematically the first model can be 
represented as: 
Exposure to information 4 Understanding 4 Rejection or Acceptance. 
27 Susan Brison, `Review of Alan Haworth's Free Speech' Mind, 113 (2004), 450,354. For a 
controversial discussion of the contagiousness on ideas see Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Susan Blackmore, The Meme Machine (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999); Daniel Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea (London: Penguin, 1995); 
Sperber, Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach. 
28 This model has its main inspiration in Rene Descartes. Cf. Daniel Gilbert, `The Assent of Man: 
Mental Representation and the Control of Belief' in Wegner, D. and J. Pennebaker (eds. ) Handbook 
of Mental Control (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1993), 57-87; Gilbert, `How Mental Systems 
Believe': Daniel Gilbert, Romin Tafarodi and Patrick Malone, You Can't Not Believe Everything 
You Read' Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65 (1993), 221-33. 
197 
CHAPTER 5 Content Regulations and Liberal Neutrality 
The step between exposure and understanding is passive; we cannot control whether 
or not we understand a proposition. When we hear something we simply understand 
it. According to this model it is the second, crucial, step linking the understanding of 
a proposition to believing it (or not believing it) that is assumed to require an active 
component of cognition29. Without an act of will, we should remain neutral towards 
the veracity of the proposition. 
There is, however, an alternative, `Spinozan' model which suggests 
understanding and believing propositions are only one process30. According to this 
model, when we understand a proposition we assume it is true. Later, if needed, a 
different process might be activated in order to reject the proposition. This can be 
represented as: 
Exposure to information 4 Understanding and Acceptance 4 Confirmation 
or Rejection. 
The second of these models involves two separate claims 
The Asymmetry Hypothesis. The first is that acceptance and rejection occur at 
different times; first comes acceptance and later rejection31. The argument is that the 
denial of propositions is an addendum to information. For instance, the 
representation of `Bob is not an extrovert' involves both the representation of `Bob is 
29 Contrast the similarity between the necessity of an act of cognition between understanding and 
acceptance/rejection on the one hand, and the `decoupling' model which asserts that there is a 
necessary act of mediation between beliefs/desires and actions. See Chapters 1 and 2. 
30 According to Gilbert, `How Mental Systems Believe' this model was devised by Baruch Spinoza. 
31 Gilbert. 'How Mental Systems Believe', 113. 
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an extrovert' and its denial. This way of understanding denials explains some 
cognitive biases such as `denial transparency', the process by which `on 
encountering denied information, the person typically has that information available 
for processing despite the denial', rather than discarding the false information32. For 
instance, in an experiment, some individuals were presented with the sentence `Bob 
Talbert is not linked with Mafia'. Other persons were presented with the sentence 
`Bob Talbert arrives in City'. Later they had to report the impression they had 
formed of Bob Talbert. The results show that people in the first group developed a 
less favourable impression than people in the second group. Notice, that there is no 
reason to form a negative impression of someone not being linked with Mafia. 
Wegner and his colleagues suggest the mechanism operating is that individuals first 
represented `Bob Talbert is linked with Mafia' and then just added the denial33 
When they had to assess Bob Talbert the information about him being linked with 
Mafia (although false) still affected their judgement. A computer would have reacted 
rather differently: it would have erased the information. 
The Unity Hypothesis. The second claim (which is more relevant for our purposes) 
holds that the act of understanding a proposition and that of believing it are in fact 
the same process. Accordingly, each time we are exposed to a proposition and we 
understand it, we also believe it. This is an automatic, passive process. Later, we 
return to the proposition and either confirm or disbelieve it. This second step, in 
32 Daniel Wegner, Gary Coulton and Richard Wenzlaff, `The Transparency of Denial: Briefing in the 
Debriefing Paradigm', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 49 (1993), 340. 
;; The experiment in reported in Daniel Wegner, et. al., `Incrimination Through Innuendo: Can Media 
Questions Become Public Answers? ' Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 40 (1981), 822-32. 
The results are also discussed in Wegner, Coulton and Wenzlaff, `The Transparency of Denial'. 
Contrast this phenomenon with the `anchoring bias' in Kahneman Tversky, `Judgment under 
Uncertainty'. 
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contrast, is not automatic but requires a cognitive effort: in order to be triggered, it 
requires mental resources. The model predicts that under certain circumstances the 
process of undoing the acceptance of propositions might malfunction. This happens 
when there is a depletion of the mental resources needed for revising the belief. The 
prediction is that `when some event prevents a person from "undoing" his or her 
initial acceptance, then he or she should continue to believe the assertion, even when 
it is patently false' 34. In contrast, the standard, dualist model predicts that under the 
same circumstances people will merely understand the proposition, they will neither 
believe nor disbelieve it. 
One of the experiments described in Gilbert et. al. (1993) investigates this 
possibility. People were asked to read aloud a pair of crime reports which would 
`crawl' on the screen of a computer35. Participants were told that the reports 
contained both false and true statements; the former appeared in red, the latter in 
black. In one report, the false statements exacerbated the gravity of the crime; in the 
other they extenuated it. Some of the subjects were also asked to perform a digit 
search task. They were told that while they were reading the reports digits would 
appear in a line under the text. They were asked to press a button every time the 
number `5' appeared -this group was called the `interrupted condition'. 
Unbeknownst to the participants, digits only appeared in conjunction with false 
statements (the interrupted condition was designed to demonstrate that people might 
treat explicitly false information as true when they are cognitively loaded). After 
reading the reports, the participants were 1) asked to recommend prison sentences 
for the crimes (between 0 and 20 years), and 2) shown 30 statements (4 true, 7 false 
34 Gilbert et. at., You Can't Not Believe Everything You Read', 222. 
35 As football results `crawl' on BBC One. 
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and 19 coils), which they had to classify as being `true', `false' or `never shown' in 
the first report, and the same for the second. 
In the case of the prison sentences, people who read false statements 
extenuating the crime recommended an average of 5.83 years in prison (the control 
group -those who did not perform the digit search recommended 6.03 years). People 
who read false statements exacerbating the crime recommended 11.15 years of 
sentence (the control group recommended only 7.03). In the interrupted condition the 
difference in years recommended caused by false statements was 5.32 years. In the 
recognition task the results show that although interrupted and uninterrupted subjects 
were equally likely to misremember true statements (the proportion was . 
06 and . 
03 
respectively), those in the interrupted group were more likely to treat false 
statements as true (0.44 and 0.23 respectively). In fact, people in the interrupted 
condition identified only 34% of false statements, and misidentified 44% as true 36 
The results of this experiment37 suggest that we have a Spinozan belief 
system. Only if we directly believe what we understand would we display the 
tendency to treat explicitly false information as true under cognitive pressure38 
Perhaps the unity hypothesis is too strong. Perhaps there is a difference between 
understanding and accepting a proposition, and Gilbert draws a conclusion which 
overestimates his evidence. Nevertheless, a weaker claim seems well supported: the 
evidence shows that acceptance is significantly easier than rejection and takes fewer 
cognitive resources. This qualified Spinozan version asserts that the default state of a 
person's mind is inclined towards acceptance, and that, under cognitive pressure, a 
36 Gilbert et. al., You Can't Not Believe Everything You Read', Experiment 1,223-6. 
3' See also experiments 2 and 3 in the same paper. 
38 Interrupted subjects mistreat false statements as true (. 44), but not true as false (. 06) 
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person will tend to believe whatever she is exposed to, even if she knows the 
information to be false. 
It is important to note, in particular, that belief and action are directly linked. 
People in the interrupted condition not only believed false statements; they also 
behaved accordingly. For instance, they recommended tougher prison sentences 
based on false ideas than people in the control condition. Notice, however, that the 
differences in the two groups are independent of the subjects' prior beliefs and their 
intellectual capacities. They are due to environmental features which thwarted their 
critical capacities. It was because they were occupied with searching for digits that 
they stopped disbelieving the information they knew was false. Even in cases in 
which people are not busy, they do not use the opportunity to abandon false 
information. Instead they store it, and sometimes it permeates their judgements. In 
general, people are gullible and credulous; only on rare occasions they are critical. 
This dynamic of belief can, in certain circumstances, lead to cases of mental 
contamination. 
`More, better speech' and Mental Contamination 
Another important cognitive bias which challenges Cohen's `fact of reasonable 
persuasion' is `confirmation bias'. In general, people have the tendency to assess 
empirical evidence in a biased manner. When participants in an experiment were 
asked to evaluate reports on the deterrent impact of the death penalty on crime they 
made their assessment in accordance with their prior beliefs on the effectiveness of 
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capital punishment39. Participants were shown two different reports on the death 
penalty. Those were fairly general and inconclusive. One presented evidence 
favouring the deterrence-effect; the other offered evidence suggesting that capital 
punishment has no impact on crime. Those who held a prior belief that the death 
penalty has deterrent effects interpreted the first report as confirming their views. 
Moreover, they claimed to have confidence that the study upon which the report was 
based was scientifically strong and had merit. On the other hand, they were not 
impressed by the second report; they doubted the methodology, questioned the 
objectivity of the study and so on. Not surprisingly, people who originally thought 
that the death penalty is not effective in preventing crime reacted in the opposite 
fashion. Moreover, people in the experiment also showed a `polarisation bias': those 
who supported the death penalty before the experiment became more convinced of 
its deterrent effects. And those who opposed it, objected to it more strongly. The 
experiment demonstrates that people tend to select only those pieces of information 
which are consistent with their prior views and tend to disregard information that 
contradicts them. They do not critically evaluate the information with which they are 
presented. 
These experiments pose a serious problem for the `more, better speech' 
strategy. It suggests that people can exercise large amount of control over what they 
believe, and that they evaluate evidence and information impartially. But people 
cannot (to the required degree) select their convictions in such a neutral manner. 
39 Charles Lord, Lee Ross and Mark Lepper, `Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The 
Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence' Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 37, (1979), 2098-2109. 
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Environmental conditions have a strong influence, and people arrive at beliefs by 
means they believe to be inadequate. 
We can distinguish two levels at which the fact of reasonable persuasion 
operates. One is the rational, conscious tier which is the target of strategies such as 
`more, better speech'. The other is an automatic unconscious level: as we have seen, 
people store false information that is later used in judgments, people can mistake 
false information for truth and use this as a reason for action (recommending prison 
sentences, for instance), and they also tend to interpret information in a selective, 
biased manner. Yet, they are not aware of this happening: these processes are not 
`felt'. So, while we can have `more, better speech' at one level, there may be 
environmental features which trigger the above processes and jeopardise the benefits 
that rational debate is supposed to deliver. Moreover, `more, better speech' is also 
limited because people often do not accept that they are susceptible to these 
cognitive biases. They are sure they can control their own minds, what things they 
believe, and what causes their actions. 
Open debate is a beneficial phenomenon, but might not always be effective, 
especially in cases where processes bypass rational control, such as automatic 
processes, implicit cognition and social stereotypes. `More, better speech' can help 
`if the additional speech provides people with scientific evidence that their behaviour 
is actually subject to such direct, automatic [ ... ] influences [ ... ] so that they can take 
steps to guard such influences then perhaps the additional speech will have some 
tendency to mitigate the harmful effects'40. As we have seen, however, leaving 
people to counteract the effects of mental contamination on their own presents 
40 Hurley, 'Bypassing Conscious Control', 322-3. 
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serious difficulties. People tend to underestimate their susceptibility to mental 
contamination and to overestimate their corrective powers. Even if they recognise 
their limitations they might be constrained in other sense, perhaps they lack the 
motivation to neutralise those influences41. Instead, I suggest, avoiding exposure to 
the sources of mental contamination would be a more effective strategy. 
Raising awareness of the biases we sometimes display is, as I have argued, a 
condition for a just society. It fails, however, in trying to undo the damage of certain 
forms of speech. It can have preventive value -warning people about the processes 
that might challenge their autonomy- but not a great amount of corrective value. 
Despite this, the arguments developed here surely do not reject the fact of reasonable 
persuasion; they merely qualify it. Essentially, although people have the capacity to 
change their minds when they are presented with reasons, and sometimes they 
exercise that capacity, they also have the tendency to interpret new evidence in a 
biased way, under cognitive pressure they regard information they should know to be 
false as being true, and they get anchored with false information, which is later used 
to make judgements. We need to be more careful in our application of the `more, 
better speech' strategy and be aware of its ecological limitations. 
Autonomy and Content-Based Regulations 
The argument I defend holds that because autonomy is inconsistent with mental 
contamination, there are valid reasons to restrict freedom of speech in sensitive 
41 Just as some people choose to smoke even when they know (and accept) that smoking harms third 
parties as well as them, some people might agree that they would be influenced in harmful ways and 
still do nothing about it. Cf. Ibid. 323. 
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areas, such as racist and sexist issues. These restrictions are not motivated by an 
assessment of the internal merits of the views proposed but rather by the effects they 
have on autonomy. In this respect I make two arguments. On the one hand, I note 
that in a strong understanding of free speech autonomy is often employed to defend 
speech, despite the harm the former can cause. But, in fact, because autonomy is 
bypassed it cannot play the exempting role. On the other hand, I argue that in order 
to achieve autonomy certain external conditions must be satisfied, amongst which is 
a social environment in which critical deliberation is facilitated. Protection of hate 
speech can impair the ecological conditions of autonomy42. In this sense, the 
restrictions suggested are autonomy-enabling rather then autonomy-disabling43. This 
second argument seems (prima facie) much more perfectionist than the first, insofar 
as it bestows autonomy with a considerable weight within a consequentialist 
structure. The rejection of this claim will occupy the next sections. 
Although restricting racist speech is a necessary condition of accomplishing 
the autonomy-enabling environment I argue for, clearly it is not sufficient; as many 
liberals argue, governments must still take active steps in order to distribute access to 
media and public fora fairly. These steps might involve establishing expenditure 
limits to political campaigns, providing public funding to political parties, 
subsidising the expression of minority or unpopular views, and so on44 
There is also another worry I wish to address. I have argued that racist speech 
must be regulated not on an assessment of its content's merits, but due to its 
42 Remember Scanlon's remark that the most important interest that audiences have in free speech 
relates to having a good environment for the formation of beliefs. 'Freedom of Expression and 
Categories of Expression', 91. 
43 For what I have said so far it is clear that restrictions on hate speech must be broader than the usual 
categories of 'fighting words' or `face-to-face vilification'. 
44 Arguments for this can be articulated from a worry about the quality of public debate (Fiss, The 
Irony of Free Speech) or the fair value of liberties (Rawls, Political Liberalism, 289-371). 
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results45. In this sense, it may be thought that the restrictions are not content-based. I 
think this captures half the truth. On the one hand, according to this interpretation, 
the argument I am presenting justifies only context-based restrictions, that is, it only 
applies to contexts in which those automatic processes are prone to be activated. But 
there may other contexts in which racist speech does not activate those processes. If 
this is so, then the restrictions are only context-dependent, rather than content-based. 
On the other hand, however, it seems that racist speech has the capacity to trigger 
those processes in virtue of its content. If the content was different, then the effects 
would not arise. Both are necessary conditions: there are certain contents expressed 
in certain contexts which threaten autonomy. Complicating matters further, we still 
know little about the relation between context and content; hard questions must be 
answered regarding the level of domain specificity and flexibility of our mental 
processes in order to devise a definitive answer. 
The upshot of the argument is, then, that speech expressing a particular 
viewpoint (namely, racist and sexist speech) ought to be regulated not because its 
content is mistaken (although it is), but because it is likely to trigger mental 
contamination. The argument holds that certain features in the environment trigger 
automatic responses that bypass rational autonomy. Racist and sexist speech 
constitute important instances of mental contamination because we have a special 
propensity to be contaminated by those ideas46. Moreover, racist and sexist ideas 
have a significant role in the public ecology of our societies, affecting the manner in 
which people act. Although the remarks discussed in this section regarding the 
45 Not because the merits of the view it presents, but because the way in which it threatens autonomy. 
46 Cf. Chapter 1. At the end of that chapter I survey Hirschfeld cognitive theory of race, according to 
which we have a specific-domain cognitive module for `human kinds', which is susceptible to racial 
categories. Cf. Hirschfeld, Race in the Making. 
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4 more, better speech' strategy apply to propositions in general, when combined with 
instances of hate speech they pose a serious threat to citizens' moral powers, in 
particular, as I have suggested, to their capacity for a sense of justice. 
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to believe that some spill-over effects 
will take place47. For instance, imagine the discussion of racist science in academic 
fora. Academic debate seems to be a good environment in which to form beliefs: 
there are not many distractions, people can focus on only one thing, discussion is 
supposed to be clear, rational, direct, free from manipulation, and so on. But it is 
important to know whether the effects of those debates can `spillover' to other 
spheres of life that do not satisfy those environmental conditions48. 
II 
Legitimacy, Autonomy, and Anti-Perfectionism 
So, is the argument defended perfectionist? Some might argue that although I have 
rejected a version of perfectionism (one which argues speech might be regulated on 
an assessment of its merits), I have covertly instilled another: a version of 
perfectionism which attaches overriding value to personal autonomy. The claim 
defended, some might argue, violates neutrality insofar as the value of an 
autonomous life is a partisan idea, with which reasonable people can disagree. So, 
" In Chapter 6, problems of spillover effects are discussed in relation to Nancy Rosenblum's `Moral 
Uses of Pluralism'. Cf. Nancy Rosenblum, Membership and Morals: The Personal Uses of Pluralism 
in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
48 On the other hand, maybe we might be willing to compromise part of the truth (e. g. in case there 
were any racial differences) for moral reasons. It may well be the case that morality overrides some 
truths. 
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while I have successfully avoided justifying restrictions on hate speech on the basis 
that racism is morally wrong, the argument is perfectionist insofar as it rests on an 
account of the value of personal autonomy. 
The debate regarding liberal neutrality and perfectionism is an extensive one, 
and the response I develop will be necessarily sketchy. The term `neutrality' itself 
has ambiguities and misunderstandings, and it is therefore not a very useful one. 
Nevertheless, I will abide with its use to follow the conventions of related literature. 
Another difficulty is the number of misunderstandings and `straw-men' invoked in 
typical discussions, which obscure the merits of the positions debated. In what 
follows I will comment briefly on what liberal neutrality is not. Later I will sketch a 
view about what perfectionism (properly understood) is concerned with. Finally, I 
will defend a restricted version of neutrality which grants a moderate concern for 
autonomy 49 
What Neutrality Is and Is Not 
There are two significant interpretations of neutrality. One claims that liberal 
policies should affect everyone equally50. `Impact neutrality' is the view that, 
because government must treat all its citizens as equals, its policies must also affect 
everyone's life prospects equally. According to this version of neutrality, `[o]ne of 
the main goals of governmental authority, which is lexically prior to any other, is to 
ensure for all persons an equal ability to pursue in their lives and promote in their 
49 This position is heavily indebted to Raz, The Morality of Freedom; Joseph Raz, `Facing Up: A 
Reply', Southern California Law Review, 62 (1989), 1153-235: Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and 
Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), and Clayton, Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing. 
50 Cf. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 115. 
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societies any ideal of the good of their choosing' 51. Liberals, such as Rawls, 
Dworkin and Nagel, reject neutrality in this sense; they acknowledge that polices 
will affect people differently, and they think this is not a cause for concern. A 
scheme of basic liberty will make some lifestyles more difficult to lead than others. 
Consider again Bob who likes playing baseball but now that he lives in the UK, he 
finds that it is easier to get participants for a game of football than baseball. The 
`cultural' market has a different impact on his life than it has in Wayne's life (Wayne 
is an avid football player). Nevertheless, Bob cannot claim unfair treatment by the 
government just because his lifestyle is not as easy to pursue as Wayne's. Neither 
Rawls's `primary goods' nor Dworkin's `equality of resources' support 
compensating people for these kinds of differences52 
Another sense in which neutrality can be understood is as a means of 
justification: governments cannot ground policies on the intrinsic merits of 
controversial conceptions of the good. This is the sense in which most liberals use 
the term neutrality53. Governmental policies must be independent from 
comprehensive doctrines54. For instance, governments can fail to be neutral by 
subsidising religious schools on the belief that religious lives are better than non- 
51 Will Kymlicka, `Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality', Ethics, 99 (1989), 883. 
52 They do support compensation for other inequalities, which does not concern us here. It seems that 
one needs to be welfare egalitarian in order to support impact neutrality. Cf. Dworkin, Sovereign 
Virtue Chapter 1. 
5' Cf. Dworkin, 'Liberalism'; Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 153-5,281-2; Peter de Marneffe, 
'Liberalism, Liberty, and Neutrality', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19 (1990), 253-74; Nagel, 
Equality and Partiality. Chapter 14; Rawls, Political Liberalism, 190-1; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 
80-1. 
54 Rawls uses the term `doctrine' to refer to `comprehensive views of all kinds' Rawls, Political 
Liberalism, xxxvii-xxxviii n. 2. `Comprehensiveness' refers to doctrines or conceptions which 
`include [... ] what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of 
friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, 
and in the limit to our life as a whole' Ibid. 13. 
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religious ones. I will explain how neutrality in this sense is possible later; the point 
of import here is to distinguish between its impact and justificatory senses. 
A common charge against neutrality is that it is logically inconsistent: it is 
impossible because it is self-defeating. In essence, neutrality must be neutral 
regarding itself, that is, liberalism must be neutral towards neutrality and non- 
neutrality, and this is self-contradictory. Liberalism, it is argued, cannot claim both 
neutrality and non-neutrality at the same time. This charge, however, misconstrues 
the nature of liberal neutrality. Liberalism does not need to be neutral on every issue, 
and certainly not towards neutrality itself. Nor it does need be neutral towards its 
own conception of justice and associated values. Liberals believe these are 
important, and that institutions must be organised in order to pursue them. These 
values include the idea of fair social cooperation, equality, liberty, and so on. 
Neutrality is not a nihilist position. Liberals are not neutral towards the interests of 
citizens as specified in their theory of justice. Rawls believes that citizens have two 
fundamental interests (to develop and exercise an effective sense of justice and to be 
able to form, revise and rationally to pursue a conception of the good55), and that 
institutions must promote those interests. To be sure, he does not wish to be neutral 
between arrangements that promote them and those that do not. So, liberals are not 
neutral towards neutrality, conceptions of justice, and the values associated with 
them, or the interests that it assigns to citizens 56 
55 Rawls. `Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', 312. 
56 Rawls distinguishes between procedural neutrality and neutrality of aim. The former only appeals 
to `a procedure that can be legitimated, or justified, without appealing to any moral values at all'. 
Political Liberalism, 191. 
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In essence, liberals believe that governments must be neutral only towards a 
subset of ideas: the set of (reasonable) conceptions of the good57. These include 
among others the value of religious life, sexuality, the worth of family and friends, 
the intrinsic merits of art, sport, and different philosophical theories. Liberal 
neutrality claims that governments must not base policies on an assessment of the 
value of these activities. In short, neutrality of justification `is the principle that the 
principles of justice that regulate basic social and political institutions must be 
justifiable in terms of moral and political values that any reasonable person would 
accept as a basis of moral claims regardless of his or her particular conception of the 
good'S8. 
Rawls, Liberalism and Legitimacy 
Rawls provides a good example of how liberalism can be neutral between competing 
conceptions of the good. He believes that a conception of justice is political if it 
satisfies three conditions59. First, it must be worked out for a specific domain, 
namely, for political, social and economic institutions. It should cover guidelines and 
principles of distribution, entitlements, burdens, benefits and conduct that apply only 
to those institutions, not to other spheres of life. So, a political conception regulates 
57 For the time being I will leave the discussion about reasonableness aside. Suffice to say that 
reasonableness as applied to a person involves a `disposition to promote and honour fair terms of 
cooperation and willingness to recognise the burdens of judgment and accept their consequences'. 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, 49 n. 1. A reasonable doctrine affirms an intelligible view of the world, 
contains norms about how to single out values and how to balance them in case of conflict, and 
belongs to an evolving tradition. Ibid. 59. 
58 de Marneffe, 'Liberalism, Liberty, and Neutrality', 253. 
59 For what follows see Rawls, Political Liberalism, 11-15. 
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taxation, but does not provide directives about how to choose sexual partners6o 
Second, a political conception is justified in a particular manner: it is presented as a 
`freestanding' view. Its justification is neither derived from nor dependent on 
comprehensive doctrines. In contrast with other comprehensive conceptions, such as 
Kant's, Mill's, Aquinas's or Aristotle's, a political conception does not appeal to 
matters of personal virtues, non-political values, religious beliefs or metaethical 
theories. This does not mean that it cannot be supported by comprehensive doctrines; 
rather that this is not necessary61. Third, a political conception derives its content 
from implicit ideas present in the public political culture of democratic societies. 
Rawls takes the commonly shared ideas of freedom and equality to their logical 
conclusion62, ideas which have been developed during recent centuries and form the 
core of democratic societies. A political conception of justice is neutral towards 
comprehensive doctrines, then, in the sense that it is presented and can be justified 
independently of any of those doctrines. Similarly, Rawls's theory maintains 
neutrality between different conceptions of the good by specifying a list of primary 
goods63, which can be shared by citizens independently of the particular conceptions 
of the good they affirm. `[I]t is enough that citizens view themselves as moved by 
the two highest-order interests of moral personality [... ], and that their particular 
conceptions of the good, however distinct their final ends and loyalties, require for 
their advancement roughly the same primary goods'64. An adequate list of primary 
60 The subject matter of a political conception constitutes what Rawls calls the `Basic Structure'. Cf. 
Chapter 1. 
61 Cf. '[A]... political conception can be seen as part of a comprehensive doctrine but it is not a 
consequence of that doctrine's nonpolitical values' ibid. 155. 
62 Thomas Nagel, `Rawls on Liberalism' in Freeman, S. (ed. ) The Cambridge Companion to Rawtwls 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 63. 
63 Cf. Rawls, `Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', 362. 
64 Ibid. 361. 
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goods, it is claimed65, treats every person as a free and equal moral agent (this 
conception of the person is a political conception, not a comprehensive one). 
The explanation for why a political conception of justice is the appropriate 
fashion by which to establish fair institutions is based on aspects of democratic 
societies: the `fact of reasonable pluralism' and the `principle of liberal legitimacy' 
First, people affirm a variety of reasonable conceptions of the good. They disagree 
about religion, virtue, philosophy, the meaning of life, our place in the universe, and 
other comprehensive subjects. This plurality of views is neither a historical accident 
nor a thing to be regretted; it is the natural outcome of practical reason used freely66. 
These disagreements could only be eliminated through oppressive power67. If the 
liberal conception of justice depended on a comprehensive view -one on which 
people disagree- it would not generate the consensus necessary for satisfying the 
principle of liberal legitimacy: 
Our exercise of power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance 
with a constitution the essentials of which citizens as free and equal may 
reasonable be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to their common human reason68. 
65 I say it is `claimed' because there are some difficulties concerning whether it actually treats every 
one as free and equal. This debate, though, is not relevant to the point about neutrality made here. Cf. 
Thomas Nagel, `Rawls on Justice', The Philosophical Review, 82 (1973), 220-34. 
66 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 36. 
67 The explanation of how reasonable disagreement comes about is provided by the `burdens of 
judgment'. Ibid. 54-58. 
68 Ibid. 137 
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According to Rawls then, the only means of generating an overlapping 
consensus (a consensus for the right reasons69) is to articulate a political conception 
of justice, which is neutral between competing conceptions of the good70. By an 
overlapping consensus it is meant that people in a well-ordered society normally act 
in conformity with reasonably just laws and endorse a liberal conception of justice, 
for many different reasons each stemming from their conceptions of the good, 
including their comprehensive moral views' 71. If people could not agree with the 
principles ruling their society, it would fail to treat every citizen as a free and equal 
moral agent. 
Perfectionism and Anti-Perfectionism 
Now contrast the view described above with a perfectionist position: perfectionism is 
the view that `there is no fundamental principled inhibition on governments acting 
for any valid moral reason'72. According to Raz, this is a natural view. Once a person 
identifies a valuable aspect of the good life, the fact that it is valuable is a reason for 
bringing it about. The government has a duty to make citizens comply with reasons 
that apply to them independently if by following when government's directives 
citizens are more likely to comply with those reasons than when following their 
69 Contrast this view with a consensus generated as a `modus vivendi'. Imagine a regime in which 
Buddhists are not persecuted, not because the Christian majority think that enforcing Christianity is 
wrong, but because they lack the power to convert or annihilate Buddhists. 
70 Some people are sceptical regarding the possibility of reaching agreement on the conceptions of 
justice. The argument holds that only certain disagreements are to be taken into account, that is, only 
disagreements among reasonable conceptions of justice. This condition makes disagreements about 
justice less pervasive, by keeping only a family of liberal conceptions. For a full articulation of this 
argument see Clayton, Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing, 19-24. and Rawls, Political Liberalism, 
Lecture IV. 
71 Freeman, Rawls, 366. 
72 Raz, `Facing Up', 1230. 
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independent judgment73. If there is a valuable course of action, then it is the duty of 
government to bring it about. This is the core of the naturalness of perfectionism. As 
Joseph Chan argues, `people care about the quality of their lives and have an interest 
in leading a good life. If the state's existence is to help citizens to pursue their 
interests, it seems natural that the state should assist citizens by promoting [them]74' 
This position does not exclude any valid moral reason: all moral claims are `fair 
play' for governments. 
Perfectionism does not need to be committed to the enforcement of the good 
life in all cases. It acknowledges that there are strategic reasons for not using power 
for promoting of the good. In some cases, the value of an activity is conditional upon 
it being done freely. For instance, it is likely that a person's prayers have religious 
value only if she believes that praying is a worthwhile activity. If this is so, then the 
government should not make praying compulsory. The reason is strategic: even if 
there was nothing morally wrong with enforced prayers, making this compulsory 
would be self-defeating. 
Another consideration that perfectionists might have is that the enforcement 
of some valuable action might diminish the value of autonomy, given that the latter 
requires endorsement. Imagine a frustrated painter who thinks that all his pictures 
lack quality. Imagine also that, contrary to his opinion, we think his pictures are very 
good and artistically valuable. Should the government force him to keep painting for 
the sake of art, or should he be allowed to drop the pursuit? From a perfectionist 
73 The normal justification thesis claims that `the normal way to establish that a person has authority 
over another person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons 
which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the 
alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow 
the reasons which apply to him directly'. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 53. 
74 Joseph Chan, 'Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29 
(2000), 5-6. 
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perspective the answer depends on the balance between the value of art and the value 
of autonomy. Perhaps the value autonomy is outweighed by his masterful creations; 
perhaps it is not. Some might make the stronger claim that autonomy is a condition 
of the good. For instance, Will Kymlicka asserts that `no life goes better by being led 
from the outside according to values the person does not endorse. My life goes better 
if I am leading it from the inside according my beliefs about value' 75. Imagine that 
listening to Sibelius is better than listening to Stravinsky, but pursuing one's 
autonomous preference for Stravinsky might be better than listening to Sibelius 
under coercion. 
Although some of these considerations present important obstacles to 
perfectionism, it might be responded that it still has the resources to overcome them. 
For instance, Hurka argues that, instead `of forcing people into a single best 
activity', perfectionists might go the milder option `of forbidding a single worst 
activity'. Or even for the still weaker possibility of giving subsidies to good 
activities or heavily taxing worse ones76. Which of these options is chosen depends 
on strategic reasons and calculations. 
With the practical issues circumvented perfectionists must then fully commit 
to the promotion of valuable ways of life. Citing principled reasons for not bringing 
about value is not an option open to them. In this respect the idea of `modest 
perfectionism' is puzzling. For instance, Chan argues that modest perfectionism is 
75 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990), 203-4. Quoted by Thomas Hurka, 'Indirect Perfectionism: Kymlicka on Neutrality', The 
Journal of Political Philosophy, 3 (1995), 39-40. Notice however that it is not clear whether 
Kymlicka's arguments support perfectionism. Kymlicka thinks that his view supports liberal 
neutrality, while Hurka argues that they can lead to an indirect perfectionism. 
76 Hurka, 'Indirect Perfectionism'. 44,47,49 respectively. 
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`local, noncoercive, mixed and multicentered'77. This version of perfectionism, 
however must provide an explanation of why, if one accepts the perfectionist claim 
at all, we should not opt for the more extreme version or some other middle-ground. 
It could be that modest perfectionism is appealing, but its appeal might be generated 
by anti-perfectionist reasons. 
Liberal neutrality, on the other hand, cites principled reasons to refrain from 
acting on the validity of comprehensive views. As such, neutrality has a peculiar 
structure. The idea that supports neutrality provides an exclusionary reason to refrain 
from acting on valid reasons dependent on controversial conceptions of the good. 
Raz distinguishes between first- and second-order reasons. The former are reasons 
that appeal directly to certain states of affairs. The latter are `any reason[s] to act for 
a reason or to refrain from acting for a reason'78. A particular type of second-order 
reasons is exclusionary reasons, which demand we refrain from acting for a reason. 
Raz argues that in cases in which first-order reasons conflict, this should be resolved 
by assessing the relative strength of both reasons, and opting for what we have most 
reason to do. So, if I have a reason to go to the cinema tonight but also a reason to 
meet some friends at the pub, what I should do depends on which of those two 
reasons is stronger. On the other hand, when conflict arises between a first-order 
reasons and an exclusionary reason, `such conflicts are resolved not by the strength 
of the competing reasons, but by a general principle [ ... ] which 
determines that 
exclusionary reasons always prevail'79. In this respect exclusionary reasons are 
reasons for not acting on the balance of reasons. Raz gives the example of Ann who 
7' Chan, `Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism', 16. 
78 Raz, Practical Reason and Norins, 39. 
79 Ibid. 40. 
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is trying to decide how to invest her money. One night, a friend phones offering her 
the chance of a good investment. The decision, however, must be taken immediately. 
Ann had a horribly tiring day at work and does not feel in the mood to make 
important decisions, so she declines the offer. Her state of mind and her tiredness are 
reasons not to make a decision, rather than a reason to decline the offer per se. She 
explains that `she is [refusing] the offer not because she thinks that the reasons 
against it override those in its favour but because she cannot trust her own judgment 
at the moment' 80. In this respect, she has a reason not to act on the merits of other 
reasons. Notice though that exclusionary reasons do not imply that the excluded 
reason has no force; they do not nullify or cancel it. It is merely that the latter cannot 
outweigh the former. 
Construed as an exclusionary reason, anti-perfectionism means only that the 
government cannot be motivated by certain considerations derived from 
comprehensive doctrines. Anti-perfectionism is not committed to the view that 
comprehensive doctrines have no merit, or are false. This should dismiss the claim 
that anti-perfectionists are sceptical about the good. For example, Hurka thinks that 
`Rawls's defence of liberal neutrality combines the defeatist assumption that 
political philosophy cannot aim at true political principles' 81. Given what has been 
said here, this criticism does not stand. Political principles do not aim at the good 
because there is a reason not to act from the validity of comprehensive doctrines of 
the good, not because political liberals think the good cannot be deciphered or 
attained82. As Raz writes, exclusionary reasons are reasons for not being motivated 
80 Ibid. 37. 
81 Hurka, 'Indirect Perfectionism'. 56. 
`2 Cf. Rawls's comments on modus vivendi in Political Liberalism, xxxix. 
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in one's action by certain (valid) considerations'83: they do not deny the truth of the 
reasons excluded. 
Legitimacy, Publicity, and Anti-Perfectionism 
So, what motivates the exclusionary reasons that support anti-perfectionism? In 
particular, they are supported by the principle of liberal legitimacy discussed above, 
which holds that the use of power is appropriate only if it is used in terms which 
citizens (as free and equal moral agents) may be reasonably expected to agree84. 
Elaborating further on the principle of liberal legitimacy, Rawls argues that a 
political conception of justice needs to satisfy what he calls the `publicity condition'. 
This condition has three levels. First, it is satisfied when `society is effectively 
regulated according to public principles of justice: `citizens accept and know that 
others likewise accept those principles, and this knowledge in turn is publicly 
recognized' 85. The second concerns the sort of beliefs by which principles of justice 
can be justified, `that is the general beliefs about human nature and the way political 
and social institutions generally work, and indeed all such beliefs relevant to political 
justice'86. These beliefs are modelled by the original position. It is important for the 
sake of the argument defended in this thesis to acknowledge that beliefs about 
human psychology are recognised as public justifications, and, as such, can be 
legitimately used for modelling a political conception of justice. The third condition 
stipulates that the full justification of the conception of justice is publicly known, or 
83 Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 185. 
' Rawls, Political Liberalism, 137. 
85 Ibid. 66. 
86 Ibid. 66. 
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at least publicly available87. The publicity condition, then, restricts the sort of 
justifications that can guide governmental policies; it restricts the `pool' of available 
justificatory reasons to those that every citizen can reasonably accept. Publicity 
secures the base for an overlapping consensus that guarantees the legitimate exercise 
of political power. These are the goods that motivate the exclusionary reasons 
provided by liberal neutrality against perfectionism 88. 
The idea of autonomy is constitutive of both the legitimacy and the publicity 
conditions. It seems that only by endorsing freely the principles that rule coercive 
institutions can autonomy be respected. As Clayton argues, '[flull autonomy is a 
condition achieved only if citizens freely identify with the constraints that they face, 
in the sense that they understand the content and justificatory bases of the 
constraints, and freely accept them' 89. It is important, for our purposes, that full 
autonomy is a political concept; it is not derived from a comprehensive doctrine. It is 
specified by the political conception of the person as free and equal and as having 
the two moral powers: an effective sense of justice and the capacity to form, revise 
and pursue a conception of the good. According to Rawls, the only circumstances in 
which full autonomy can be realised is when citizens `act from principles of justice 
that specify the fair terms of cooperation they would give themselves when fairly 
represented as free and equal persons'90. The publicity condition can also be 
defended from an anti-paternalistic principle, according to which the government 
87 Ibid. 67. 
88 Cf. `Liberalism asks that citizens accept a certain restraint on the power of the state to enforce some 
of their most deeply held convictions against others who do not accept them, and holds that the 
legitimate exercise of political power must be justified on more restricted grounds which belong in 
some sense to a common or public domain'. Nagel, Equality and Partiality, 158. 
89 Clayton, Justice and Legitimacy, in Upbringing, 15. 
90 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 85. 
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fails to respect citizens' autonomy when the latter are ruled by principles they cannot 
be reasonably expected to accept, even if the rules are grounded on true premises91 
Contrast this condition of publicity with that endorsed by Thomas Christiano, 
who argues that legitimacy requires weak publicity. According to him, publicity 
demands that `the principles of justice be ones that that people can in principle see to 
be in effect' 92. Christiano defends this weak notion of publicity on the grounds that 
the `requirements of consensus would impose an impossible burden on principles of 
justice. Theories cannot get off the ground if they require agreement on principles 
themselves as a condition of justice93'. Given the impossibility of full publicity, 
Christiano suggests, we must adopt a weaker version by `publicly embody[ing] 
justice in a way that is compatible with a range of disagreements about what justice 
requires' 94 
One way of answering Christiano's challenge is by highlighting that not all 
possible disagreements about justice are fatal for an overlapping consensus. Rawls 
insists that the consensus for which we should aim is restricted only to reasonable 
citizens. Reasonableness is associated `with the willingness to propose and honor 
fair terms of cooperation' and `with the willingness to recognize the burdens of 
judgments and to accept their consequences95'. If a person who fails to satisfy the 
threshold of reasonableness disagrees with the principles of justice, the consequences 
of such disagreement are not relevant for legitimacy. Indeed Rawls argues that 
political liberalism aims at a consensus among a family of liberal conceptions 
91 Clayton, Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing, 15. 
9' Thomas Christiano, `The Authority of Democracy', Journal of Political Philosophy. 12 (2004), 
270. 
93 Ibid. 274. 
94 Ibid. 274. 
95 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 49 n. 1. 
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(among which he thinks `justice as fairness' is the most reasonable). He argues that 
liberal conceptions have three conditions. First they specify certain `rights, liberties, 
and opportunities'. Second, they give special priority to these freedoms. And third, 
they specify `measures assuring all citizens, whatever their social position, adequate 
all-purpose means to make intelligent and effective use of their liberties and 
opportunities' 96. Weak publicity seems to have two problems. On the one hand the 
argument that reasonable agreement is impossible is not tenable. On the other, weak 
publicity is not appealing insofar as it does not sufficiently respect the political 
conception of autonomy97. It seems clear then, that full publicity is a necessary 
condition for the satisfaction of citizens' first moral power. `Only if the full 
explanation and justification [of the political conception of justice] is publicly 
available can citizens come to understand its principles in accordance with the idea 
of society as a fair system of social cooperation98' . 
Autonomy and Anti-Perfectionism 
I have developed a concept of autonomy far more demanding than the political 
account defended by Rawls99. Next I want to consider briefly whether it is possible 
to maintain the appeal of a more comprehensive version of autonomy within an anti- 
96 Ibid. xlviii. See also Clayton, Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing, 19-24; Burton Drehen, On 
Rawls and Political Liberalism', in Freeman, S. (ed. ) The Cambridge Companion to Ra%ti'ls 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 328-9. 
97 Christiano argues that `this is where [... ] democracy comes in'. `The Authority of Democracy', 
274. 
98 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 78. 
99 Cf. Chapter 2. 
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perfectionist framework'°° Rawls distinguishes between fully and partially 
comprehensive doctrines; the former `covers all recognized values and virtues within 
one rather articulated system', the latter `comprises a number, but by no means all 
nonpolitical values and virtues and is rather loosely articulated" 01 Is it possible to 
argue for a non-perfectionist liberalism which gives weight to autonomy? 
Consider the following distinction. We can have an inclusive idea of 
neutrality, according to which the government must be neutral towards different 
conceptions of the good, but also towards different conceptions of the relation 
between a person and her conception of the good 102. On the other hand, we can also 
have a restricted view of neutrality, which applies only to conceptions of the good, 
and not to the way in which a person forms, revises and pursues them. While the 
former demands neutrality towards the idea of autonomy, the latter does not; it 
allows liberals to attach moral significance to how a person forms her attachments 
and goals. Restricted neutrality appeals to the value of autonomy in a manner 
consistent with the second moral powers of citizens. It acknowledges that forming, 
developing and pursuing a conception of the good requires the satisfaction of certain 
conditions. 
This is a controversial claim, for someone might reject the assertion that 
autonomy forms part of her well-being. Despite accepting that autonomy is 
controversial, a partially comprehensive liberalism insists that autonomy is valuable. 
Nevertheless, it rejects perfectionism by citing principled reasons for not promoting 
loo The argument that follows is highly indebted to Clayton, Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing, 
26-7. 
101 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 13. 
102 Matthew Clayton, `White on Autonomy, Neutrality and Well-Being', Journal of Philosophy of 
Education. 27 (1993), 104-6. 
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certain (valuable) aspects of a person's life'03: we can invoke some part of the truth 
about non-political values for justification, but not the whole truth. We can appeal to 
part of the controversial value of autonomy, while still maintaining principled limits 
regarding what the government can appeal to. 
Contrast this view with Rawls's position. Rawls distinguishes between two 
forms of the identity of persons. On the one hand, qua citizens we have an 
institutional, public identity, which is not tied to any particular conception of the 
good. In relation to this identity we have, as citizens, an interest in being able to 
revise and detach ourselves from the particular conception we endorse. On the other 
hand, we have a noninstitutional identity, which specifies our deeper attachments 
and goals' 
04 In some cases, these two identities can conflict. Rawls gives the 
example of the person who changes his faith. As a follower of a different religion he 
might think he has become a different person, but for public matters his institutional 
identity has not changed: he is still bound by the duties and obligations he was prior 
to changing his faith. In this sense, Rawls thinks that, by defending a purely political 
conception of the person, a political conception of justice will generate the necessary 
agreement for an overlapping consensus. 
This is relevant to the distinction between inclusive and restricted neutrality 
in the following way. Imagine Paul, a person who thinks that he is better off by not 
subjecting his faith to critical analysis. He thinks that there are many temptations in 
the world, and that it is likely that he will be misguided into believing falsehoods. As 
a believer, he thinks that it is in his interest not to be able to revise his conception of 
the good, or in other words, he rejects that he as an interest in developing his second 
103 As we have seen, this option is not available to perfectionists. 
104 Rawls, Political Liberalism. 30. 
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moral power. Why should he affirm, qua citizen, that he has an interest which, qua 
person, he rejects? As Clayton argues, `it is unclear why those who reject the 
comprehensive claim that they have an interest in being able rationally to reflect on, 
and revise, their conception of the good should accept that they have such an interest 
as citizens' 105 Think about Betty, a fellow believer of Paul's who, after subjecting 
her faith to critical scrutiny, remains strongly convinced of it. From an inclusive 
sense of neutrality we must remain indifferent to Paul's and Betty's cases. If, in 
contrast, we affirm a restricted sense of neutrality, we can perceive differences 
between them. Under this interpretation, we affirm that Betty takes the right course 
of action, by establishing a direct link between her moral autonomy and her political 
autonomy. To be sure, this view is controversial (in virtue of being partly 
comprehensive), but it is, nevertheless, more plausible than the alternative. A 
restricted sense of neutrality unites our intuitions regarding the value of autonomy 
with an anti-perfectionist political morality. 
To conclude I will briefly summarise what has been said in this chapter. Most 
liberal discussions of free expression regard restrictions on hate speech as 
illegitimate when they are content based. The presumption against content 
regulations emanates from a popular account of political neutrality. A common 
strategy to neutralise the harmful effect of racist speech is to have `more, better 
speech'. Against Cohen's `fact of reasonable persuasion', I argued that, despite 
people being technically able to change their minds, they tend not to. People usually 
do not assess new information neutrally, they form impressions on irrelevant 
105 Clayton, Justice and LegitiºnacY in Upbringing, 25. 
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information, get anchored, and are subject to the distortions emanating from 
information framing. I also suggested that the manner in which we form beliefs is 
biased towards acceptance and that assessing and rejecting propositions we 
understand consumes considerable cognitive resources, which, in stimuli-rich 
environments, might not be always available. These claims support the argument I 
made in previous chapters, which asserted that the best way to defend ourselves from 
mental contamination is by controlling the environment in ways favourable to our 
deliberative capacities. Content-based restrictions on speech are justified, not by an 
assessment of the intrinsic merits of racist speech, but by the effect this has on 
autonomy. 
I also reject the claim that the position delineated above is perfectionist. I 
discuss some misunderstandings about the meaning of liberal neutrality and interpret 
neutrality as an exclusionary reason, justified by the goods of publicity and 
legitimacy. A condition of full publicity is defended on an account of citizen's 
autonomy. Finally, I defended a restricted sense of neutrality, which is consistent 
with an anti-perfectionist autonomy-based liberalism, and my argument in favour of 
content-based regulations of speech. 
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CHAPTER 6 
FREE ASSOCIATION, PUBLIC ECOLOGY, AND FREE SPEECH 
Most liberals agree that freedom of association is a vital component of life in a free 
society and therefore must be protected from governmental intervention. However, 
there is still much disagreement concerning the limits to which government can 
legitimately impose upon the activities and the membership criteria such groups are 
allowed to employ. In this chapter, I draw from the arguments developed in those 
previous to argue that there are legitimate reasons for governments restricting what 
private associations are allowed to express and the admissions criteria they are 
allowed to employ. In doing so, I shall focus attention specifically on racist speech 
and racist associations. 
There are striking similarities between the defences of freedom of association 
and freedom of speech. First, both are usually defended on grounds of autonomy. 
Being free to associate in one's own terms is, for some people, a condition of 
personal autonomy. And, in similar fashion to the defence of speech, this idea can be 
used to defend free association as a constraint on governmental actions. On this 
view, the state fails to respect a person's autonomy if it interferes with her joining an 
association. Autonomy can, additionally, figure in a consequentialist argument, 
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which claims that a government's promotion of the value of autonomy requires an 
environment in which people are free to associate on their own terms 1. 
Defences of freedom of association can employ a minimalist or a maximalist 
approach2. Regarding the former, it can be argued that the impacts of associations 
are not harmful to third parties, and, consequently, associational freedoms are an 
instantiation of a more general principle of minimal liberty. On the other hand, it can 
be argued that the harmful effects they have on third parties are trumped by the 
benefits of associations for members or for society in general. 3 
Free association resembles freedom of expression in the sense that there is a 
strong presumption against regulating the `content' of associations. Although it is 
permissible to restrict associations' activities on the basis of `manner, time and 
place'4, governments are usually barred -from restricting them in virtue of an 
assessment of the merits of their membership policies and/or pursuits. For instance, 
preventing an association of environmentalists from gathering close to a nuclear 
plant might be acceptable when the restriction is justified on `contextual' grounds, 
but not when it is made only on an assessment of environmentalism. In general, 
interference can be justified only by showing that an association presents a clear and 
present danger to society; not merely that it has some harmful consequences on 
others. 
Lastly, it is sometimes suggested that the costs of associations can be 
neutralised by forming other groups that will provide opportunities to the excluded 
' Free associations can also be defended on grounds of democracy by highlighting the contribution 
that associations make to democratic pluralism. Cf. Robert Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: 
Autonomy vs. Control (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). 
2I discuss the difference between minimalist and maximalist defences of speech in Chapter 1. Cf. also 
Cohen, `Freedom of Expression'. 
The arguments I will discuss in this chapter mainly address this approach. 
4 This restrictions usually are addressed by liberty of assembly. 
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people. This strategy is similar to the `more, better speech' remedy discussed in 
Chapter 5. The idea is that the legitimate way to neutralise the harmful effects of 
associations (or speech) involves setting up new opportunities, either for association 
or for speech, which will redress the setbacks caused by others' associational or 
expressive activities. This alternative is preferred to interfering directly with citizens' 
activities. 
The claim I defend in this chapter holds that an association's activities are to 
be constrained by the condition of reasonableness, and that their exclusionary 
practices must be justifiable by public reasons. These conditions are better suited to 
protecting the goods of associational freedom. The argument defended might face 
the following objection: although at the core of liberal regimes is the idea that 
governments have a duty to treat everyone with equal respect and concern, private 
associations and individuals (in their private lives) are not bound by this 
requirement. So, a liberal regime rules out racism or sexism only at state level; in the 
private sphere citizens are allowed to associate on racist grounds, or express racist 
views if they so wish. 
I will proceed as follows. I begin by describing the fundamental goods it is 
claimed voluntary private associations protect and/or promote, and the constraints 
under which they are usually assumed to operate. I will illustrate how associations 
can relate to those goods through three examples of racist associations. In the second 
section, I will assess a prominent theory of associations: Nancy Rosenblum's `Moral 
Uses of Pluralism'5. Finally, I will develop an argument for legitimate restrictions on 
associations constrained by an account of reasonableness and public reason6. 
5 Nancy Rosenblum, 'Compelled Association: Public Standing, Self-respect and the Dynamics of 
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I 
Associational Freedom 
Within liberal societies people associate for many reasons and with many goals. In 
order to understand why governments should not interfere with and in many cases 
protect these associations it is useful to identify the goods that associations are 
supposed to provide. While doing so, it is important to bear in mind that freedom of 
association necessarily (analytically) involves a right of discrimination. My freedom 
to associate with a person X for an activity A is meaningless unless I also have the 
possibility of not being joined by person Y. Although this point is somewhat trivial, 
it is important to notice that it says nothing regarding the reasons by which people 
can legitimately deny membership to others. 
Associational Goods 
Authenticity. It is usually argued that associational freedom is a fundamental 
component of living a life on one's own terms. As George Kateb writes: `To be free, 
to live as one likes, includes associating on one's own terms, which means engaging 
in relationships of all sorts, finding or trying to find pleasure in them, and also 
finding in them opportunities for many kinds of experience'7. In order to lead a life 
that I can truly call `mine', I must be able to engage in relationships with the people I 
choose, and I must be able to do so in the terms with which we voluntarily agree. 
Exclusion', in Gutmann, A. (ed. ) Freedom of Association (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1998), 75-108; Rosenblum, Membership and Morals. 
6 Stuart White, 'Freedom of Association and the Right to Exclude', The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 5 (1997), 373-91. 
7 Kateb, `The Value of Association', 37-8. 
231 
CHAPTER 6 Free Association, Public Ecology, and Free Speech 
The possibility of joining people with whom I share interests, values and 
commitments is a fundamental part of leading a life with which I can identify 
myself. Similarly, many of a person's important and dearest projects are collective 
enterprises. In order to be successful these projects require several persons acting 
together. If carried out in solitude these projects will fail. It is important to note also 
that the capacity of associations to protect authenticity would (arguably) be self- 
defeating if their terms were imposed by government. Essentially, this is because 
people do not merely want to associate with others; they also wish to do so in terms 
they find satisfactory and mutually acceptable. 
Intimacy. This good refers to the capacity for companionship, friendship and 
camaraderie. Although, in some sense, the goods of intimacy resemble authenticity, 
they seem to be `less serious' 8. This is not to argue that intimacy is not an important 
good; only that it is less `articulated' than those covered by authenticity. People 
usually establish meaningful `spontaneous' relationships with others. These 
relationships arise in daily life and usually lack any specific aim (apart from 
companionship itself). Groups of friends who meet in the pub or eat lunch together 
are perfect examples. These relationships, however, can flourish and become much 
more important. When a person chooses a partner or to have a close relation with her 
family she also enjoys the good of intimacy. Intimacy, however, is fragile in the 
sense that it is mainly based on trust and `good-faith'; governmental intervention can 
very easily spoil the meaning, worth and enjoyment of these sorts of associations. 
8 Cf. Sam Fleischacker. `Insignificant Communities' in Gutmann, A. (ed. ) Freedom of Association 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1998), 273-313. 
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Personal Development. Another important set of goods delivered by 
associations concerns the development of both moral and psychological capacities of 
members. In virtue of being voluntary, it is usually argued, associations provide an 
environment in which members acquire moral dispositions for cooperation, respect 
for public rules, and self-esteem9. The dynamics of associational life generate virtues 
such as respect, reciprocity, trust, solidarity and mutual support. For instance, Rawls 
argues that the `morality of association' requires a complex set of abilities which 
include the capacity to recognise that other individuals might have different points of 
view, different perspectives, different ends and wants. Moreover, it is not only 
recognition that associations can foster, they can also enlighten our understanding of 
others' reasons as reasons that deserve respect and endorsement. Finally, 
associations encourage control and modification of our behaviour in respect of other 
people's points of view 1 °. In short, the idea is that, by fostering cooperation, 
associations trigger the moral development of their members 11 
Expressive Goods. Sometimes people associate in order to put forward a 
`voice'. In this sense, a central aim of associations is to communicate a point of view 
(or a subject matter) to the public agenda. The relation between private associations 
and free speech is usually assumed to grant a right of association12. Given their 
9 Rosenblum, `Compelled Association'. 
10 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 409-4 10. Rawls goes on to say that `we may suppose that there is a 
morality of association in which the members of society view one another as equals, as friends and 
associates, joined together in a system of cooperation known to be for the advantage of all and 
governed by a common conception of justice'. Ibid. 413. 
1 This holds for both, children and adults. 
12 For instance in the U. S. Constitution, there is not a right of association as such, but associations 
have usually been protected under the First Amendment doctrine (free speech and rights to assembly) 
and under the freedom of religion. Cf. Kent Greenawalt, `Religious Association' and Amy Gutmann, 
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expressive goals, groups are protected from governmental intervention, and subject 
to the same limits, for the same reasons that individual expression is protected. For 
instance, Justice Brennan links association and free speech when he writes: 
`According protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially 
important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident 
expression from suppression by the majority' 13. 
There seem to be two tiers to these expressive goods. On the one hand, 
associating with others is an effective way of conveying a message to the public 
arena. Because it is much easier for this to get across and to be heard if it is proffered 
by many people (rather than just one), freedom of association increases the potential 
of the communication 14. This aspect of expressive associations is usually referred to 
as its `voice'. On the other hand, associations also have internal expression 
capacities. Associations themselves are a forum for expressing and discussing ideas 
among members. By joining people with similar interests a person can discuss and 
express her views with greater ease than she could in the public arena. The 
connection between this aspect of expression and the good of `authenticity' is 
obvious: part of what living a life in my own terms presumably requires is to be 
listened to and heard by people with interests similar to my own15. Because what is 
`Freedom of Association: An Introductory Essay' both in Gutmann, A. (ed. ) Freedom of Association 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
13 Quoted by Greenawalt, `Religious Association' 114. Emphasis added. 
14 Other things being equal: it is probably true that a rich person has a greater capacity at reaching 
audiences by himself than an association of poor people. 
15 Gutmann writes: `When the primary purpose of an association is expression of a point of view [... ] 
then its freedom to select its members consistently with its expressive purposes is essential to its 
members' exercise of free speech through the association [... ] Any meaningful right to free speech 
must protect associations whose primary purpose is expressive from political interference in their 
membership policies insofar as that interference is directly related to its expressive purposes'. 
Gutmann, `Freedom of Association', 11-12. 
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said is kept indoors I believe that this dimension of expression is much better 
covered under authenticity and intimacyl6 
Effective Pursuit of Goals. The last good I wish to discuss is a 
fundamentally instrumental role held by associations. Many associations are joined 
as a means of achieving other goals. By coordinating actions, lobbying governments, 
providing contacts or forming networks, associations tend to be more effective at 
achieving goals than individuals. The degree of member involvement varies greatly 
in associations that provide this sort of good17. Although many involve regular face- 
to-face contact between members, others do not require much cooperation at all: 
sometimes the only requirement is a joining fee, and the involvement of members is 
minimal (think, for instance of associations such as Oxfam, the Wild Life Trust, or 
English Heritage or the friends of CBSO). 
Conditions for Associations 
Although associational life is a fundamental component of liberal democracies, there 
are limits placed upon associations' activities and goals. In the literature concerning 
associational freedom there seems to be a consensus on four conditions that must be 
satisfied. 
16 Arguments of free speech are especially relevant when the expressive activities are targeted to a 
public audience. 
1' Gutmann distinguishes between primary, secondary and tertiary associations based on the degree of 
members' involvement. Cf. Gutmann, `Freedom of Association', 10. 
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Basic Rights. Associations cannot engage in activities that violate the basic 
rights of citizens (there cannot be a British Association of Artful Back-Stabbers'8). 
Nor can associations have violent, illegal goals (the Association of Tax-Evaders 
cannot exist). For instance, there are some important controversies regarding the 
extent to which associations can pursue illegal goals, or employ violent means to 
achieve their aims 19. It is not clear what limits should acts of civil disobedience 
abide. For instance, think about parades of Animal Right's Activists, or the Hunting 
Association20. 
Similarly, associations are usually barred from violating the basic rights of 
their members. Ritual torture, for instance is not a protected practice, even if 
inflicted on voluntarily participants. This point is controversial: some people might 
argue that insofar as a person gives consent, as the maxim volenti non fit injuria21 
states, the (harmful) practices with which she engages are self-regarding, and 
interferences are illegitimate examples of paternalism22. In contrast, it might be 
argued that the government has a duty to defend a basic set of rights even against the 
will of the person involved. Fortunately this dispute has no direct implications for 
the argument defended here, so I will set it aside. 
Right of Exit. One of the essential conditions that liberal governments 
impose upon associations is that they must respect their members' right of exit. 
Associations cannot force members into life membership; the exit door must be 
18 White, `Freedom of Association and the Right to Exclude'. 379. 
19 A through discussion of these examples is far beyond the reasonable limits of this chapter. 
20 For a theory of civil disobedience see Will Smith, `Democracy, Deliberation, Disobedience'. Res 
Publica, 10 (2004). 353-77. For a discussion on, and qualified defence of paramilitary associations see 
Rosenblum, Membership and Morals. Chapters 7-8. 
21 Thanks to Andrew Walton for bringing this maxim to my memory. 
22 Cf. The Spanner Case. www. spannertrust. org [accessed 28`h August 2007]/ 
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always open. This condition can be understood in two senses. On the one hand 
government can forbid voluntary `slavery'. Associations cannot force their members 
to stay for life: there must always exist the legal possibility of leaving the 
association. For instance liberal governments ban the practice of associations taking 
away members' passports and other official documentation. However this condition 
is too weak: associations can still make exit unreasonably hard by denying members 
the actual conditions for leaving. In this respect, it seems that associations need to 
guarantee that its members are able to leave. Although it is not obvious to what 
extent associations have a positive duty to ensure exit, they are barred from taking 
certain actions that preclude exit. For example, consider the Susan and Toni Alamo 
Foundation v Secretary of Labor case23. The Alamo Foundation is a non-profit 
religious organisation which 
derived its income by operating service stations, retail clothing and grocery 
outlets [... ] staffed by Foundation "associates" [... ] In the 1985 case involving 
the Alamo Foundation, the secretary of labor filed action under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, charging the group with violating minimum wage and overtime 
24 
provisions . 
Although private associations may be exempt from labour and economic regulations, 
the court was troubled by the fact that members-employees `were entirely dependent 
on the Foundation for food, shelter, and clothing'25. Rosenblum agrees that the Court 
was right in forcing the association to satisfy the Fair Labor Standards Act's 
requirement because it was precluding members' possibilities of exit. 
23 Tom & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U. S. 290 (1985). See Rosenblum, 
Membership and Morals. 99-100. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 100. 
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Voluntary Entrance. Private associations cannot force entrance. This is the 
one of the defining characteristics of private `voluntary' associations. There are a 
few controversial cases in which associations can force individuals to become 
members; for example, to become part of a trade union can be a condition for 
employment26. There are also other `associations' to which we seem to belong 
without having voluntarily agreed to such as religion, culture, family, social class, 
but it is dubious whether they qualify as private associations in the sense required27. 
On the whole, however, this is typically an enforced condition. 
No Enforcement of Criminal Law. The last duty of private associations is 
that they cannot enforce criminal law28. Governments must remain neutral towards 
the particular conceptions of the good which different private associations support. 
Enforcing the view of one association as criminal law would be an unfair treatment 
to individuals who do not belong to it and/or share its particular conception of the 
good. Imagine, for instance that the Catholic Church were able to criminalise 
homosexuality because it conflicts with traditional dogma. Homosexuals (and in 
fact, people who merely believe the opposite) would be treated unfairly. 
Similarly, associations do not have equivalent powers to the government in 
the capacity of enforcing criminal law. A legitimate state has a range of sanctions, 
ranging from fines to imprisonment, available in order to extort citizens' compliance 
26 I will ignore these examples for the purpose of this chapter; it seems that forcing entrance to trade 
unions might be acceptable when free riding (by non-unionised workers) might be an important threat 
to the bargaining power of the union. Cf. Stuart White, 'Trade Unionism in a Liberal State' in 
Gutmann, A. (ed. ) Freedom of Association (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 330-56. 
27 Cf. Michael Walzer, 'On Involuntary Association', in Gutmann, A. (ed. ) Freedom of :1 ssociation 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 64-74. 
28 Cf. Rawls. `The Idea of Public Reason Revisited', 158-9. 
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with the law. In contrast, a private association's right to enforce its rules is more 
limited: they may use some means to ensure that members comply with rules, but the 
right to enforce them is usually conditional on individuals remaining members. 
Disputes within associations are settled by members, and government tends to 
intervene only in cases in which an association violates the rights of citizens. Think 
for instance of the controversy in Christianity regarding ordaining homosexuals. A 
government will refuse to intervene, unless the rights of some citizens are under 
threat. In many instances important internal disputes lead to schisms in the 
association rather than an involvement of government to enforce one `interpretation' 
of the `true aims' of the association29. 
Examples of Associations 
The following table illustrates how three racist associations could justify their 
activities and admission policies based on the associational goods described above. 
Racist political 
party 
All White Church Racist private club 
Authenticity x X X 
Intimacy - X X 
Personal 
Development 
x X X 
Expression x X ? 
Effective means to 
other goals 
x ? X 
The Racist (White) Political Party. This association might defend its right 
to exist, its practices and its membership criteria by virtue of four of the associational 
goods discussed above. First, they can claim that excluding non-white people is a 
29 Cf. Rosenblum, Membership and Morals, Chapter 3. 
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necessary condition of being a racist party: associations sometimes demand would- 
be members pass a `screening' process. If they accept people who do not satisfy a 
basic members' profile the `viability' of the association might be jeopardised30. In 
this example, if a racist party accepts non-white people it would cease to be a racist 
white party. Second, they can argue that the association's goal is to promote and 
advance their members' conception of the good, such that living their lives according 
to their own principles is best achieved by being part of such an association. Third, 
they can claim that their personal moral development is triggered by the cooperation 
and solidarity of belonging to an association whose goals and principles they share. 
Fourth, they can assert that the party protects important expressive goods. One the 
one hand, it propagates their shared conception of the good in the public sphere; on 
the other, it serves as an exploration of their views and beliefs by, for instance, 
organising conferences, holding debates, inviting speakers and so on. Finally, the 
members of this party can also argue that it is an important and effective medium of 
achieving their political goals and for establishing their views in the electoral 
agenda 31 
The all-White Racist Church/Cult. What reasons (if any) can a church 
provide in order to defend its right to exclude people on the basis of race, and to 
legitimise its practices? Similar to the political party, the church can appeal to 
authenticity goods. They can argue that their religious beliefs impose a duty on them 
30 For a critical discussion of the `viability' test (regarding special exemptions in education to the 
Amish in the Pennsylvania) see Rosenblum, Membership and Morals. 94-8. 
31 It is not clear whether a political party can appeal to intimacy. Usually they are large associations 
with annual meetings and not too intense interaction among ordinary members. 
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to act according to their racist principles32. They can assert that there are intimate 
goods that their association protects (usually members of churches have lots of face- 
to-face interaction: they organise socials, masses, and charity programs. They also 
usually befriend each other and offer support, friendship and company). Although 
the intensity of interaction varies from church to church (ranging from `totalistic' 
religions `which immerse members in the organisation and take up every moment of 
their lives'33 to a more relaxed ones), religious life almost always comprises of levels 
of intimacy and fellowship. Third, members of this church can appeal to their 
personal development: churches promote cooperation and solidarity among 
coreligionists. Another important ground on which churches can claim protection is 
that of the expressive goods that churches are said to protect. As Stuart White writes: 
`where an association's primary purposes concern the exploration and/or propagation 
of distinctive religious and/or philosophical beliefs, the right of association members 
to exclude specifically to protect association's distinctive beliefs has an especially 
strong presumption of legitimacy'34. They are the keepers of the religious doctrine 
they represent, and an important function is that of disseminating this across 
society. 
35 
The all-White Racist Private Club. This is the paradigmatic example of an 
association promoting intimacy. Just as I have a right to invite to my birthday party 
32 Some people argue that religious associations and religious practices deserve special protection 
(compared to non-religious ones) because religion imposes special duties on people. Cf. Greenawalt. 
'Religious Association': Paul Bou-Habib, 'A Theory of Religious Accommodation', Journal of 
Applied Philosophy, 23 (2006). 109-26. 
33 Rosenblum, Membership and Morals, 98. 
34 White, 'Freedom of Association and the Right to Exclude', 385. 
35 I do not think religious associations are merely instrumental to other goals, unless one considers 
them to be means for salvation. In general, religious activities are described as ends in themselves. 
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whoever I want (and for my own reasons), so private clubs appeal to a right of 
intimacy that makes it `permissible for people to practice whatever pattern of 
exclusion they like'36. In Roberts v Jaycees37, Justice Brennan holds that intimate 
associations are highly selective; they require seclusion from others in critical 
aspects of the relationship' and `congeniality is essential to their purposes'38. Stuart 
White nuances the idea of intimacy by defining two requirements that intimate 
associations must satisfy. First, he argues that `there must be a strong and mutual 
familiarity, ordinarily grounded in regular, intensive, "face-to-face" interaction, 
between more or less all the organisation members'. Second, `the pursuit and 
enjoyment of intimacy-related goods, such as friendship and love, must be the 
organisation's primary associative purpose'39. Because goods of intimacy are related 
to authenticity the private club can also appeal to the latter in order to exclude others. 
In a similar fashion, personal development can also be fostered by the solidarity and 
cooperation of fellowship and camaraderie. 
Whether the private club can appeal to expressive goods is more 
controversial. It is obvious that there are likely to be expressive activities within the 
36 White, `Freedom of Association and the Right to Exclude', 386. 
3' Roberts v Jaycees, 468 U. S. 409, (1984). `Apellee United States Jaycees is a nonprofit national 
membership corporation whose objective, as stated in its bylaws, is to pursue such educational and 
charitable purposes as will promote and foster the growth and development of young men's civic 
organizations... Two local chapters in Minnesota have been violating the bylaws for several years by 
admitting women as regular members, and, as a result, have had a number of sanctions imposed on 
them by appellee, including denying their members eligibility for state or national office. When these 
chapters were notified by appellee that revocation of their charters was to be considered, members of 
both chapters filed discrimination charges with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, alleging 
that the exclusion of women from full membership violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act'. 
38 Gutmann, 'Freedom of Association', 9; Greenawalt, `Religious Association', 113. Justice Brennan 
agreed with the court in their ruling that the Minnesota Jaycees accepting women as full members was 
not a violation of Jaycees freedom of association. Justice O'Connor ruled out the Jaycees 
discriminatory policy by defining them as `public accommodation', that is, she denied that the 
Jaycees protected intimate goods. See, Roberts v Jaycees, see also Rosenblum, `Compelled 
Association'. 
39 White, 'Freedom of Association and the Right to Exclude', 390. 
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club, they probably make racist jokes and informally discuss racist science. 
However, they do not have expressive purposes targeted at the public agenda: they 
are not a `voice' in the public arena. In this case there might be a conflict between 
intimacy and expression: insofar as they define themselves primarily as an intimate 
association their expressive claims are weakened, if they define the organisation as a 
`voice' their intimate character becomes less strong. Similarly, their intimate 
character makes more difficult for them to become a means to another goal. 
II 
A Theory of Free Association 
The `Moral Uses of Pluralism' 
In this section I will examine Nancy Rosenblum's theory of freedom of association, 
or as she calls it the `moral uses of pluralism'40. In her book, she develops an 
emphatic defence of private associations based on the effects that `associational life 
has on the moral dispositions of members personally and individually 41' 
Associational life, she argues, is of fundamental importance because it promotes and 
encourages cooperation, autonomy, and self-respect. Albeit different, these goods are 
related to the associational ones identified in the first part of this chapter. The 
capacity for cooperation is an important component of personal development and, 
presumably contributes towards living an authentic life. Autonomy, understood as 
40 The theory is developed at length in Rosenblum, Membership and Morals. A shorter and sketchier 
statement is presented in her `Compelled Association'. 
4 Rosenblum. Membership and Morals, 3-4. 
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self-rule, overlaps, in several respects, with authenticity. Similarly, it seems that in 
many cases the development of autonomy requires a person to be able to form 
intimate bonds and relationships. The capacity for self-respect must figure in the 
value of authenticity, intimacy and personal development in the sense that in many 
instances, the value of intimate relations are conditional to fostering (or at least 
insofar as they do not threaten) self-respect. 
Based on Rawls's `morality of association' 42, Rosenblum argues that moral 
development arises when 
members come to appreciate that the group's system of cooperation requires a 
variety of actions and points of view, and they learn to take on the perspectives 
of others. Ties of friendly feeling and trust are generated as they see that others 
intend to do their share. As individuals become attached to these arrangements 
and develop mutual confidence, they are motivated to comply with the 
obligations of membership and to live up to the ideals of their station. Qua 
members, they learn to habitually overcome the vices that impede 
cooperation43 
The link between moral development and cooperation is further expanded by the 
effects of association participation on individuals' self-respect. According to the 
`moral uses of pluralism', self-respect is `inseparable from actual participation in an 
association's ends, an affirmation of the worth of an individual to a particular group 
will depend on internal assessment of his or her usefulness'44. These three goods, she 
insists, make associational life a cornerstone of a liberal society, and provide 
stringent reasons for protecting associations' activities. 
42 Rawls, A Theoný of Justice, § 71,409-13. 
43 Rosenblum, Membership and Morals, 50-1. 
44 Ibid. 62. 
? 44 
CHAPTER 6 Free Association, Public Ecology, and Free Speech 
According to the `moral uses of pluralism', liberal theory is typically overly 
optimistic about the effects of freedom of association on liberal democracy: there is a 
leading proposition in political theory and public policy, Rosenblum argues, which 
holds that `the relation between civil society (that is, our associational life) and 
liberal democracy is, or must be, reciprocally supportive; that liberal democratic 
character and commitment must find their origin and vital complement in an array of 
independent groups'45. This idea of liberal congruence is rejected by the `moral uses 
of pluralism' for two reasons. 
First, there is no reason to suppose that associations will enforce the values of 
liberal democracy. In a plural society, Rosenblum argues, associations praise many 
different conceptions of the good that may be incompatible with those of liberalism. 
Associations may encourage undemocratic and illiberal practices46: racism, sexism, 
xenophobia, aristocracy, hierarchy, and machismo among many others. There is no 
reason to suppose that within a liberal society, the so-called civic sphere will 
necessarily reproduce the values liberals praise47. However, the fact that associations 
are illiberal does not preclude them from contributing to the moral development of 
their members. So, rather than focusing on the effects that associations have on 
democracy (and on society in general), the `moral uses of pluralism' insists that we 
should value to the effects they have on the development of members `personally 
and individually' 
45 Ibid. 10. Emphasis added. 
46 Provided they satisfy the constraints discussed above, that is, they do not violate the basic rights of 
non-members (and probably members), they right to exit is effective, entrance is voluntary and they 
do not enforce criminal law. 
4' Cf. Yael Tamir, 'Revisiting the Public Sphere', in Gutmann, A. (ed. ) Freedom of Association 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1998), 214-38. 
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It seems that if the government were to impose liberal practices all the way 
down its attempts would fail on two grounds. First, it would `fail the fundamental 
test of treating its citizens as free and reasonable beings who have the right and 
responsibility to decide what kind of associational life is most conducive to their 
own well-being and well-being of their society'48. Second, it is likely that 
governmental intervention renders the `moral uses of pluralism' self-defeating: in 
order to derive the benefits of cooperation and self-esteem members need to feel that 
the association is in an important sense `theirs', that is, that they are participating on 
their own terms. It seems difficult to deliver the benefits of association (in terms of 
moral development) by governmental engineering 49 
Rosenblum's defence of free association is essentially maximalist; she 
suggests that the benefits of associations outweigh the harmful effects. This is clear 
in the subject of exclusion, in which the `moral uses of pluralism' suggests 
associations can legitimately exclude provided that certain conditions are met. In 
addition to the general constraints outlined above, Rosenblum suggests that many 
forms of exclusion are acceptable insofar as they do not entail second-class 
citizenship. In her discussions on the Jaycees case, Rosenblum argues that, by 
forcing the Jaycees to accept women as full members, the court was endorsing the 
view (which she rejects) that `second-class membership in this sort of voluntary 
48 Gutmann, `Freedom of Association', 22-3. 
41' This is an empirical claim: it could be that moral development is less likely to occur if enforced 
from 'above'. It could also be that moral development is essentially a by-product of other activities, 
and therefore impossible to orchestrate deliberatively. Examples of activities that are essential by- 
products are discussed in Elster, Sour Grapes, Chapter 2. This claim seems too strong. There is no 
reason to assume that government attempts to promote moral development through associations is 
completely doomed to failure (although, it is possible that members will develop to a lesser extent 
than if left to associate in their own terms). A third possibility is that the value of development is 
conditional upon associations being independent from government. If this is the case, Rosenblum has 
not argued for this stronger claim. Unfortunately, it is not clear which of this three claims `the moral 
uses of pluralism' defends. 
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association implies second-class citizenship tout court'50. In essence her claim is that 
public standing and membership are independent; that arbitrary discrimination does 
not compromise equal public standing. Rosenblum goes so far as to claim that the 
`moral uses of pluralism' offers forms of self-respect that are incommensurable with 
the same good when distributed by public institutions 51 
Moreover, Rosenblum argues that other forms of membership can 
compensate for the costs of exclusion. The strategy is similar to the `more, better 
speech' approach discussed in Chapter 5. Whatever the damages of exclusion, the 
legitimate remedy for government is to establish new forms of associations, rather 
than force exclusionary ones to modify their admissions criteria. She seems to 
suggest that forcing associations to accept otherwise excluded members will not 
benefit anyone. On the one hand, existing members need some sort of `gatekeeping' 
in order to retain control over their own affairs52. On the other, would-be members 
will not benefit from association because compelled association might `impose[] 
heroic obligations on victims' 53. To illustrate, imagine that you are not wanted in a 
private school due to your religious beliefs, but that the government has forced the 
school to accept members of your faith. Attending the school knowing that everyone 
has been forced to accept you might be psychologically demanding. According to 
`the moral uses of pluralism', a better solution for the excluded group is to form an 
alternative association; women excluded from the Jaycees could form a women-only 
Jaycees type of association. Liberal governments are responsible for insuring the 
50 Rosenblum, `Compelled Association', 87. Emphasis added. 
51 Rosenblum, Membership and Morals. 62. 
52 Ibid. 64. 
53 Rosenblum, 'Compelled Association', 92. 
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background conditions that `facilitate the ceaseless formation of new associations' 54 
As she sums up: 
There is little reason to suppose that [... ] public policy should aim at mandating 
inclusiveness and eliminating rejections, dismissiveness, secretiveness, even 
discrimination despite the pain these cause those who are excluded [... ] The 
principal thing is that alternative associations are available for those alien or 
unwanted. And that associations do not keep their members captive or 
permanently cut off; that members have a real choice of discontinuing 
affiliation 55 
The second important argument against liberal congruence claims that the 
illiberal private practices and attitudes maintained within some associations will not 
spread to other spheres of society, and, in particular, not to the public domain in 
which individuals interact as equal citizens. So, according to Rosenblum, the main 
problem with the ideal of liberal congruence is that it assumes (without evidence) 
that `dispositions and practices shaped in one association spillover to other 
contexts' 56. Instead, the `moral uses of pluralism' believes that even if the racist 
private club promotes attitudes against black people among its members (by making 
jokes, discussing racist `science', etc), qua citizens they can still detach themselves 
from those beliefs and respect black people (qua citizens) in the public sphere. 
Liberals, she claims, adopt a simplistic `transmission belt', according to which the 
`formative effects' of private associations will be transmitted to the public sphere57. 
54 Rosenblum, Membership and Morals, 60. 
55 Ibid. 64. 
56 Ibid. 38. 
57 Ibid. 48. This transmission belt works for both `good' and `bad' effects. 
248 
CHAPTER 6 Free Association, Public Ecology, and Free Speech 
Rosenblum's argument against spillover effects holds that individuals `exercise 
[their] capacities for discrimination and moral adaptation all the time even among 
seemingly close situations. This includes a refined capacity to resist spillover' 58 
Moreover, Rosenblum asserts that the experience of pluralism enhances people's 
ability to make distinctions between spheres and to adjust their behaviour according 
to different expectations. She writes, `even if we are subject to (or inflict) prejudice, 
arbitrariness, or deference in one domain, we may be able to exhibit an iota of 
tolerance in public arenas of fairness in hiring. If spillover and reiteration were the 
only or principal dynamic, the confinement of attitudes, behaviour, and moral 
dispositions would be inconceivable' 59 
This argument, however, seems too strong. For we can object that spillover 
and reiteration effects need not be the only or principal dynamic processes in order 
to be significant for political morality. There well may be other process occurring, 
and, if at least some spillover takes place, we need to assess the degree at which it 
jeopardises citizens' ability to exercise their sense of justice. 
To sum up, the `morality of association' holds that associational life 
encourages cooperation, which triggers the moral development of members. 
Associational life also operate as `compensation to disappointed social and political 
expectations' 60 by providing an environment in which groups of excluded 
individuals can form their own associations, and where they too can then get the 
benefits of the `moral uses of pluralism'. In this sense it counterbalances exclusions 
suffered in other spheres. Additionally, freedom of association enhances the capacity 
58 Ibid. 49. Italics in original. 
59 Ibid. 
-50. 60 Ibid. 64. 
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of moral agents to discriminate among contexts and behave accordingly. For 
instance, one can make racist comments at home or at the club, but not in the street 
or at school. 
Regarding the costs of associations and exclusions the `moral uses of 
pluralism' claims that spillover effects do not occur61, that government should not 
enforce liberal practices without compromising the very goods that associations 
protect, and that second-class membership is independent from second-class 
citizenship. The only conditions required for this to be upheld is that governments 
guarantee a pluralist environment favourable to the formation of new associations, 
that existing associations respect the right (and the possibility) of exit of members 
and that no basic rights are violated. 
The `Moral Uses of Pluralism': A Critique 
Rosenblum's dismissal of the spillover effects of private attitudes in the public 
sphere, along with the important value she allocates to associational goods, leads her 
to underestimate the costs of associational life on society and to somewhat 
overestimate the benefits on members' lives. The impact of associations affects not 
only on their members' lives, but society in general. We need a more refined 
understanding of social conditions that enhance citizens' moral development (both 
members and non-members). 
Rosenblum does not link democratic private associations and liberal 
democracy because she believes there is no guarantee private associations that are 
61 Or at least that we should not expect them to happen. 
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conducted by democratic practices will democratise the public sphere. For this 
reason, she argues that freedom of association must only be concerned with the 
experience of pluralism, taking as a `metric' of success how much associations 
contribute to their member's abilities to cooperate. However, this line of reasoning 
seems too short-sighted. The ability of a racist club to enhance cooperation among 
its members is a short-term effect, which needs to be balanced against other long- 
term, enduring changes in society. For example, society's attitudes about racism may 
change if racist clubs are protected and/or people discriminated against on racist 
grounds might lose (even more) power, becoming (even more) disadvantaged. A 
problem with the `moral uses of pluralism' is that it is myopic to all these long-term 
effects. 
Rosenblum is worried about the social ecology of private associations. She 
argues that government must keep interference to a minimum, and that it must 
promote a wide range of plural associations. Nevertheless, it seems arbitrary to focus 
only on the social ecology of associations and not on their public ecology. This 
problem is also reflected in Rosenblum's solution to the problem of exclusions. 
Although she might be right that building a net of associations for disadvantaged 
groups could counterbalance injustices suffered through exclusion, she does not 
show why this is the best solution. Her argument again does not extend further than 
the claim that cooperation is fundamental to the moral development of members and 
that costs are somewhat negligible. It may well be the case that a more efficient way 
to neutralise the bad effects of certain associations could be to restrict their freedom 
to engage in certain activities (namely, those that are too costly to non-members). In 
order to neutralise the costs of an all-White Church (such as the change of attitudes 
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about non white persons, discrimination, and so on) for instance, it is possible, and 
perhaps probable, that forming an alternative church or a support group for excluded 
people excluded will not sufficiently counterbalance those costs. It is likely that 
restricting some of the all-White Church practices would to be more effective. 
Restrictions on admissions policies seem to be especially costly to citizens 
who are prevented from joining racist associations. It could be objected that the costs 
they face can be reduced insofar as there are alternative (non racist) associations 
which they could form. According to some, this response must acknowledge that 
there is a loss; that in one aspect the lives of racists go worse by the prohibition of 
racist associations. Although internalising the costs might be justified (given the 
impact these groups have in society), perhaps racists should be compensated for their 
being worse off62. 
This objection is not convincing. First, one could conditionalise the interests 
a person has in joining an association, stating that associational goods are conditional 
on associations being just. According to this response, the moral development 
achieved within a racist association has no weight. In this respect, the `deficit' in 
moral development suffered by racists is only prima facie. 
A second, more modest, response holds that the moral development that 
associations facilitate is not `tied' to any particular association being available. 
Following Raz's idea that autonomy requires an adequate range of options, the 
absence of a particular association may not be detrimental to a person achieving the 
goods that associations offer if there are others available. It is difficult to see why the 
goods delivered by fox-hunting associations cannot be also delivered by drag- 
02 Cf. Chapter 4 in relation to speakers' interest in having hate-speech protected. 
252 
CHAPTER 6 Free Association, Public Ecology, and Free Speech 
hunting associations. This is another aspect in which Rosenblum overestimates the 
goods of associations. Associational freedom might be significantly beneficial to 
members, but it does not follow that the goods of having the option to become a 
member of any particular association is similarly significant63. 
This recognises that there is a loss, but one which can be redressed by 
alternative options. Another response would be to conditionalise the interest a person 
has in joining an association, stating that associational goods are conditional on such 
groups not being unjust. 
However, it could still be argue that society should bear the long-term costs 
of associations on the basis that public policy must be concerned only with public 
attitudes and not with private beliefs and practices. This idea takes us to the core of 
Rosenblum's argument: the rejection of spillover effects. As noted above, 
Rosenblum holds that we have a refined capacity to discriminate between contexts. 
Thus, privately held beliefs and prejudices will not spillover into public life. 
Although this is an attractive idea, there is an important collection of evidence that 
suggest Rosenblum is far too optimistic about our mental control. 
Rosenblum writes that `the logic of [liberal] congruence does not come 
automatically equipped with a social or psychological dynamics to explain why 
dispositions cultivated in one association can be expected to be stable and 
transmitted to other spheres'64. It is true that liberalism itself does not provide a 
psychological theory that explains why spillover sometimes happens. However, 
research over the past 20 years has shown that much of our behaviour is caused by 
automatic unconscious responses rather than acts of will. Many of these findings 
63 Thanks to Matthew Clayton for this suggestion. 
64 Rosenblum, Membership and Morals, 38. 
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suggest that attitudes cultivated in one sphere are likely to spillover into other 
spheres, bypassing the agent's control. 
As we have discussed in past chapters, there is a significant amount of 
evidence to support this claim. These responses occur regularly, and are directly 
caused by the environment. Automatic behaviours include not only bodily 
movements, but also the pursuit of goals. In general, it does not matter whether 
individuals are aware of the stimuli that cause their behaviour. Although automatic 
responses are not unavoidable, in most cases they are incontrollable. Neutralising 
automatic behaviour requires significantly more mental resources than people 
usually have at their disposal. 
A significant portion of automatic behaviour is related to `implicit 
associations'. As Greenwald and Banaji write `the signature of implicit cognition is 
that traces of past experience affect some performance, even though the influential 
earlier experience is not remembered in the usual sense -that is, it is unavailable to 
self-report or introspection' 65. For instance, some individuals were presented with 
the task of generating complete words in response to an incomplete series of letters 
and word fragments. The answers given were most commonly words from a list to 
which these persons had been exposed to previously (with or without their 
awareness)66. In another experiment, some individuals were shown two series of 
letters. They were asked to press a button when both series formed actual words (e. g. 
CAR/HOUSE), and a different button when at least one did not (e. g. 
APPLE/KUPOD). Interestingly individuals took longer to recognise words that were 
65 Anthony Greenwald and Mahzarin Banaji. 'Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and 
Stereotypes', Psychological Review, 102 (1995), 4. 
66 Ibid. 4. 
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unrelated (e. g. BREAD/NURSE, BUTTER/DOCTOR) than words that were related 
(e. g. BREAD/BUTTER, NURSE/DOCTOR) 67 
Another component of implicit social cognition, as we have reviewed, is 
social stereotypes: `a cognitive structure that contains the perceiver's knowledge, 
beliefs, and expectancies about some human group'68. As noted above, in Western 
societies black people are associated with laziness, aggression, rhythm, low 
intelligence and poverty among others traits. White people, in contrast, are 
associated with being intelligent, clean and successful. Gender stereotypes relate 
women with dependency and underachievement, while males are related with 
aggressiveness and success69. Not surprisingly, Greenwald and Banaji report that 
readers of academic essays assume that the best essays have been written by men 
rather than women70. 
There is an important body of evidence which suggest that even people who 
describe themselves as being low-prejudiced71 behave according to the stereotype 
under certain circumstances. This is caused by the automatic and implicit elements 
of stereotype activation, just as other representation stereotypes become 
automatically activated when features of the social group are perceived. In an 
67 John Dovidio, Nancy Evans and Richard Tyler, 'Racial Stereotypes: The Contents of Their 
Cognitive Representations', Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 22 (1986), 23. Another 
example of implicit associations is the `halo effect' discussed in Chapter 2. 
68 Hamilton, D. and Trolier, T., `Stereotypes and Stereotyping: An Overview of the Cognitive 
Approach', in Gaertner, S. and J. Dovidio, (eds. ) Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism (New York: 
Academic Press, 1986), 133. Quoted by Greenwald and Banaji, 'Implicit Social Cognition', 15. 
69 Cf. Devine, `Stereotypes and Prejudice'; Greenwald and Banaji, `Implicit Social Cognition'. 
70 Greenwald and Banaji, `Implicit Social Cognition', 15. 
71 In this context being low prejudiced means to explicitly reject the content of the stereotype. There 
are several exercises that measure people's levels of prejudice. For instance, see John McConahay, 
Bettee Hardee, and Valerie Batts, `Has Racism Declined? It Depends upon Who's Asking and What 
is Asked', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25 (1981), 563-579. For discussion see: Devine, 
'Stereotypes and Prejudice'; Dovidio, Evans and Tyler, `Racial Stereotypes'; Dovidio, Kawakami, et. 
al.. 'On the Nature of Prejudice'; Dovidio and Gaertner, 'Aversive Racism'. Irwin Katz and Glen Hass, 
'Racial Ambivalence and American Conflict Value: Correlational and Priming Studies of Dual 
Cognitive Structures', Journal of Personality, and Social Psychology, 55 (1988), 893-905. 
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experiment Dovidio and his colleagues72 primed subjects with schematic faces of 
Black and White people. The faces were flashed for a fraction of a second so that the 
subjects were not aware of it. Later they had to pair a string of letters ('PPPPPP'- a 
supposed cue for persons -or 'HHHHH'- a supposed cue for houses) that were 
used as distractors with positive ('good', `kind' and `trustworthy') or negative traits 
('bad', 'cruel', 'untrustworthy'). The results show that people primed with faces of 
African-Americans reacted faster to negative traits than to positive ones, and that 
when they were primed with White faces they reacted in the opposite fashion. This is 
because negative traits are associated with Blacks, and the positive traits with 
Whites. The races are stereotyped. It is noticeable that the results obtain 
independently of whether people were low- or high-prejudiced toward Blacks. As 
Devine writes `priming will automatically activate the cultural stereotype for both 
those high and low in prejudice'73. It is not only racial or gender stereotypes that 
elicit automatic responses: people primed with words related to the elderly walked 
slower than neutral controls74, and people asked to think about `intelligent' 
stereotypes (such as university professors) did better at general knowledge tasks than 
people who thought about `stupid' stereotypes (such as football hooligans)75. As 
noted above these findings have generated the idea of `aversive racism' -the notion 
that people who endorse egalitarian, non-prejudiced beliefs suffer from mental 
72 Dovidio, Kawakami, et. al., 'On the Nature of Prejudice', Exp. 1. See also Devine, `Stereotypes and 
Prejudice', Exp 2. 
73 Devine, `Stereotypes and Prejudice', 5. Dijksterhuis and Bargh explain the dynamics of stereotype 
activation as follows: `the effects of stereotype activation in changes in overt behaviour can be 
explained by a series of steps. First, stereotypes activate associated traits. These traits, in turn, activate 
more concrete behaviour representations. Finally, these behaviour representations activate the motor 
programs responsible for actual behaviour'. Dijksterhuis and Bargh, `The Perception-Behavior 
Expressway', 24. 
7' Bargh, Chen, and Burrows. 'Automaticity of Social Behavior'; see also Chapter 2. 
75 John Bargh, 'The Cognitive Monster: The Case against the Controllability of Automatic Stereotype 
Effects', in Chaiken, S. and Y. Trope (eds. ) Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology (New York: 
Guildford Press, 1999), 374. 
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contamination and display negative feelings and beliefs towards people of other 
races. 
Another important collection of evidence suggests that a similar, automatic 
mechanism operates regarding goal-oriented behaviour. They are also mental 
representations (just as stereotypes and concepts) capable of become automatically 
activated76. For instance, a group of students were presented with two l OX 10 
matrices of letters with some words hidden in them. Matrix 1 contained some words 
related to high performance such as 'win', 'compete', 'succeed', 'master', as well as 
some neutral words, such as `lamp', building', and so on. Matrix 2 had the same 
neutral words but those related to high performance were substituted for other 
neutral words ('carpet', `river', `robin'). Not surprisingly, students assigned to 
Matrix 1 performed significantly better than those assigned to Matrix 2. The idea of 
this experiment was to activate the goal to perform well without students' 
awareness77. It seems to have succeeded. 
A person regularly making the same choice in a particular situation develops 
a tendency to employ the same mental processes, which, in turn, leads to a removal 
of the conscious role in the process78. Think about the process of driving a car. It is 
by repeating the same action in particular situations many times (pressing the clutch 
pedal - changing the gear - releasing the clutch pedal slowly - pressing the 
76 John Bargh, Peter Gollwitzer, et. al., 'The Automated Will: Nonconscious Activation and Pursuit of 
Behavioral Goals'. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 81 (2001), 1015. 
77 Ibid. Exp. 1,1016-7. 
78 See diagram in Tanya Chartrand and John Bargh 'Automatic Activation of Impression Formation 
and Memorization Goals: Nonconscious Goal Priming Reproduces Effects of Explicit Task 
Instructions', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71 (1996), 469. 
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accelerator pedal) that the entire process becomes automatic; experienced drivers do 
not need to focus their attention on this process79. 
An important feature of automatic goal activation is that it produces the same 
behaviour as goals performed at will. In this sense, automatic behaviour bypasses 
about the source of activation; once the mechanism is activated it will produce the 
same conduct80. For instance, in another experiment, Bargh and his colleagues8' 
activated the goal of cooperation in some students by using the Scrambled Sentence 
Test (the priming words used were 'dependable', 'helpful', 'support', `reasonable', 
`honest', `cooperative', `fair', `friendly', `tolerant' and `share'). Later, they had to 
undertake a resource-dilemma task against a presumed other player82. They were to 
catch fish (that had to be replenished periodically) from a common pool. Every turn 
they had the option of keeping all the fish they had caught or returning some to the 
lake. In the game's instructions, some students were told that they had to cooperate 
so that the common pool was not depleted. Results show that people who were 
primed to cooperate, returned almost as many fish (31.1) as the students who were 
explicitly told to do so (32.1). People who were both primed and told to cooperate 
returned more than all the others (35.1). In contrast, students who were neither 
primed nor told to cooperate returned the least (24.9). After the experiment, when 
students were asked to report about their willingness to cooperate those primed did 
not mention that they had such a goal. These 
79 This mechanism is not `habit' as conceptualised by classical behaviourist theory, but `instead is 
behaviour that is flexibly responding to environmental events as they unfold in the ongoing situation'. 
Bargh, Gollwitzer, et. al., 'The Automated Will: Nonconscious Activation and Pursuit of Behavioral 
Goals', 1025. 
80 Chartrand and Bargh, The Chameleon Effect', 476. 
81 Bargh, Gollwitzer, et. al., 'The Automated Will: Nonconscious Activation and Pursuit of Behavioral 
Goals'. Exp. 2. 
82 The game resembles a prisoner's dilemma: the best outcome for both is to cooperate, but the 
rational individual action is not to cooperate. 
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findings suggest that nonconscious-goal effects on behaviour do not require the 
individual to become consciously aware of the fact that this goal is being 
pursued in the situation. They also support the notion that participants who are 
unaware of the activation of nonconscious goals will remain unaware of their 
subsequent operation to guide behaviour83. 
How does all this evidence relate to the `moral uses of pluralism'? In her 
criticisms of the idea of liberal congruence, Nancy Rosenblum rejects the view 
which holds that `the relation between civil society (that is, our associational life) 
and liberal democracy is, or must be, reciprocally supportive' 84. This claim has two 
different parts. One is a normative assertion, and will be addressed in the next 
section. The other is an empirical one. In contrast to it, the evidence surveyed above 
provides reason to suspect that spillover effects are likely to happen85. Even if the 
evidence here is not definitive, we have a prima facie reason to doubt Rosenblum's 
optimism about the ability of individuals to compartmentalise and contain their racist 
attitudes in private. It seems we do not have the capacity to control our behaviour to 
this extent, and we cannot make the successful context-sensitive discriminations that 
she assumes possible. For there are situational features in the environment that 
trigger responses, of which we are not aware, and usually do not control. As 
discussed in previous chapters, neutralising mental contamination 86 requires a 
significant amount of mental resources. And even with this there is no guarantee of 
83 Bargh, Gollwitzer, et. al., 'The Automated Will: Nonconscious Activation and Pursuit of Behavioral 
Goals', 1024. 
84 Rosenblum, Membership and Morals. 10. 
85 In the next section I will defend the view that there are normative reasons to support a form of 
congruence. 
86 Mental contamination is defined subjectively as people reacting in ways they would not approve. 
Cf. Wilson and Brekke, `Mental Contamination and Mental Mediation'; see also Chapter 2. 
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success. A preferred alternative might be to control exposure to contaminating 
factors. 
Features in the environment activate automatic behaviour, and we do not 
control this. We are as likely to respond in a way `X' to stimulus `A' whether it 
happens in public or in private. People who associate Blacks with negative features 
and display negative attitudes towards them will do so in both spheres, because we 
do not come equipped with a public/private discrimination device (as Rosenblum 
implies we do). These findings suggest that we must be more vigilant about the 
ecology of speech and association, and about socialisation processes not only in 
children (who are very vulnerable87) but in adults too. Given the problems posed by 
mental contamination, it seems that we have an interest in not being exposed to 
certain stimuli that at some other point of our lives will cause behaviour we would 
regret. These problems highlight the harmful costs of spillover effects, not only to 
direct targets of racial stereotypes and racist- and gender-based exclusions, but to 
other members of society too. Although mental contamination (presumably) will not 
affect a person who is more likely to join a racist club, church or political party, it 
affects a large number of citizens by setting the environmental conditions that 
trigger, for instance, aversive racism. In this sense the creation and maintenance of 
racist institutions that produce, reproduce and pass on racial stereotypes and attitudes 
posses a direct threat to the moral development of an important section of the 
population. 
87 Young children are cognitively vulnerable in that, for instance, they have not yet fully developed 
the structures that allow rejecting propositions likely (Cf. Gilbert, `How Mental Systems Believe'). 
Also, they have yet to reach a minimal threshold of autonomy. Cf. Clayton, Justice and Legitimacy in 
Upbringing. 
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The argument I develop here highlights another shortcoming of the `moral 
uses of pluralism'. Rosenblum believes that the primary element of a person's moral 
devolopment is the ability and willingness to cooperate with other members of one's 
association. Although this surely is an important element, it is not a complete. As 
noted above, citizens have fundamental interests in developing and exercising a 
sense of justice and in devising, reviewing, and pursuing a reasonable conception of 
the good. These interests motivate a normative claim regarding the public ecology of 
associational freedoms, and support the claim that a modest version of liberal 
congruence is appealing. In the next section, I will develop this view. 
III 
Public Reason, and Reasonable Association 
In this section I will discuss an idea of freedom of association constrained by the 
notion of reasonableness. In this sense, I address Rosenblum's claim that liberal 
congruence is normatively inappropriate. The main claim I will defend is that 
restricting associations on grounds of reasonableness better protects the associational 
goods described in the first section. Like Rosenblum, the view I will defend begins 
by acknowledging the fact of pluralism, and the effects it has on the moral 
development of citizens. However, in sharp contrast, my argument for reasonable 
association takes a wider view by recognising the ecological effects of pluralism on 
society, and not only those on an association's members. 
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The notion of reasonableness emanates from acknowledging that we live in a society 
deeply divided by different comprehensive and incompatible doctrines of the good. 
People hold different ideas about the value of life, the sources of morality, our place 
in the universe, the nature of religion, and so on. A characteristic feature of this 
pluralism is that different doctrines are incompatible. There is no (more 
comprehensive) doctrine that accommodates them all. Pluralism is a fact that can be 
neither ignored nor fought. As Rawls states, it must be assumed that it `is the normal 
result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions 
of a constitutional democratic regime' 88 
Rawls argues that there is a constraint on the plurality of comprehensive 
doctrines to which public justification is required: pluralism must be reasonable. 
Reasonable persons have two basic features. First, reasonableness involves a 
dimension of reciprocity, according to which persons are willing to engage in 
practices the rules of which no one could reasonably reject89. According to Rawls, 
`[p]ersons are reasonable in one aspect when, among equals say, they are ready to 
propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them 
willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so'90. Reasonable persons 
not only are moved by self-interest, they also seek for its own sake to cooperate with 
others in terms all can accept91. So, being reasonable imposes a demand to recognise 
others as free and equal. Citizens are free in the sense that a) they can exercise their 
88 Rawls, Political Liberalism, xviii. 
89 Cf. Scanlon. What We Owe to Each Other, 191-7. 
90 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 49 
91 Ibid. 50. 
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moral powers (see below), b) they are self-authenticated source of valid claims92 
and, c) they are responsible for their ends, and capable of adjusting these ends in 
light of demands of justice 93 
Reasonable persons, must also, be willing to accept the `burdens of 
judgement'94. The burdens of judgement explain (together with the free exercise of 
reason) the sources of the plurality of doctrines in our societies. When we 
contemplate, say, the existence of God, the demands of morality, the meaning of life, 
the virtues of nuclear power stations, or the case for animal rights, there are many 
different considerations that must be taken into account. The burdens of judgment 
include, among other things, the complexity of evidence and the hardness of 
assessing it (both practically and theoretically), the disagreement about the relative 
weight of different considerations, the problem of conceptual vagueness and the 
existence of difficult, borderline cases, the manner and degree in which our personal 
experience influence our attitudes towards certain values rather than others, and so 
on95. The burdens of judgement explain why different people reach different 
reasonable doctrines when considering these issues. It is important to note that 
reasonable persons tolerate diverse views because they believe that such plurality is 
the outcome of the free exercise of reason, and also because they desire to engage 
with others on fair terms of cooperation (according to which people must be able to 
exercise their reason freely), not because they lack the power to `convert' others to 
92 Ibid. 32. 
93 Ibid. 33-4. 
94 Ibid. 54-8. 
95 Ibid. 56-7. Rawls also writes: `Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal 
in a system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms of 
cooperation according to what they consider the most reasonable conception of political justice; and 
when they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular situations, 
provided that other citizens also accept those terms'. Rawls, `The Idea of Public Reason Revisited', 
136. 
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their own views. Similarly, reasonable persons do not regret the fact of reasonable 
pluralism. While the first aspect of reasonableness involves a moral element 
(namely, the idea of reciprocity) the second aspect can be characterised as having an 
epistemic one. The idea of the reasonable is nicely displayed by Rawls: 
reasonable persons see that the burdens of judgment set limits on what can be 
reasonably justified to others, and so they endorse some form of liberty of 
conscience and freedom of thought. It is unreasonable for us to use political 
power, should we posses it, or share it with others, to repress comprehensive 
views that are not unreasonable96 
The demands of reasonableness, then, can be understood as the disposition to 
understand society as a fair system of cooperation, and to propose and honour fair 
terms of cooperation, between free and equal citizens97. These demands are derived 
from a view of citizens as free and equal and correspond to the fundamental moral 
powers that citizens are described to posses98. As noted above, citizens have two 
highest order interests (each corresponding to their `moral powers'). First, a person 
is interested in developing and exercising the capacity to understand, to apply, and to 
act from a conception of justice". Second, a person has also a fundamental interest 
in forming, revising and rationally pursuing a conception of the good. Individuals are 
also assumed to have, at any given time, a particular conception of the good, which 
raises another higher order interest (albeit one less fundamental than those 
mentioned above) in pursuing and advancing their own particular conception of the 
96 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 61. 
97 Cf. `... in attributing freedom equality and the basic moral powers to others a reasonable citizen 
thereby takes a series of commitments. She commits herself to beliefs and actions compatible with a 
respect for the other's basic moral powers' James Boettcher, What is Reasonableness', Philosophy and 
Social Criticism, 30 (2004), 606. 
98 Reasonableness is a disposition and not a moral power because it embodies a willingness to 
exercise those moral powers. Cf. Ibid. 604. 
99 Rawls, 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', 312. 
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good1°°. These powers entail the development and exercise of critical and 
deliberative capacities that are necessary in order to endorse a sense of justice and to 
develop, affirm and revise a conception of the good. Here is one of the important 
points at which the `moral uses of pluralism' and the approach I defend overlap: at 
the core of both there is a concern for the moral development of individuals. 
Public Reason 
Given the fact of pluralism, on what grounds can reasonable people reach an 
agreement (acceptable to them all) about the basic institutions of society? According 
to Rawls, in order to be acceptable citizens' political claims must be made in 
accordance with public reason'°1. 'The idea of public reason', writes Rawls, 
`specifies at the deepest level the basic moral and political values that are to 
determine a constitutional democratic government's relation to its citizens and their 
relation to one another' 102. The fundamental features of public reason are that it must 
present a political conception of justice not dependent on comprehensive doctrines 
and that it must satisfy the criterion of reasonableness discussed above 103. As noted 
in previous chapters, a political conception of justice is necessary given the fact of 
reasonable pluralism. Essentially, because individuals differ deeply in the doctrines 
they endorse, the only means of reaching an `overlapping consensus' 
104 is by 
presenting conceptions of justice that are independent ('freestanding', as Rawls 
'oo Ibid. 313. 
101 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 212-54; The Idea of Public Reason Revisited', 131-80. 
102 Rawls. `The Idea of Public Reason Revisited', 132. 
103 It is important not to confuse public reason with reasonableness; the latter is necessary. but not 
sufficient for the former. 
104 Rawls, Political Liberalism. Lecture IV. 
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writes) from the doctrines people endorse105 Political conceptions have three 
fundamental features: `they apply to the basic structure of society', `they can be 
presented independently from comprehensive doctrines', and `they can be worked 
out from fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a 
constitutional regime' 106 Citizens' political conceptions of justice must be 
reasonable in the sense stated above: they must satisfy the criterion of reciprocity 
and must accept the burdens of judgement107. To sum up, by satisfying these criteria 
public reason can form the basis for an overlapping consensus among free and equal 
citizens who hold different and incompatible reasonable comprehensive views. 
There are two important considerations regarding public reasons. The first 
concerns the subjects to whom it applies; the second concerns its scope. Public 
reasons, Rawls argues, binds only the `discourse of judges on their decisions [... ]; 
the discourse of government officials, especially chief executives and legislators; and 
finally, the discourse of candidates and their campaign managers' 108. Although other 
agents are free from the demands of public reason, Rawls still insists that `ideal 
citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators' 109 In this respect, 
citizens have a moral (not legal) duty to justify their decisions in terms of public 
reasons. 
105 Independence from comprehensive doctrines does not mean that political conceptions cannot 
appeal to any values. It implies that values directly dependent on the soundness (or truth) of 
comprehensive doctrines are eschewed. Nevertheless, political conceptions can (and surely must) 
appeal to political values. 
106 Rawls. `The Idea of Public Reason Revisited', 143. 
107 Cf. Rawls's `principle of liberal legitimacy'. Rawls writes that `our political power is fully proper 
only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free 
and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to 
their common human reason' Rawls, Political Liberalism, 137. 
108 Rawls, `The Idea of Public Reason Revisited', 133. 
109 Ibid. 135. 
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Second public reason is to be applied only to certain decisions. There is some 
ambiguity in Rawls's description of the scope of public reason' 10. On the one hand, 
the narrow view suggests that political liberalism 
strives[s] for publicly based justifications for questions regarding the 
constitutional essentials and basic questions of distributive justice but not in 
general for all the questions to be settled by the legislature within a 
constitutional framework. We should distinguish, then, between these two 
cases. The first attainable [... ] and desirable, the second neither attainable nor 
desirables ll 
It is unclear, however, why we should restrict public reason only to constitutional 
essentials and matters of basic justice. It seems that insofar as binding decisions are 
taken, those decisions must be justifiable to all reasonable citizens. We can concede 
that there is degree of urgency regarding constitutional essentials that the funding of 
art galleries might not have, but this is not a reason to conclude that non-essentials 
should not satisfy public reason. In this respect it seems a natural interpretation of 
Rawls's idea of legitimacy suggests a different, broad, view, according to which `the 
ideal of public reason ought to be applied, whenever possible, to all political 
decisions where citizens exercise coercive power over one another' 112. 
A possible objection to this broad view might be to claim that public reasons 
concern only decisions whose subject is the basic structure of society113 As noted in 
the first chapter, the nature of the basic structure might be interpreted in two 
1 10 Cf. Jonathan Quong, `The Scope of Public Reason', Political Studies, 52 (2004), 233-50. 
111 Rawls, Justice as Fair less, 91 n. 13. In contrast, in Political Liberalism, Rawls grants that the 
focus on constitutional essentials is the strongest case for public reasons. He suggests that once 
essentials are justified, then `it is usually desirable to settle political questions by invoking the value 
of public reason. Yet, this may not always be so'. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 215. 
112 Quong, `The Scope of Public Reason', 234. 
113 Here I return to some issues discussed in Chapter 1 
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different ways. The `coercive-based' interpretation claims that only coercive 
institutions are to be included. The `profound effects' interpretation, in contrast, 
suggests it is sufficient for institutions to have deep effects on citizens' lives in order 
to be the subject of political justice 114. The latter interpretation is appealing because 
it acknowledges that society's public ecology affects the kind of persons we are: it 
influences our ambitions, development of talents, the conceptions of the good we 
pursue, and the capacity for a sense of justice. In addition, institutions belonging to 
the public structure must provide public guidelines to citizens acting in good faith' 15 
One of the reasons liberalism values freedom of association is its capacity to 
deliver certain goods. These associational goods are valuable because they affect the 
moral development of citizens as well as their autonomy. Indeed, as I have 
suggested, this is the main reason we think that associations warrant special 
protection despite the harmful effects they might have on third parties. If we accept 
the profound effects reading of the basic structure, then we can include associations 
within it. Moreover, their belonging to the basic structure could explain why 
associational freedom is so important for liberalism. 
This is not to argue that principles of justices should directly rule the internal 
life of associations 116 There is a difference between the kind of reasons by which we 
justify the organisation of institutions and the principles by which they are 
governed 11 . 
Associations can produce admissions policies that are not themselves 
114 Cohen, 'Where the Action Is' 18. 
115 Cf. Chapter 1; Williams, `Incentives, Inequalities, Publicity'; Clayton, Justice, and Legitimacy in 
Upbringing, 35-40. 
116 Rawls, `The Idea of Public Reason Revisited', 158-9. 
117 Rawls does not think that justice as fairness is the only political conception of justice, nor that 
public reason gives a definite answer to all political problems. Regarding some issues it might be 
underdetermined or incomplete. This is no a reason, though, to reject the broad view. For an elegant 
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consistent with principles of justice but which have, nevertheless, been sanctioned by 
public reasons. Imagine, for instance, that we are forming a Symphonic Orchestra 
and we need to decide who can participate. After deliberation, we agree on a 
membership policy based exclusively on natural talents. Everyone wishing to be 
included must pass a `musical talents test' 118. Although the membership policy is, in 
some sense, inconsistent with the principles of justice, if the procedures for reaching 
that decision and its justification are based on public reasons, then it seems 
legitimate. 
Note, however, this does not validate racist decisions. The main problem is 
that it is difficult to imagine procedures consistent with public reason whose 
outcomes are racist policies. Moreover, it seems that any procedure which can 
produce such an unreasonable outcome can be questioned, and presumably rejected 
from the standpoint of public reason. 
Reasonable Association 
How does the argument developed in this section relate with the associational goods 
discussed at the beginning of the chapter? The important question is this: are there 
legitimate public reasons to which associations can appeal in order to restrict 
membership on racist grounds? To respond in the positive associations must show 
that their discriminatory practices are justified by a reasonable freestanding political 
conception of justice. In this respect, equality, rather than discrimination should be 
defence of public reason see Andrew Williams, `The Alleged Incompleteness of Public Reason', Res 
Publica, 6 (2000), 199-211. 
118 Assume for the sake of the argument that there is a machine which grades musical talent so that 
everyone who scores over eight can enter the Orchestra. 
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the rule. And any deviation from it must be publicly justifiable. The burden of the 
proof is on excluder, not on the excluded. 
Authenticity Reassessed. As noted above, citizens have a major interest in 
forming, revising and pursuing a conception of the good, and in living in accordance 
with their own convictions and ideals. Obviously, this interest does not grant an 
absolute right: authenticity is always constrained by the rights of others. Charles 
does not have a right to stab Manchester United fans merely because he wants to live 
according to his convictions. There are two ways in which we can understand this 
conflict. First, we can think that we must balance the authenticity of Charles's 
interests in stabbing Manchester United fans against those of his victims. In our 
conclusion, we would need to acknowledge that there is a loss in authenticity from 
Charles's point of view, but that this is justified by the protection of the interests of 
his victims. 
Another, more attractive, interpretation takes a different stand: it qualifies our 
rights by claiming that we have no right to be unreasonable. A person is 
unreasonable if she rejects any of the following claims: 1) `that political society 
should be a fair system of social cooperation for mutual benefit', 2) `that citizens are 
free and equal', and 3) `the fact of reasonable pluralism' 119. Under this interpretation, 
the conflict between Charles's authenticity and the interests of his victims is only 
prima facie: because Charles view is unreasonable there is no conflict to be 
balanced. Charles suffers no harm in being prevented from living according with his 
view. 
1 19 Jonathan Quong, `The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens', The Journal of Political Philosophy, 12 
(2004). 315. 
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If my argument is valid then racist claims based on authenticity grounds are 
excluded because they are unreasonable and costly to others (both to victims and to 
bystanders). The costs can be divided on costs to direct victims. Racist (as well as 
other exclusive) associations deprive victims of economic, social and political 
goods 120: they usually deny access to employment 121, pressure groups 122 
123 24 education, civic activities' , and so on. Racist associations are also costly to non- 
direct victims: as noted above, they create, enforce and transmit stereotypes that 
promote and sustain aversive racism. We, thus, have a prima facie clash of 
authenticity claims. On the one hand, there are racists who want to live according to 
their own views, and on the other, there are citizens who do not want to be racists, 
120 White discusses the goods that `categorical' exclusion has on victims. He, nevertheless, reaches a 
very different conclusion. He argues that expressive and intimate associations have `strong 
presumption of legitimacy' and can only be overridden when there is a risk of `profound material 
deprivation, e. g. starvation, or exclusion from a decent minimum of education'. White, `Freedom of 
Association and the Right to Exclude', 379 n. 11. 
121 For instance, anti-discrimination laws in the US forbid denying employment on grounds of race, 
gender, and so on. However, associations might be exempt if they discriminate on religious grounds 
or for expressive reasons. Cf. Rosenblum, Membership and Morals; Greenawalt, `Religious 
Association'. Also, exemptions can be granted to small businesses on the grounds that they are family 
businesses (and thus are protected by intimacy). Rosenblum, `Compelled Association', 89. But see 
Boy Scouts of America et. al. v Dale (99-699) 530 U. S. 640 (2000) in which the Court ruled out the 
attempt of the Boy Scouts to fire Dale because he was a homosexual. The court ruled that anti- 
discrimination law had precedent because Dale's homosexuality neither threatened the First 
Amendment rights of the Boy Scouts, nor significantly affected members' ability to carry out their 
purposes. 
22 The Jaycees case is a good example of how exclusion deprives people from networks and 
influential groups. 
123 Until recently, there were still segregated schools. Nowadays, racial segregation in schools has 
been banned. Cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160 (1976). For instance, Bob Jones University did 
not allow Black students to enrol until 1976, and until 2000 interracial dating was forbidden. 
http: //archives. cnn. com/2000/US/03/04/bob. jones/ [accessed 18/09/07]. But cf. Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 et. al. 551 U. S. 2007. 
124 Cf. N. Y City Ancient Order of Hibernian t'. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp 358 (1993) in which New York 
city's Irish Lesbian and Gay Organization were denied the right to participate in the St. Patrick's Day 
Parade. Also see. Welsh v. Boy Scouts, 993 F. 2d 1267 (1993). M. Welsh, a7 years old boy, was 
excluded from the Boy Scouts for refusing to express a belief in god. The court found that the Boy 
Scouts had a right to exclude him because believing in God was a fundamental part of the Boy 
Scout's value system. 
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but who behave as such without awareness. According to my argument, racists' 
claims have no force in virtue of being unreasonable12s 
Intimacy Reassessed. Liberalism authorises private spaces in which no 
intervention seems to be justified. These `brackets of privacy"26 involve the spheres 
of sex, marriage, close friends, family, and so on. It seems that here people can 
legitimately exclude for whatever reasons they so wish (or even for no reason at all). 
I can refuse to invite someone to my birthday party based on a whim, and without 
offering explanations to anyone. 
Is racist behaviour to be tolerated in intimate associations (for instance, think 
of someone whose choice of partner is driven by racist preferences)? The question is 
difficult to answer. On the one hand, it seems that, just as in the birthday party 
example, a person is free to choose intimate companionship for whatever reasons she 
wants. But, on the other hand, it also seems that if a person is to have a (reasonable) 
sense of justice she should act in accordance with it. If this is the case, then a person 
should have no right to choose sexual partners based on racist preferences. 
Nevertheless, there is additional problem because many times we cannot know 
whether we are making decisions based on racist views or not127. Consider the 
aversive racist: he sincerely believes that his behaviour is not racist, although it is. It 
seems that certain decisions (such as who to marry) are so complex and involve so 
many attitudes operating at different levels of awareness that it is difficult to provide 
125 It seems that even if we accept that citizens have a right to be unreasonable, the balance between 
racists and aversive racists would be inclined towards citizens who want to neutralise the effects of 
racism. 
126 I owe this phrase to Fabienne Peter. 
127 I do not mean to claim that we never know. It is clear that someone can disregard people from a 
certain race as a possible sexual partner. However, in most cases the dynamics of sexual attraction are 
too complex, and the ultimate reasons for our preferences might not be transparent to us. 
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a definitive answer. In this sense, we could say that, in certain aspects, racists are 
protected by the opaqueness of the mind128. 
There is an important caveat to this problem: families within the basic 
structure are obliged to educate children in a manner that facilitates the development 
129 of their moral powers . This puts parents under a duty not to educate their children 
in the context of a racist environment. This duty covers not only explicit opinions, 
but also implicit attitudes that children could learn. So, even though a person could 
choose her partner on racist grounds, once the pair have children they have a duty to 
control their racist (implicit and explicit) attitudes in order that their children's moral 
development not be distorted. Parenting rights are, in a sense, conditional. Parents 
must raise their children in a manner consistent with a reasonable conception of 
justice. Given that a child learns and imitates implicit attitudes of her parents, actual 
and would-be parents must behave in a way that does not reflect racism' 30 A person 
expecting a child has an important reason to avoid racist attitudes before he becomes 
a parent. Remember that controlling implicit attitudes is difficult, so a person who 
before having children displays racist attitudes will find it difficult to eradicate them 
once her children are born, thus making it less likely that she will use her parental 
rights properly. 
128 By opaqueness of the mind I mean that our minds are not transparent to us, the fact that some 
times we cannot know the reasons that cause our behaviour. Cf. Wilson, Strangers to Ourselves. I 
would tentatively say that I believe we have no right to act on racist preferences in these intimate 
spheres. But given that in many circumstances people just do not know whether they are acting on 
such preferences and attitudes (and given that it is difficult for external individuals to see whether 
someone is acting on racist grounds), people could not be penalised for choosing a partner on racist 
grounds. 
129 Cf. Chapter 1; Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family. Chapters 2,5. Matthew Clayton argues for 
the stronger claim that parents are bound to raise their children in accordance with public reason. 
Clayton, Justice and Legitimacv in Upbringing, 87-128 
130 Cf. Okin's view that families' internal life must be just in order children to develop a sense of 
justice. Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family, 97-101. 
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There seems to be a problem, however for private clubs here, which try to 
enforce racist membership policies, and justify those policies by appealing to 
intimacy. First, they cannot appeal to our minds' opaqueness because their 
membership policy is explicitly racist. They cannot say `I'm sorry, I just didn't know 
I was acting as a racist'. Second, it is doubtful that the brackets of privacy extend to 
social clubs. After all, they are institutions that have a public presence: they own 
buildings, they are formally integrated (in contrast with the birthday party), they 
have explicit codes of conduct and constitutions, they make claims on public funds 
through tax exemptions or subsidies, and so on. These features weaken these clubs' 
claims to intimacy and suggest they belong to the public sphere. If this is the case, 
then they are more constrained by public reasons and conditions of reasonableness 
than marriages, friends, etc. 
Moral Development Reassessed. This associational good is Nancy 
Rosenblum's main focus. I have criticised her for offering an overly narrow 
conception of moral development, according to which the most salient feature seems 
to be the ability to cooperate with members within one's voluntary associations. In 
other words, Rosenblum fails to accommodate sufficiently for the public ecology of 
associations. The argument I developed here shares the concern for the development 
of moral and critical capacities, but it avoids the flaws of Rosenblum's approach by 
focusing on citizens' moral development rather than that of members. Even though 
racist associates may genuinely foster capacities for cooperation and the self-esteem 
of members, my claim holds that moral development is conditional on being 
reasonable. In this respect I follow Dworkin, who, as discussed in Chapter 4. argues 
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that justice is a parameter of living well; a life of injustice is not a good one no 
matter how autonomous it is. 
131 
I also hold that citizens have an important interest in being protected from the 
deleterious effects that racism has on their development. I claim that racist churches, 
clubs and political parties have detrimental effects on the social environment, which 
forms the background in which social attitudes develop 132. Phenomena such as 
aversive racism pose an important concern for citizens who wish to develop their 
moral and deliberative capacities according to their own conceptions of the good. As 
I argued in the last chapters, an attractive strategy for protecting ourselves against 
these distorting environmental features is to minimise exposure to them. 
Expressive Rights Reassessed. In order to make claims based on expressive 
rights, associations must present themselves as articulating a 'voice'. Obviously, the 
attitude we have to this claim depends on our views about free speech. If the 
argument I have defended in this thesis is tenable, then freedom of speech might be 
legitimately regulated in order to respect and/or promote autonomy. 
Now, consider the differences between the `voice' of the racist Church and 
that of the racist political party. In the case of the latter, it could be argued that 
political speech deserves greater protection because it serves a vital interest of 
citizens 133 Nevertheless, it seems that, because it matters more than other categories 
of speech, we must also be more concerned about its ecology. It is because political 
speech and political decisions are of such great importance that Rawls argues they 
131 Cf. Clayton, Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing, 143. 
132 Cf. Lessig. L. (1995) The Regulation of Social Meaning'. 
133 More important than the interest we have in commercial or artistic speech. 
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must be constrained by the requirements of public reason while non-political speech 
must not134. As citizens we have an important interest in the public ecology of 
speech; because we want to participate as free and equal members, we have a special 
concern regarding how political speech and deliberation are executed and also in 
their content. Ultimately, these concerns direct us to design policies that enhance our 
deliberative capacities by, for instance, neutralising mental contamination. 
On the other hand, the `voice' of a racist Church is not political in this 
respect: it does not `have to do with the electoral process and the activities of 
government' 135 It does have, however, political implications insofar as it is 
`intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue' 136 
Nevertheless, the `voice' it promotes is unreasonable, and, as such, these doctrines 
have detrimental effects on the ecology of people's political beliefs through 
processes of mental contamination. 
Effective Pursuit of Goals Reassessed. The argument I develop here is less 
permissive in the goals that associations can legitimately pursue. Associations are 
not bound merely by a theory of `clear and present danger' ; their goals must also be 
reasonable 137. Racist associations, such as racist political parties fail in appealing to 
this justification, because racist goals cannot be justified by public reasons. 
13' I owe this insight to Susan Hurley and Fabienne Peter. 
135 Scanlon, `Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression', 101. 
136 Cass Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: Free Press. 1995), 130. 
137 This condition allows for political disobedience, because it is not limited to goals that are legal. Cf. 
Smith, 'Democracy, Deliberation and Disobedience'. 
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To conclude, freedom of association is a keystone to liberal legitimacy, but 
we cannot give a carte blanche to associations. Private associations are gatekeepers 
of certain goods but we must carefully assess how such groups actually protect and 
distribute these benefits. I have argued that it is important to balance the goods that 
associations offer their members with the costs that they impose on society. 
Nevertheless, I argue that the benefits offered by racist associations provide no 
reason for their protection. Limiting associational freedom on the basis of 
reasonableness provides, I believe, an appealing solution insofar as it distributes the 
goods (especially the goods of moral development and personal autonomy) of 
associations in a satisfactory fashion. This not only allows members to benefit, but 




In this thesis I defended the claim that liberalism is compatible with certain 
restrictions on freedom of expression. The aim has been to rebut popular defences of 
free speech and association, according to which these freedoms are necessary to 
protect, respect, or promote individuals' autonomy. 
The thesis articulates and defends two claims. One, modest in its scope, 
asserts that, if autonomy is bypassed by automatic, nonconscious processing, it 
cannot play the exemptionary role it is often allocated. The argument in defence of 
autonomy-based free speech claims that speech causes harm, but that this is justified 
because the benefits speech has on personal autonomy outweigh this. If speech 
bypasses autonomy, however, the justification becomes untenable. The second, 
stronger claim holds that, if speech is detrimental to autonomy, and we think the 
latter to be of value, then there is a strong reason to neutralise those effects. 
Moreover, given the nature of those harms, the most plausible strategy to do so is to 
impose some restrictions on expression. 
In Chapter 1a background of political morality was detailed against which 
the ensuing argument was developed. Here I argued that the most plausible 
interpretation of freedom of expression construes it as an independent principle; that 
is, as a principle which grants protection to speech beyond a general principle of 
minimal liberty. Under this interpretation, there is a relationship between autonomy 
278 
CONCLUSIONS 
and speech, in virtue of which freedom of expression should be protected despite of 
the harmful effects it has on third parties. 
I located the autonomy defence of free speech within the framework 
public/private distinction. I suggested this dichotomy is relevant in understanding 
discussions of free speech for two reasons. First, liberals tend to treat autonomy as a 
constraint on governmental interference. A primacy of private responsibility is 
invoked, according to which agents should bear the costs arising directly from their 
actions. In this regard, government should not infringe upon the liberties of a person 
who is not directly responsible for a harmful act. Second, the public/private 
distinction is relevant in the sense that liberals believe political principles concern 
only certain forms of conduct. In particular, it is usually argued that they do not 
apply to private actions of citizens. Against the idea of discontinuous responsibility, 
I noted that there is sufficient evidence suggesting features in the environment 
directly cause much of our behaviour, and this fact cast doubts on the plausibility of 
such a conception. I also argued that principles of justice must apply to institutions 
which have profound-effects on people's lives. Essentially, because there are many 
features in the environment which bypass rational control, those features, which 
affect importantly the opportunities of citizens, must be included within the remit of 
justice. 
In order to defend this argument, in Chapter 21 revised a familiar set of 
conditions that autonomy needs to satisfy. I linked those conditions with different 
challenges. In particular, I surveyed academic literature on recent developments in 
Social and Cognitive Psychology regarding automatic behaviour and unconscious 
processing. Ideomotor theories suggest that perception and action are linked in a 
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direct fashion which dispenses of consciousness (or `acts of will'). The idea is that 
`perception is for doing'. For instance, it has been argued that the mere perception of 
behaviour tends to increase the likelihood of. that same behaviour. Similarly, 
experiments show how individuals tend to mimic and imitate others. Another related 
instance of ideomotor theories suggests that the perception of an action automatically 
triggers related concepts. In particular, I focused on the existence of social and racial 
stereotypes that automatically increase the tendency of people to behave consistently 
with such stereotypes. I highlight that these automatic tendencies are the normal state 
of our minds; they operate continuously. However, I do not want to suggest that 
tokens of automatic processes are necessary or unavoidable; only that their control is 
both costly and difficult. It is costly insofar as it demands a large amount of mental 
resources; it is difficult because, in most cases, even with introspection people ignore 
which tendencies are operating, their magnitude, and their direction. 
From these ideas I developed the category of `mental contamination', which 
is defined as `the process by which a person ends up with an unwanted judgement, 
emotion or behavior because of mental processing that is unconscious or 
uncontrollable' I. 1 explored the different steps required to avoid metal contamination 
and argued that, in general, people tend to underestimate their susceptibility to it and 
to overestimate their capacity for controlling their mental processes. Instead, I 
suggested a strategy more likely to neutralise those reactions is, as in the case of 
other forms of contaminants (such as asbestos and waste), to avoid the source of 
contamination altogether. With the idea of mental contamination in mind, I defended 
an ecological conception of autonomy. Such a conception acknowledges that, in 
1 Wilson and Brekke, `Mental Contamination and Mental Correction', 119. 
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many instances, social environments are important sources of mental contamination, 
rendering individuals less autonomous. Due to the importance autonomy places on 
mental states having the right structure and the right causal history, as well as agents 
having a disposition for effective rational reflection, autonomy requires mental 
contamination to be neutralised in aspects that affect vital interests. A particularly 
troublesome example of mental contamination is that of aversive racism, the 
phenomenon by which a person who endorses egalitarian, non-prejudiced views also 
displays negative feelings, attitudes, and reactions to people from other races which 
are in part the result of mental contamination2. 
I follow a familiar strategy in considering problems of freedom of 
expression. This consists of identifying the interests which are at stake in 
controversies of free speech, and in cases of conflict assigning due to weight to 
them. 
In Chapter 31 explored Thomas Scanlon's powerful defence of free speech3 
in which he offers reasons for protecting speech in virtue of audiences' interests. 
Scanlon argues that the Millian Principle is a `consequence of a particular idea about 
the limits of legitimate political authority: namely that the legitimate powers of 
government are limited to those that can be defended on grounds compatible with 
[ 
... 
] the idea that each citizen is sovereign in deciding what to believe and in 
weighing reasons for action'. The Millian Principle rules `that the 
harmful 
consequences to which [arguments for censorship] appeal cannot count as potential 
2 Dovidio, Kawakami, et. al., `On the Nature of Prejudice' 512. 
Scanlon, `A Theory of Freedom of Expression'. 
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justification for legal restrictions of expression'4. I explored Scanlon's arguments in 
support of this principle and concluded that there is no plausibility in the view that 
citizens are primarily interested in arriving at beliefs without governmental 
interference. They are concerned also with the manner in which those beliefs are 
reached. Because social environments in which speech is free usually have 
contaminating features, the Millian Principle fails to protect citizens' autonomy. 
Instead, I argue, citizens can be reasonably concerned with the social environment 
and have a motivation to neutralise mental contamination. This conclusion is 
defended by appealing to an original position-type situation, in which citizens 
attempt to protect themselves from mental contamination by avoiding exposure to 
certain kinds of expression, in particular those that threaten their capacity for an 
effective sense of justice, their capacity to form, revise and pursue a reasonable 
conception of the good, and their disposition towards effective rational deliberation. 
I also concluded, against the notion of discontinuous responsibility, that 
citizens must share the costs of an autonomy-friendly public ecology, and in this 
respect it is not unreasonable to make speakers bear the burden of attempts to 
neutralise sources of mental contamination. It is acceptable, that is, to impose some 
limits on expression. 
The conclusion of Chapter 3, then, claimed that there is a pro tanto reason, 
based on audiences' autonomy, which supports some restrictions on expression. 
Whether these reasons are conclusive, however, could not be adjudicated upon until 
the interests of speakers had been considered. 
Scanlon, `Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression', 95. 
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In Chapter 4,1 discussed speakers' interests in free expression. I explored 
Dworkin's arguments, according to which expressive interests are sufficient to 
sustain a principle of free speech. I conditionalise the interests of speakers in free 
speech upon acting in a just manner. In this respect, I claimed that speakers who are 
prevented from expressing racist views are not wronged in a justice-sensitive sense. I 
argue that hate speech creates disadvantages in resources for both the victims of hate 
speech and aversive racists. Because those disadvantages are caused by prejudice, a 
liberal theory of justice cannot be neutral towards them, as it is towards 
disadvantages affecting the distribution of resources which result from some 
differences in talents, ambitions, or lifestyle. I argue that an added difficulty is that 
the processes by which those inequalities are created are difficult to monitor and 
control because, in many cases, it is the result of attitudes and processes which are 
(in part) implicit, automatic or unconscious. The argument concludes, then, that we 
have reason to neutralise the influences that cause these disadvantages. 
A second argument developed in this chapter addressed an apparent conflict 
between Dworkin's idea of integrity and restrictions of speech. Dworkin claims that 
restricting the expression of certain views might compromise the integrity of those 
who endorse such views and who have an interest in voicing their support and living 
in accordance with them (the principle of authenticity is so discussed in this respect). 
Because Dworkin thinks that integrity is a parameter of living well, it seems that 
restrictions on speech threaten the capacity of some citizens to live integrated lives. 
But, I argue, Dworkin thinks that justice is also a parameter of living well. And, as 
hate speech creates disadvantages that are unjust, racists who propagate their views 
live defective lives. I argued that integrity is conditional upon justice, and concluded 
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that restrictions on racist speech make the lives of those interested in its expression 
no worse. Accordingly, because there cannot be trade-offs between justice and 
integrity, a lack of integrity on the part of racist speakers constitutes no wrong from 
the point of view of justice. 
In Chapter 51 defended the view that content-based restrictions on speech do 
not imply a commitment to perfectionism. I attempted to dismiss the following 
objection: because accepting content-based regulations is a violation of liberal 
neutrality, I could either reject neutrality and keep content regulations or maintain a 
commitment to the former and reject the latter. In order to rebut this objection, I 
argued that content regulations are defensible because of the detrimental effects 
speech has on autonomy. I did not claim that restrictions were justified by an 
assessment of the intrinsic merits of racist speech. Then, I developed an anti- 
perfectionist, partly comprehensive view of liberalism, which includes a concern for 
autonomy. The anti-perfectionist claim is defended by the view that principles of 
justice must satisfy a Rawlsian full publicity condition, which is a necessary 
component of the legitimate exercise of power. 
In the last chapter I turned my attention to the issue of free association, 
defences of which often resemble those of speech in important aspects. I identified a 
set of `associational goods' and illustrated how they might be employed by three 
examples of racist associations. I critically assessed Nancy Rosenblum's theory of 
free association, the `moral uses of pluralism', and concluded that she fails to 
accommodate sufficiently for the impact associations have in society because her 
account considers only short-term effects. Instead, I argued, we should expand our 
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considerations and focus also on the public ecology of associations. There is 
significant evidence to suggest that attitudes developed in the private will spillover 
into the public area, thus jeopardising citizens' two moral powers. In order to 
neutralise those effects, I suggested, associations should have to satisfy a criterion of 
reasonableness. I also claim that the moral development facilitated by free 
association is conditional upon them being reasonable. 
The aim of the argument developed here is in one respect, modest. I provided 
arguments contending that content-based restrictions on hate speech (and 
association) are compatible with autonomy and justice within a liberal framework. I 
do not argue, however, that those restrictions are, all things considered, acceptable. 
There may be practical issues, such as maintaining coherence in legislation, that 
militate against such restrictions. I have not provided guidance on how those 
restrictions should be implemented, or on who should authorise and execute them. 
There may be other alternatives to state censorship. Perhaps, independent 
commissions with some form of democratic accountability would be better. Or, 
perhaps the costs of regulation are too high. Similarly, it may be difficult to devise 
legislation that regulates instances of hate speech, but which leaves sufficient free 
expression to promote citizens' autonomy. Or, perhaps there are other reasons for 
protecting speech which are independent of autonomy. Nevertheless, given the 
arguments developed here these shortcomings are detrimental to autonomy and not 
justifiable from an account of justice. This might be yet another example of the 
breach separating an ideal theory of justice from our non-ideal world. 
The thesis is less modest in another respect. I argue that political theorists 
have neglected developments in other disciplines, and that such oversight has 
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important consequences. In order to organise institutions that promote and protect 
liberal values, we need a clearer understanding of how our minds function. In 
particular, we need to develop a deeper sense of the relationship between rationality 
and the environments in which we operate. Developments on Social and Cognitive 
Psychology (and other areas of research) can help liberals to understand better the 
associations between the institutions they favour and the values which motivate 
them. Failing to review and revise these knowledge or connections might threaten 
liberalism's capacity to inculcate in its citizens the motivations and the development 
of moral powers ultimately necessary to render itself stable over time. 
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